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Note on Language  
Transliteration 
 Arabic words have been transliterated to most faithfully convey my interlocutors’ styles 
of informal, everyday speech. Long vowels and emphatic letters are marked with diacritics, as 
per guidelines provided by the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES). Diacritics 
are also used to denote ʿayn and hamza (ʾ). Those familiar with Arabic will recognize the 
predominance of urban, Palestinian dialect variations in the text, as well as colloquial grammar 
structures. Arabic terms and loanwords are set in italics. As per IJMES guidelines, words found 
in the Merriam-Webster dictionary are not italicized, nor do they receive diacritics (e.g. fatwa). 
Disability language 
 When working and thinking with disability communities, questions of language are of the 
utmost importance. Throughout the dissertation, I employ identity-first language (e.g. “disabled 
people” rather than “people with disabilities”) when writing in my own analytical voice, 
following the precedents set by disabled activists and academics in North America (Brown 
2011). I maintain the person-first description for Down Syndrome, however, as I have yet to 
encounter a grammatically sound rendering of the identity-first format. When conveying direct 
speech from Arabic, I use the closest translation of the speaker’s intent, resulting in a mixture of 
person-first and identity-first language. 
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Abstract 
This dissertation traces the emergence of Down Syndrome in contemporary Jordan and 
explores how certain forms of embodied difference become disabling in different contexts. 
Down Syndrome is a relatively new idea in Jordan. Its dissemination and uptake are tied to 
burgeoning biomedical, therapeutic, and educational industries, as well as to the significant 
presence of human rights-focused organizations that operate locally and internationally. The 
emergence of Down Syndrome is also tied to growing disability communities that connect 
people around the world through Facebook, Instagram, and other social media platforms. This 
research explores how Down Syndrome fits into a context where strong models of gender and 
sexuality shape performances of personhood, and where the resources channeled through 
kinship-based networks vastly outstrip state-centered support systems or citizen-based identities. 
Drawing on twenty months of ethnographic research based in the capital city of Amman, the 
chapters that follow trace how ambivalent and potentially violent practices of kinship comingle 
with acts of care to unevenly transform the actors connected through them. 
 Families and individuals in Jordan situate and experience disability – real or potential – 
through embodied relationships of kinship and faith. These affective ties intimately shape 
entanglements of self, society, and temporality, which I theorize through the concept of kinship 
futures. Families mark the passage of time and imagine the future in terms of shifting, embodied 
capacities for providing care. Down Syndrome emerges through these existing and anticipated 
relationships. In turn, fears about sustaining family-based economies of care remake Down 
Syndrome in the present. Kinship futures encompass relationships of moral accountability forged 
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at the nexus of human mortality and divine authority, and they create value and hazards for 
disabled and nondisabled people alike. Ultimately, Down Syndrome operates as a node where 
various registers of difference coalesce, providing a powerful lens for understanding how family, 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
I. Counting disability, making disability count 
Less than one month after my arrival in Jordan, the Washington Group on Disability 
Statistics convened in the capital city of Amman for their Thirteenth Annual Meeting. I attended 
the event’s opening with my newly established research contact, Imm Zahra.1 Upon becoming 
parents, Jordanian women and men commonly assume the teknonym (kunyeh in Arabic) 
“mother-of” (Imm-) or “father-of” (Abu-). While the first-born son takes precedence in this 
naming practice, couples without sons will often be identified through the name of their oldest 
daughter. Zahra was neither her mother’s firstborn son nor her oldest daughter. Yet, many of the 
women in Imm Zahra’s social circle, myself included, refer to her by the name of her youngest 
daughter.2 In the wake of Zahra’s postnatal diagnosis of Down Syndrome, Imm Zahra decided to 
mobilize, and she founded the al-Nur society to connect and support families across Jordan. It 
was through this work that she found herself attending events like the Washington Group 
conference, which was held at an international hotel in downtown Amman near many of the 
government’s administrative hubs.  
The Washington Group was established in 2001 under the auspices of the U.N. Statistical 
Commission City Group. It seeks to “address the urgent need for cross-nationally comparable 
                                                
1 All names in the dissertation are pseudonyms. 
2 I preserve the kunyeh throughout the dissertation. To minimize confusion, I use the name of the child most 
immediately present in the material at hand. Not all women embrace this naming practice, and some reject it 
entirely. Among my research participants, however, the kunyeh was common and unproblematic. I write the formula 
with Imm (mother), rather than Umm, to convey a sense of the dialect pronunciation. 
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population-based measures of disability. Its mandate is the promotion and coordination of 
international cooperation in the area of health statistics, focusing on disability data collection 
tools suitable for censuses and national surveys” (The Washington Group 2018). Hosted by 
Jordan’s Higher Council for the Affairs of Persons with Disabilities (HCD) and the Department 
of Statistics (DoS), the Washington Group played a part in developing Jordan’s 2014 Population 
and Housing Census. Ultimately delayed until the fall of 2015, the census incorporated extensive 
use of tablet technology and GIS mapping software, receiving support from both the USAID 
Jordan Census Project and United States Census Bureau. This most recent census included, for 
the first time, a disability-specific question set developed and tested by several of the 
Washington Group’s 123 member states (Jordan News Agency 2013). The introduction and 
celebration of the disability module reflects increasing local, national, and transnational interest 
in gathering reliable quantitative information on disabled people.  
Heterogeneous definitions, measures, and methods of data collection have historically 
resulted in wildly divergent rates of reported disability (Mont 2007). Developed countries almost 
always report significantly higher rates than those of developing countries, and survey 
instruments tend to report higher rates than census data collected from the same population 
(Mont 2007). Jordan’s 2004 census, based on the self-identification question, “Do you/does 
someone in your family have a disability,” reported a 1.2% prevalence rate (Mont 2007, 8). This 
number falls strikingly below the World Health Organization’s overall estimated disability 
prevalence rate of 15%, which drops to 11% for developed nations and rises to 18% for lower 
income countries (World Health Organization 2011).3 International and local disability groups 
hailed the census’s improved technology and methodology as opportunities to gather better data 
                                                
3 The Center for Disease Control places the current disability prevalence rate in the United States at 22% (2017). 
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on disability in Jordan, the collection of which then leads to somehow improving the lives of 
disabled people. 
A number of disabled people attended the Washington conference as both employees and 
participants in various community initiative and organizations across Jordan and Amman in 
particular. Some of these advocates are also members of prominent local families, a factor that 
strengthens their organizing capacities. In looking around the room, however, I noted a particular 
absence. “Imm Zahra,” I whispered, “There’s no one here with Down Syndrome.” Imm Zahra 
looked around, scanning the room for a familiar face. “You’re right. And they’re not even 
speaking Arabic!” she said with a laugh. She glanced up at the speaker on the podium, who 
belonged to a well-known, elite Jordanian family. Observing the various dynamics of the 
gathering, I was struck by a certain irony. Intent on studying Jordan’s local disability world 
(Ginsburg and Rapp 2013), I instead found myself in a remote outpost of Washington D.C.  
Over the twenty months of fieldwork I conducted in Amman between 2013 and 2015, I 
occasionally attended similar disability-related conferences, events, or celebrations. I usually, 
however, tried to sidestep these invitations. The provenance of individuals whom I would come 
to recognize as key influencers in Jordan’s disability activism and advocacy, the formal 
occasions felt distinctly removed from the day-to-day routines and struggles of families, which is 
where I situate my research. The local rhythms of everyday life in Jordan certainly intersect with 
the transnational disability movements and practices exemplified by the Washington Group. 
Families debate the nature of disability, argue about representational stakes of changing 
terminology, and try, on individual and collective levels, to harness the opportunities that 
disability presents as an emerging identity. The perceptibly global dynamics and possibilities 
inherent in these issues sharpen local attentiveness. When formal events convened to assess a 
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new law or celebrate the inauguration of a global campaign, however, they felt acutely removed 
from the actual complexities families encounter as they attempt to forge everyday inclusive 
spaces and practices for their children. Such gatherings seemed to belong to the realm of public 
discourse that Paul Dresch describes as mujamalah, which he likens “in many a context, [to] 
‘polite waffle’… or, otherwise, in a low key American sense, ‘bullshit’” (2000, 112, 117). The 
lively and antagonistic debates between audience members and experts that I watched unfold at 
more than one event of this kind suggest that others shared in my assessment.4  
As they attempt to advocate for rights, services, and resources, most families of 
intellectually disabled children in Jordan directed their energies into reconciling and recognizing 
disability in the domain of kinship, itself a deeply political project.5 The urgency of this project 
emerges quite clearly from my interlocutors’ own accounts of what it means to have a child with 
Down Syndrome. I first met Abu Amer while he accompanied his son to a local farmer’s market 
that offers intellectually disabled children and adults space to congregate and socialize. I 
explained that I was an American student doing research on the experiences of families who 
have members with Down Syndrome. Abu Amer nodded vigorously to convey his approval of 
my research topic. “Ask me anything!” he replied enthusiastically. Then, without pausing, he 
began reflecting on his son’s life and their family’s experience: 
                                                
4 If mujamalah marked interactants as formal acquaintances who were obligated to perform the rituals of distance 
and flattery (MacDougall 2017), a distinct kind of openness and intimacy emerged between family members of 
disabled children. Despite varying degrees of familiarity, the affective and experiential ties of disability made 
relative strangers comfortable enough to address and criticize formal public officials with the frankness – and fury – 
of friends. 
5 Veena Das and Renu Addlakha introduce the concept of “domestic citizenship” to capture the entangled politics of 
kinship and disability that shape women’s life trajectories across their respective fieldsites in India (2001). They 
describe domestic citizenship as an attempt to, “(1) displac[e] citizenship from its conventional association with 
publics defined through civility and (2) displac[e] domesticity from its conventional place in private, particularistic 
loyal ties” (Das and Addlakha 2001, 530). I have found their work on this concept to be provocative in thinking 
through the social politics of disability in Jordan. 
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The most important thing, the fundamental thing, is that his family accepts him 
(inū al-usra yataqabbalū). In Arab society, often times if the woman gives birth 
to a sick child, the husband leaves. Not me! The most important thing is the 
mother and the father, then the [extended] family – siblings (al-imm wa-l-ab wa 
baʿadayn al-usra – al-akhwān)! 
Abu Amer drew out the final long vowel in al-akhwān for dramatic emphasis, his voice rising 
with emotion. He then threw his hands up into the air and continued:  
My siblings have daughters, so they didn’t want Amer to be seen, because they 
want their girls to get married. [He then pantomimed locking someone behind a 
door and throwing away the key]. This is how Arab society thinks. If someone is 
disabled, the family is disabled (izā fī wahad muʿāq, al-usra muʿāq). 
Abu Amer repeated his list, adding new components and ticking his fingers off one by one to end 
with his palm outstretched in the air: “the father, the mother, the family, neighbors, society (al-
ab, al-imm, al-usra, al-jīrān, al-mujtamaʿ).” Somewhat belatedly, he then added, “and another 
problem, there’s no support from the government (mā fi daʿam hukūmiyya).” Essentially, during 
this conversation, Abu Amer drew me a map. On this map he located disability in a web of social 
relations, linking the nuclear family to extended kin and potential future kin through marriage, 
and then to neighbors, society, and more belatedly, the state and governmental bodies. Trying to 
parse out how disability, and Down Syndrome specifically, generates and imperils relations 
between these actors and institutions in contemporary Jordan forms the heart of this dissertation.  
II. Kinship futures  
Time is central to dominant framings of disability, which usually rely on medicalized 
terms relating to onset, chronicity, and permanence. While understandings of illness emerge in 
relation to potential cure, disability precludes such a relationship. It is through the absence of 
disability and disabled persons, argues Alison Kafer, that the future is imagined as progress. 
Futurity, Kafer argues, is deployed in the “service of compulsory able-bodiedness and able-
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mindedness” which then loops back to shape the lives of disabled persons in the present (2013, 
27). The future that Kafer crips6 in her work, however, belongs to a specific time and place. 
Communities imagine their futures on different terms, in relation to the particular ideals, and 
across varying temporal scales. Disability and futurity possess local histories and belong to 
grander cosmologies.  
Families in Jordan bring Down Syndrome into being through what I am calling kinship 
futures. While the birth of a baby invites parents and family to imagine and dream about the 
future, the birth of a baby with Down Syndrome, in Jordan, occasions urgent and immediate 
questions about family reputation and marriage. What will happen between spouses? What will 
happen to the marriage prospects of siblings and cousins? What will happen to an individual with 
Down Syndrome after the marriages of their siblings and cousins? Families wonder what kind of 
person a child with Down Syndrome will become, and they imagine possible futures in terms of 
the lineal and affinal relationships that their child will or will not be able to create. Geoffrey 
Hughes writes that “for all of their diversity, my Jordanian interlocutors were nearly unanimous 
in thinking of marriage as a key moment for the social reproduction of families, communities, 
and Jordan itself as a nation-state” (2015, 3). Down Syndrome changes this key moment, but this 
moment is already changing across Jordan and the broader Middle East. These larger 
developments have their own potential implications for individuals and families living with 
Down Syndrome.  
                                                
6 Crip studies and crip theory have emerged out of dissatisfaction with earlier disability studies scholarship’s lack of 
intersectionality. Often described in parallel to the emergence of queer studies and queer theory from the earlier 
domain of LQBTQ-studies, the term “cripping” can be understood in relation to “queering.” Cripping seeks to 
address and push back against inequalities, racism, and heteronormativity within disability studies and disability 
activism (McRuer 2006; Samuels 2017; Schalk 2013). 
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Many families criticize and position themselves against marital anxieties that they 
nevertheless describe as unavoidable part of their culture (thaqāfa). In setting up this tension, 
they demonstrate how kinship continues to provide a critical means for cultivating wellbeing and 
survival in contemporary Jordan. Men and women, in their respective roles as spouses, have 
different resources at their disposal to negotiate and mitigate the threat of stigma that 
accompanies the birth of a disabled child. These resource differentials potentially put them at 
odds with each other, in some cases threatening their own marital ties. As an allied marital unit, 
spouses also have various resources at their disposal to manage their broader kin and social 
networks together. Although I initially tried to represent marriage as one chapter, a finite 
moment or life stage, this ultimately proved impossible. Marriage courses throughout the 
dissertation just as it does throughout social life and politics in Jordan, forging – and damaging – 
connections between spouses, children, kin, friends, and even strangers. 
Fears about marriage and collective family reputation make certain disabilities emerge 
through Jordan’s local political economy of care, which is grounded in the entanglements of 
kinship and statecraft that Andrew Shryock and Sally Howell describe as “house politics” 
(2001). Families mark the passage of time in terms of changing kinship roles, and kinship roles 
take shape and evolve through embodied capacities for providing and exchanging care. The 
development of a lifelong condition that might impair a child’s capacity to provide future care 
can affect immediate and extended networks of kin. Families respond to these uncertainties in a 
variety of ways, often making fraught and unpredictable calculations in their attempts to sustain 
kinship futures. These attempts can extend to include, or even come to depend on, the labor 
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performed by various non-kin, such as therapists, doctors, tutors, and foreign domestic workers.7 
In the absence of reliable, adequate state-sponsored social services, and coupled with neoliberal 
policies exacerbating socioeconomic vulnerability across the country, families’ abilities to shape 
and protect their kinship futures remain key determinants in the lives of disabled persons.  
The horizons of kinship futures also extend beyond death, encompassing relationships of 
care that bind family members to each other and create a sense of shared moral accountability 
before God. Families embed disability in a politico-moral project grounded in local realities of 
religion and kinship, which are, in turn, shaped and informed by each other. At different 
moments in the life course, and in different ways, people in Jordan connect disability to the 
nature and meaning of good deeds, the inevitability of divine Judgment, and the wisdom of 
seeking refuge in God. Caring properly for family shapes individuals’ own assessments of their 
relative position on the path to heaven or hell, and it also impacts social status and moral 
reputation in everyday life. In the context of my research, being good to one’s family did not 
need to be described as Islamic, but being good to one’s family made one a good Muslim. I use 
the lens of kinship futures to examine these imbrications of disability, care, and morality. 
Religion, class, and capital offer practical and moral strategies for challenging disability 
stigma among kin and in the community, albeit in ways that are not always predictable or 
consistent. Many families, special educators, and therapists in Jordan push back against an 
abstract classist narrative that designates the poor as inherently antagonistic toward disability. 
Kawthar, an employee at the Society with experience working in the special education sector 
across the Middle East, described this to me in the following way. “The problem in the Arab 
                                                
7 Almost none of my interlocutors employed foreign domestic workers, but wealthier families frequently rely on 
such labor. I did in fact meet several caretakers, almost all whom were from the Philippines, through one specific 
program that attracted primarily upper class families. 
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world is al-fikr (thinking). Economic level doesn’t determine people’s ideas. There are rich 
people who hide their children and poor people who recognize that [disability] is something from 
Allah and their child is a human being with rights.” Where the rich and the poor converge, 
however, is in thinking through disability in terms of kinship.  
III. Narratives of change and progress 
Jordan is a small country located in the dynamic and volatile region known today as the 
Middle East. Roughly the size of Maine, it is bordered by Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, Saudi 
Arabia, and Iraq. In the 2004 Population and Housing Census, the country’s total population 
registered at 5.1 million. By the close of 2015, this number had exploded to 9.5 million 
inhabitants, almost half of whom live in the capital city of Amman. Noncitizens comprise almost 
one third of the country’s current population, 1.2 million of whom are refugees of the Syrian 
civil war that began in 2011.8  The demographic shocks caused by displacement, occupation, and 
war have shaped the country’s history, beginning with the Palestinian Nakba in 1948, the Six-
Day War in 1967, the Gulf War in 1990, as well as the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq in 
2003.9 As a result of each of these conflicts, Jordan has absorbed large numbers of refugees (and 
returnees in the case of the Gulf War) in short periods of time.  
Against this backdrop of continuing regional turmoil, however, the quality of public 
health in Jordan has continued to improve over the past half century. Like most Middle Eastern 
and North African nations, Jordan is currently in the middle of a demographic transition from 
high to low mortality and fertility rates (Bel-Air and Ababsa 2013; Bloom et al. 2001; 
Puschmann and Matthijs 2012).  For Jordan’s more affluent, oil-rich neighbors to the east, such 
                                                
8 These figures come from the 2015 census (Department of Statistics and UNICEF 2016). 
9 One could go further back and begin with the resettlement of Circassian populations by the Ottoman empire in the 
late 19th century (Shami 2009). 
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as Oman, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, rising rates of diabetes, obesity, cancer, and 
inherited blood disorders have sharpened state biopolitical machinery through various forms of 
surveillance and control (Beaudevin 2013; Trainer 2012). These rates continue to increase in 
Jordan as well, but a lack of capital has hindered the establishment of widespread screening or 
intervention programs. The major exception to this is a recent premarital screening program for 
Beta thalassemia, which began in 2004 (Alkhaldi et al. 2016). Overall, Jordanians today enjoy 
longer life spans while suffering from increasing rates of non-communicable and chronic 
disease. This juxtaposition is embodied, felt, and a topic of frequent discussion. Both older and 
younger generations recognize the indicators of improved health all around them. At the same 
time, they experience what they describe as uniquely new aches, pains, and bodily risks. These 
macro level contexts shape how families encounter and make sense of Down Syndrome. 
Bodily disruptions, configured and recognized differently across time and place, generate 
meaning and demand social practices to contain them. This is because the symbolic richness of 
bodies makes them “good to think with” (Douglas 1966; Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987; Turner 
1984). “As the locus of personhood and the material manifestation of self,” writes Julie 
Livingston, “the human body is at once a profoundly moral and historical site” (2005, 2). In her 
research on debility10 in Botswana, Livingston’s interlocutors made sense of the present – 
fraught with social, economic, and bodily crises – by “remembering a past in which such 
suffering was hardly possible” (Livingston 2005, 1). This narrative process generates what 
Livingston describes as the “moral imagination” (2005, 1). Tine Gammeltoft also draws on the 
imaginary to analyze the enthusiastic embrace of selective reproductive technologies in Vietnam. 
The vigorous promotion of pregnancy termination that Gammeltoft witnesses in cases of 
                                                
10 Debility “denotes both the frailties associated with chronic illness and aging and as the impairments underlying 
disability” (Livingston 2005, 6). 
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suspected fetal abnormalities reflects and reproduces entangled conceptions of the ideal 
Vietnamese citizen. Personal and collective traumas of war, fears about genetic damage in the 
wake of Agent Orange, and insecurities wrought by economic liberalization compel families in 
Vietnam to minimize the risks of giving birth to a disabled child by any means possible 
(Gammeltoft 2014, 154–55).  
Both Livingston and Gammeltoft’s work illuminates how historical crises shape 
embodied experiences of vulnerability, which in turn materialize through narrative form. The 
moral imagination articulated by my interlocutors in Jordan, however, revolves around promises 
of material, social, and moral development – however incompletely realized. This progress-
oriented outlook exists in striking tension with other local and regional narratives centered on 
deterioration, stagnation, and hopelessness (Al-Mohammad 2012; Matthies-Boon 2017; Schielke 
2008; Schielke 2015). “Before,” according to a common narrative I encountered during 
fieldwork, “there were not so many people with Down Syndrome.” In the words of an older 
woman whose son with Down Syndrome was nearing his late thirties, “It’s because they all died! 
They didn’t know then what they know now about their nutritional needs and about their heart 
problems. There wasn’t any care!”11 Her analysis speaks to a widespread belief that while people 
with Down Syndrome have always existed, their capacity for basic survival and emergence in 
public social life reflect dramatic improvements in local practices of medicine, hygiene, and 
nutrition.  
                                                
11 This belief was often coupled with the perception that high rates of disability prevalence are endemic and also 
increasing, due to both genetic and environmental factors. These perceptions are not entirely unfounded. The 
cumulative effects of long-term consanguineous marriage practices impact disability rates to varying degrees 
(Khoury and Massad 1992; Hamamy 2012; Hamamy et al. 2005). On the other hand, the historically widespread 
lack of iodine availability across the region, which would have impacted prevalence of disability and other iodine 
deficiency-related conditions, is managed today through fortified foods and supplements (Scalenghe 2014, 4). 
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Better basic care and its impacts on survival, however, do not fully account for this health 
transition. Families position these empirical observations, along with the emergence of disability 
rights discussions in Jordan, in a broader narrative of social change. They consider them 
indicators of development, a process that involves material and spiritual progress (see Deeb 
2006). Development operates through bodies, becoming visible through embodied states of 
health (and illness), but it ultimately requires changing social consciousness. This latter element 
of the process was repeatedly described to me in terms of society’s need to develop proper 
towʿiyya, or awareness about disability. This moral-material development of awareness, while 
ultimately directed toward society, operates concretely through “the family” (al-usra or al-
ʿā’ila). Over the course of my research, the families, special education teachers, therapists, 
activists, and NGO workers I met, frequently told me that, “People here hide their children” 
(yukhabūhūm).12 In describing his siblings’ reaction to Amer’s Down Syndrome, Abu Amer 
physically acted out the process of shutting a door and throwing away the key. This image of a 
locked door, with a disabled child hidden behind it, circulates among Jordanian locals, 
transplants, and expatriates alike. Families, professionals, and activists draw on culture (thaqāfa) 
to explain hiding as the product of ignorance (jahl), backwardness (takhalluf), and the power of 
shame (‘ayb)13 in Jordanian society and the Arab world, a community they imagine in terms of 
cultural and religious ties. They locate these powerful forces as belonging to the domains of 
tradition (taqlīd) and days past (‘abl). The future, in contrast, holds potential for developing 
awareness and acceptance (taqabbul) of disability, both though the family and in society. 
                                                
12 When I described my research to friends and acquaintances not directly connected to the project, they also reacted 
by articulating the same association between disability and hiding.  
13 This term is further contextualized and complicated in Chapter Two. 
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Disability histories 
The word used by Abu Amer above to describe the family as disabled, muʿāq, is derived 
from the modern Arabic term for disability, iʿāqa. It comes from the root verb āqa, which means 
to hinder or prevent. Regional historians and scholars of Islam emphasize that no comparable 
term exists in the medieval or early modern archives.14 The classical Arabic term ʿāha, or blight, 
most closely approximates the modern concept of impairment.15 ʿĀha, according to medieval 
historian Kristina Richardson, conveys the sense of “a mark that spoils the presumed wholeness 
of a thing” (2012, 5). Richardson cautions, however, that “the category of blightedness or being 
marked encompasses more hybridity than the modern category of disability, and people of 
blights were characterized by physical deviance defined by debility, superability, and 
physiognomic undesirability” (2012, 5). Based on this description, ʿāhāt (pl.), clearly extended 
beyond the contemporary concepts of impairment and disability. They included “blindness, 
deafness and paraplegia; diseases like leprosy and halitosis; temporary ailments like ophthalmia 
and jaundice; extraordinary physical features like blue eyes, crossed eyes, flat noses, black skin, 
baldness, hunched backs, lisps and thin beards” (Richardson 2012, 6). While some ʿāhāt severely 
limited a person’s status and degree of inclusion into social life, others were not considered 
disabling.  
Mental and bodily difference nevertheless emerged as prominent aspects of identity 
during the Middle Ages and early modern periods, attracting considerable attention in the fields 
                                                
14 For English-language sources with a comprehensive focus on disability in Islamic theology and jurisprudence, see 
Ghaly (2008, 2010) and Rispler-Chaim (2007).  
15 Mohammed Ghaly writes that, “in theological writings, the ‘disabilities-plus group’ was couched in the term ahl 
al-balāʾ (people of affliction) which was used to signify those people who went through difficulties in life, usually 
seen as a test (ibtilāʾ) for their faith and trust in God” (Ghaly 2016, 154). I did not encounter the term ʿāhāt in daily 
conversation, but I did once overhear a group of women discussing whether or not disability should be considered an 
ibtilāʾ. They associated ibtilāʾ with tragedy and thus reasoned that disability should not be included in this category.  
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of religion and law but also in everyday life. For example, Richardson observes, “a person with a 
noticeable physical difference often incorporated this attribute into his very name, suggesting the 
body’s centrality in subject formation and its prominence in the social imagination” (Richardson 
2012, 6). Sara Scalenghe, drawing from an extensive corpus of 16th-19th century sources, 
excavates the social dynamics and limitations experienced by those with ʿāhāt16 and echoes 
Richardson’s findings on the pervasiveness of difference. She writes, “Although there was no 
category for ‘the disabled,’ either conceptually or linguistically, people with impairments of the 
body and of the mind are everywhere in Arabic sources dating from Ottoman times” (Scalenghe 
2014, 3).17 Diversity of thought and experience, however, did not amount to radical 
undifferentiation or egalitarian social norms. Scalenghe notes that in the early modern period, 
“impairments of the mind were the most disabling in all spheres of life and were subject to the 
most severe legal restrictions” (2014, 164).  
The etiologies of impairment that Scalenghe details provide tentative insights into how a 
condition like Down Syndrome might have been lived in earlier historical periods. “Early 
modern Arabs,” she explains, “divided impairments of the mind into four broad groups: idiocy, 
melancholia, madness, and holy folly” (89). The potentially temporary nature of the latter three 
states, which were largely perceived as the products of humoral imbalance, distinguished them 
from “idiocy,” or ʿatāha. This distinctive category “was the least fluid and ambiguous… It was 
viewed as a permanent state, and it was almost always congenital or acquired early in childhood” 
(2014, 89). The characterization of ʿatāha overlaps in striking ways with the contemporary 
                                                
16 Scalenghe’s sources include “biographical dictionaries, chronicles, travelogues, legal and medical texts, treatises 
on physiognomy, dream manuals, essays on specific subjects (on blindness, for example), works of belles-lettres, 
such as collections of jokes and anecdotes, and Arabic lexicons” (2014, 15). 
17 Both Richardson and Scalenghe voice concern about a widespread tendency to view the contemporary marginal 
status of disabled people in the Middle East as reflective of either historical continuity or Qur’anic mandate. 
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medical model of intellectual disability, which presents conditions like Down Syndrome as fixed 
in the body, immutable, and incurable.18 Ultimately, however, significant archival gaps continue 
to limit insights into lived experiences of ʿatāha. Persons understood through this label figure 
marginally into the available sources on everyday life, and they are discussed primarily as legal 
and medical abstractions (Scalenghe 2014, 89). The political, legal, and medical transformations 
that occurred with the demise of the Ottoman Empire raise additional questions as to the region’s 
disability histories. Future work tracing these 20th century disruptions and transitions may shed 
light on how these older social, medical, and legal systems merged with disability models 
imported by missionaries, colonial bureaucrats, and development organizations.19 
From hiding to claiming disability 
My interlocutors usually broached the topic of hiding with me by sharing first or 
secondhand accounts of discovering someone else hiding a child. They used these stories as foils 
for their own experiences and to position themselves in relation to my research. Benedicte 
Ingstad has written extensively on what she refers to as “the myth of the hidden disabled,” a 
pervasive and top-down discourse that she links to early human rights and development 
initiatives (Ingstad 1995, 246). In an effort to promote the emerging global agenda of disability 
rights, advocates often highlighted the challenging and sometimes brutal conditions faced by 
disabled people and communities in the Global South. In so doing, they placed a mass emphasis 
on the barriers created by local “attitudes," which resulted in disabled people being hidden from 
society (Ingstad 1995, 246). Ingstad critiques this framing’s focus on “attitudes” and beliefs,” 
                                                
18 Scalenghe highlights the significant role played by Islamic jurists in shaping the extent to which these four 
categories became disabling. Scholars working across different time periods and geographic areas have detailed the 
repressive influence of legal institutions in the lives of intellectually disabled persons (Belt 2015; Carey 2003). 
19 Indeed, Scalenghe’s next project will try to reconstruct this period of colonization and Mandate-era restructuring 
in terms of its impact on disability concepts and experiences (personal communication, 2016). 
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which can far too easily misrepresent or ignore the material constraints that shape local 
economies of care and disability. During her long-term fieldwork in Botswana, family caretakers 
emphasized the extreme difficulties that their resource-poor, rural settings presented. They felt 
compelled to prioritize keeping disabled family members alive over considerations of their 
flourishing and quality of life. Additionally, Ingstad’s interlocutors did not always equate 
domestic confinement with “hiding.” Th accuracy of this description depended on the nature of 
confinement practices involved and the kinds of social relations maintained or diminished in the 
context of spatial restrictions.  
I hesitate to equate the pervasive discussions about disability and hiding in Jordan to the 
level of myth. In addition to numerous personal accounts, local media reports would emerge 
from time to time that documented cases of particularly egregious neglect, abuse, or even the 
murder of a disabled child or adult. 20 Such incidents, more often than not, involved various 
practices of extreme home confinement and social deprivation. Yet even without this additional 
layer of investigative materials, my interlocutors insisted that hiding was real, pervasive, and 
crucial to my understanding of disability in Jordan. Hiding posed challenges for my fieldwork, 
however, in terms of logistics and methodology, and especially with regard to sample bias. 
Families hiding a child or adult would be hesitant to seek out the networks of advocacy and 
services through which I met almost all of my interlocutors. In other words, the personal nature 
of fieldwork almost guaranteed that I would meet only those families actively seeking services 
                                                
20 One of the most (in)famous examples of this kind of media coverage came in the form of the 2012 exposé 
“Behind Walls of Silence (Khalaf jidrān al-ṣamt)” (BBC Arabic 2012). An undercover investigation of abuse 
occurring at a special education center located in west Amman, the film received widespread attention in Arabic and 
English media. Two cases that occurred during the latter part of my own fieldwork in 2015 also received extensive 
coverage, albeit more so in Arabic media and on social media. In the first case, a man threw his autistic son off the 
top of parking garage in western Amman and burned the body (Al Ghad 2015). In the second, authorities discovered 
an intellectual disabled woman in Irbid who had spent the majority of her life chained to the stairs of her family 
home (Malkawi 2015). 
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for their children, or those who had done so in the past. Given this constraint, I focus on how the 
families I did meet through such networks recognize and relate to hiding in their own lives.  
What counts as hiding and why? Which practices fall on the acceptable end of the moral 
spectrum, and under what kinds of conditions do previously acceptable practices become 
problematic? Families confront these very same questions while navigating the changing social 
and therapeutic landscapes of disability in Amman. I received many warnings that research on 
disability would be extremely challenging, or even impossible, due to its “hidden” nature. The 
reality on the ground, however, was far more complex and dynamic. I arrived at a moment when 
many of the questions I sought to ask made immediate sense. This was especially the case for 
families I met through the al-Nur Society and other organizations like it. Circumstances have 
compelled these families, with all the brute force of lived experience, to evaluate seeming truths 
about kinship and personhood that are unsettled by disability. At the same time, they seek to 
bring their own moral commitments and truths to the larger world of disability ideas and 
practices that they encounter through local and global disability rights initiatives. 
IV. The al-Nur Society: A meeting space 
Mothers find organizations like the al-Nur Society through the efforts of family members, 
at the suggestion of a supportive nurse, or through the process of Googling and Facebooking 
Down Syndrome in Jordan. Like many of them, I also found the Society through Internet 
searches and social media. Having arrived unexpectedly in Jordan after funding restrictions 
upended my original project in southern Lebanon, I began fieldwork unfamiliar with the 
landscape of Amman and notably lacking in social connections. When Imm Zahra responded to 
my inquiry, a fortuitous and highly unusual outcome of online communication in Jordan, I 
jumped at the opportunity. We first met at an iconic Starbucks located in the affluent west 
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Amman neighborhood of Abdoun. In retrospect, I can only guess she chose this spot for my own 
benefit, assuming I would be more comfortable in a part of the city known for outrageous villas, 
cosmopolitan restaurants, and home to many embassy workers and expatriates. Imm Zahra 
brought with her a volunteer and longtime friend who had studied abroad in Europe and spoke 
fluent English. She was also fluent in English, however, having learned from coworkers in the 
Gulf during a former career in sales. We generally tried to speak Arabic together, in part because 
she enjoyed making fun of me, but we frequently conversed in English as well. At that first 
meeting, I explained that I wanted to spend meet families and learn about their lives. Imm Zahra 
seemed perfectly amenable to this prospect. I then waited patiently by the phone for a week 
before receiving a call from her asking where I was and why I had yet to come visit.   
For many families, making the journey to the Society proves no small feat in a city 
lacking affordable, accessible transportation and suffering from extreme traffic congestion. 
Additionally, Amman is highly and tangibly stratified. Both scholars and residents divide the city 
into an affluent west and poorer, densely populated east (Ababsa 2013a; Hannoyer and Shami 
1996; Potter et al. 2009). The mothers in my sample differ in terms of class, education, 
religiosity, age and number of children, ethnic identity and even citizenship status, allowing me 
to interact with an unusually diverse and dynamic cross-section of Jordanian society. This also 
meant that I could observe how class, capital, and family dynamics shape women’s abilities to 
find and pursue services for their children. Throughout the dissertation, I utilize the phrase 
“residents of Amman” or the adjective Ammani (following Tobin 2016) to situate most of my 
participants, which gestures to the complexities of identity that play out in the capital today.21  
                                                
21 The elusive and sensitive question of “who” counts as Jordanian – as vexing an issue for the ruling Hashemite 
family as for citizens and noncitizens of Jordan alike – remains an enduring legacy of American and European 
colonialism and the continued Israeli occupation of Palestine. Both historical and contemporary iterations of 
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Some of my interlocutors arrived in Amman decades ago, but they will never possess Jordanian 
citizenship. Others were very new to Jordan and hoped to resettle elsewhere as soon as possible, 
although it was unlikely they would secure the necessary papers to do so. Still others were born 
and raised as the daughters and sons of Jordanian fathers, the latter being the necessary 
precondition for citizenship in the Hashemite Kingdom, but some of them nevertheless identified 
as both coming from and belonging to other homelands. The urban bias of my research, however, 
means that I cannot speak to the realities and difficulties of life in the semi-urban, small-town, 
and rural parts of Jordan. I will say that my city-based interlocutors associated all of non-Amman 
– often described in terms of the countryside (al-rīf) – with more severe disability stigma and 
backwardness. 
Staff at the Society, families, visitors, and patrons all subsume the goal of supporting the 
individual child with Down Syndrome under the broader goal of providing family support.22 To 
speak of one without the other simply makes no sense. Societal change can only be achieved 
through families, although this responsibility ultimately rests more heavily with mothers. Time 
and time again, I listened to women urge each other to remember that “the mother is 
fundamental” (al-imm hiyya al-assās). One time, after hearing one of the early intervention 
specialists, Layla, mention this phrase yet again, I responded, “And what about the father?” 
Layla did not dismiss the father as an important actor, answering at first with, “yes, and the 
father.” Men, however, deal with their own constraints, and women generally accept them as 
                                                                                                                                                       
Jordanian and Palestinian identities, and their impacts on exclusionary practices of citizenship, occupy a position of 
significant importance in scholarship on the country (Brand 1995; Layne 1994; Shryock 1997). More recent work 
traces these enduring categories of concern as they intersect with forces of generational change, class, piety, 
neoliberalism, and gender (Adely 2012; Kaya 2010; MacDougall 2017; Tobin 2012). 
22 The Society focuses on children. Their limited direct service prevention, in the form of early intervention training, 
is geared toward children ages 0-9. In reality, they serve many individuals in their teens and even twenties and 
beyond, as best they can, expanding their programming and activities. Older individuals who age out of the available 
special education systems simply have nowhere else to go if they want life outside the family home.  
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significantly limiting. Layla continued, “But, he is at work, and he comes home at the end of the 
day tired. He doesn’t always have time for this training.” In both affective and effective terms, 
this is women’s work. This gendering manifests spatially in many of the societies, where female 
staff and female family members are the status quo. The al-Nur Society, for example, is not sex 
segregated, nor is it a women’s association, but only certain men can enter its spaces comfortably 
and without perceptibly changing the interactional dynamics.  
Mothers claim a significant amount of agency for securing disability-related services, 
reproducing the more general gendered division of childcare that exists in Jordan. This gendered 
skew also reflects current labor trends, where the rate of women’s participation in the formal 
labor sector hovers around 22%, as compared to 87% for men (The World Bank 2014). The 2016 
overall unemployment rate of 14.6% (Department of Statistics [Jordan] 2016) surged to 18.2% 
by the first quarter of 2017 (Azzeh 2017). While male heads of household aspire to the role of 
breadwinner, many fail in their attempts and manage to do so inconsistently at best. During a 
conversation between three women very involved in the Society and quite comfortable with one 
another, the topic of husbands’ participation in early intervention training arose. “He can’t 
(huwweh mā byi’dar),” said Mona, referring to her husband. The other two women nodded in 
agreement. Mona gave me an explanation similar to the one Layla provided, pointing out that 
men are not home enough to perform the daily and repetitive labor of childcare. When they are at 
home, what’s more, they tend to be exhausted from work or from trying to find it.23 While not 
necessarily happy or satisfied with this arrangement, upending the normative gendered division 
                                                
23 I rarely encountered essentialist arguments about men being unfit for childcare. Rather, women stressed the 
structural constraints placed upon men that affected their moods and temperament, making them particularly 
unsuited, especially to the detail-oriented exercises that early intervention activities require. I did, however, meet 
father who were far more involved in their children’s life than their spouse. These men were welcomed for their 
efforts and presence. 
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of labor falls extremely low on most women’s priority lists. They identify their most pressing 
concerns and challenges elsewhere.  
Finding spaces: fieldwork  
The days I spent at the Society included a number of possible activities: I showed up in 
the morning and drank coffee or tea with the staff; I observed early intervention training sessions 
with Hiba; I sat in the waiting room chatting with the employees and the family members 
(usually mothers) who arrived early with their children for appointments or lingered afterward; I 
occasionally attended family trainings or lectures on specific topics; and I appeared at local 
awareness-raising and social events. As time went on, staff assumed I would show up several 
days a week at the minimum, and my absences (usually time spent visiting other organizations or 
interviewing families privately) never went unnoticed. During my research, I formally 
interviewed 18 mothers of children with Down Syndrome at least once,24 and my larger sample 
included an additional 50 mothers of children with Down Syndrome. My total sample of families 
was still larger, however, as I met and occasionally interviewed families whose children are 
intellectually disabled in other ways.  
Anthropologists have become increasingly self-reflective and vocal about the ways that 
fieldwork and ethnography entail creation, omission, and reconstruction (Behar and Gordon 
1996; Clifford and Marcus 1986; Ingold 2014), especially given the ongoing intensification of 
globalization and urbanization (Appadurai 1990, 1996; Marcus 1995). Even so, my fieldwork 
often felt acutely artificial in ways that were hard to articulate. This was due in part to the urban 
sprawl I navigated quite extensively, and it also has to do with the random and unpredictable 
nature of disability. Marginalized, socially limited disabled persons deeply enriched the Amman 
                                                
24 In four of these cases, fathers were also present for a formal interview. 
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that I built through my field experience. Language skills, for instance, remain a source of 
struggle for all but the most adept of researchers conducting fieldwork outside their mother 
tongue. I was no exception to this reality. And yet by the end of fieldwork, I became more 
proficient at communicating with persons with Down Syndrome than most Ammanis, who often 
have little experience with or tolerance for speech impairments.  
In my Amman, disability was everywhere. I toured special education and residential 
centers. I met special educators, therapists, and activists who brought me to their practices and 
organizations. I attended celebratory events and free medical screening days specifically 
marketed toward disabled persons and their families. Very little of this occurred systematically; I 
met families through other families, I joined Whatsapp groups, and I kept a close watch on mass 
Facebook event invitations, because invitations beget more invitations. Through the unusually 
independent, mobile, and unfettered life that I built for myself in Amman, I found disability 
everywhere I looked. Needless to say, this sensibility clashed strongly with my interlocutors’ 
sensibility that disability was nowhere to be found. My mobility and rootlessness, however, also 
shaped my access and engagements in more complex ways.  
I started my project with the intention of bypassing clinical spaces, and I initially planned 
my fieldwork by taking inspiration from a long tradition of Middle Eastern ethnography that is 
firmly anchored in domestic spaces (Lila Abu-Lughod 1986; Fernea 1965; Hoodfar 1997; Jansen 
1987; Meneley 1995; Singerman and Hoodfar 1996). My second winter provided a logical point 
to transition from Society-based observations to formal interviews and house visits because life 
slows down during Jordan’s winter months. This is particularly true for women whose children 
have compromised immune systems. Trying to navigate the city in cold temperatures and 
unpredictable weather, especially when relying on public transportation or taxis, usually results 
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in sickness. I first discussed my plan to transition to home visits with Hiba, one of the early 
intervention specialists at the Society, and I recorded the following conversation in my 
fieldnotes: 
Hiba immediately had a very strong reaction to this idea. Not of disapproval, per 
se, but almost of pity for me. She told me [visits] would probably be impossible, 
that mothers would not let me into their homes because of their situation, and 
because I am an American. They fear a media aspect, as well as what the 
neighbors might think seeing an American walk into their home. It’s not like I 
haven’t thought about this before, but it’s a little concerning to hear her be so 
certain. I tried to counter this assessment with, “but they know me.” Hiba flashed 
me a kind smile laced with gentle rebuke. “No, Christine. They don’t.”… She 
suggested that I consider interviewing women at the Society. “The Society is 
somewhere safe and legitimate for them and also somewhere they can be away 
from their families. And many of them have already poured their hearts out here, 
so it’s a much more open space for them.” 
Hiba’s predictions, for the most part, exaggerated the difficulty of the transition that I did in fact 
make, although never quite as fully as I hoped.25 The invitations that some mothers eventually 
extended to me, while warm, gracious, and genuine, were hard won and involved a delicate 
reading of cues and circumstantial constraints on my part. Hiba’s cautionary words, however, 
were both instructive and insightful. While my aloneness generated concern, if not pity, among 
most of the people I met in Jordan, it also marked me as a difficult kind of stranger. How well 
could anyone expect to know me? Especially since I lacked the social coordinates or shared 
experiences that often helped to foster closeness among mothers. 
Yet Hiba’s concerns and suggestions were not just about me. They also spoke to the 
ambivalence of domestic space for mothers of disabled children and for children themselves. 
                                                
25 I did explore Hiba’s suggestion of using the Society as a home base for conducting interviews. The Society’s 
home-like aspects, however, created their own challenges. During the one (and only) interview I held at the Society, 
we were frequently interrupted, and after concluding, I received many queries about the content of our discussion 
and my perception of how it went. I conducted the rest of my formal interviews either in women’s homes, or I 
accompanied them on errands and trips out of the house. In some cases, I visited women in their homes but their 
domestic circumstances did not allow for formal interviewing. In these cases, I relied on observations, fieldnotes, 
and occasionally more general audio recordings. 
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Home, Hiba implied, can be difficult for women to navigate, and my presence might further 
exacerbate a difficult situation. Many mothers build intense affective ties to the women and 
children they meet at the Society. For some, it is the only space in which they can “pour their 
hearts out.” Notably, the Society utilizes an early intervention program (the Portage Program) 
originally designed for home-based visits, but they continue to offer sessions at the Society 
(Cameron 1997).26 In part, this reflects the assumption that mothers will work independently to 
act as early intervention specialists for their own children. It also reflects an intentional 
commitment to creating a space outside the home where women can congregate and learn from 
each other.27 Neither domestic nor completely removed from home and family, spaces like the 
al-Nur Society play increasingly important roles in the lives of Middle Eastern women, and they 
are capable of producing new kinds of intimacy and social distance (Deeb 2006; Ossman 2002). 
V. Situating disability  
My extremely unattached status, neither a wife nor a mother and far from my parents, 
puzzled many of the families I met. Kinship provides the intuitive and logical connection to 
disability in Jordan. Lacking this, my project and I remained perplexing.28 Why was I interested 
in what most families considered an intimate issue? Imm Zahra described me as a volunteer from 
America (mutaṭawwaʿ min Amerika). When asked who I was and what I was doing in Jordan, I 
repeated this description verbatim, adding that I was a doctoral student studying “the relationship 
between disability and culture in Jordan.” This usually made a good deal of sense. People would 
                                                
26 The Portage Program is popular across Jordan, and most organizations offer home-based and non-home-based 
sessions. 
27 Landsman (1998) writes about the use of home-based early intervention programs in New York. Intended to keep 
infants comfortable in their ‘natural environment,’ she reported them as being extremely isolating for mothers 
(Landsman 1998, 89). 
28 This unattached status also generated genuine concern. Most of my interlocutors shared the belief that living far 
from kin, while an entertaining and appealing thought experiment, would prove a sad and dangerous reality. 
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nod approvingly and tell me that, “Culture is the problem.” My methods for making sense of this 
problem, however, appeared quite strange. Confusion about how I could afford to come to 
Jordan and spend almost two years without a job understandably compounded this puzzle. Even 
for the significant number of adults I met who were in possession of Bachelor’s and higher 
degrees, the “deep hanging out” that anthropologists claim as their inimitable research method 
remained quite suspect (a position shared, of course, by my own family).  
The explanations forged to account for my interest in disability, unmotivated by the ties 
of kinship or a professional connection to special education, reveal how anthropologists occupy 
both global and local fields of knowledge and meaning. I became intelligible to many of my 
interlocutors through their belief that greater care and services are available for disabled people 
in the West (al gharb). My presence seemed to confirm this truth. Awareness and interest in 
disability must be significantly widespread and institutionalized in the United States, they 
reasoned, if I was traveling all the way to Jordan to study it comparatively. My presence then 
became another diagnostic marker of local backwardness. Many parents and teachers used my 
identity as a volunteer to lament the lack of any such spirit of volunteerism or civic responsibility 
in Jordan.  
Societies in society 
Members and beneficiaries of the al-Nur Society and others like it are very careful about 
the sorts of critiques they articulate or want to be associated with. For many families, the day-to-
day goal of nurturing their children’s development remains their top priority. Parents identify 
“society” and “government” as problems that infiltrate into their children’s very bodies via the 
lack of available services. Very few families, however, actually express the desire to pursue a 
concrete agenda for political mobilization. They concentrate on the domains of family, 
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education, and rehabilitative therapies, rather than citizens’ rights, state-centered resource 
distribution, or legislative reform. What might appear to be political quietism, however, remains 
an important and explicit condition of societies’ right to survival.  
For over 40 years, jamaʿiyyāt fell under the jurisdiction of Jordan’s 1966 Law No. 33 on 
Societies and Social Bodies. In the early 2000s, however, societies underwent an extensive 
overhaul. The 2008 Law No. 51 on Societies,29 which was subsequently amended in 2009 after 
generating widespread criticism and negative press,30 defines a society as:  
Any legal person composed of a group of persons no less than seven31 and which 
is registered according to the provisions of this law to provide services or to 
undertake activities on a voluntary basis without aiming to derive or distribute 
profit, to realize any benefit for any of its members or for any specific person, or 
to achieve any political goals that enter into the scope of the work and activities of 
political parties in accordance with the legislation in force.32 (Act 3) 
Aspiring founders must apply for legal status through the Register of Societies, a monitoring 
body created by the new law and housed in the Ministry of Social Development (MOSD). 
Academic and popular presses often translate societies into the familiar categories of a non-
governmental organization (NGO) or civil society organization (CSO). While reasonable 
approximations, the closeness of these terms obscures important details relevant to the 
particulars of the Jordanian context.  
First and foremost, the Registry can deny a society’s application or dissolve an existing 
society (and the grounds for denial remain unclear, as does the possibility for subsequently 
                                                
29 This section uses the English translation provided by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (2016). 
30 Law 33 already granted the government extensive powers over societies’ activities. Law 51 and its subsequent 
amendments, however, introduce new restrictions directly impacting foreign societies to a significantly greater 
degree. 
31 In 2016, the Ministry released a draft law that would have replaced Law 51 and called for increasing the 
mandatory number of founders to 50 persons. As of 2017, the status of the amendments remained unclear 
(International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 2017). 
32 Some organizations, however, remain exempted from this designation, including those regulated by laws 
pertaining to Islamic affairs and finances, minority religious organizations, and youth organizations (Act 3). 
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appealing such a decision). In 2015, for example, 41 societies were dissolved for “violations” 
(The Jordan Times 2015). Additionally, 70 other societies were placed under review and control 
of their daily and financial operations granted to temporary oversight commissions (Times 
2015). Violations included not practicing stated work activities, failure to submit the legally 
required balance sheets for review, and/or the failure to establish headquarters at the appropriate 
address. Six societies were also under review for potentially receiving donations from foreign 
sources that, as per the 2008 law, require pre-approval. Societies cannot accept funds from 
“sources that violate public order or morals,” and all foreign donations must be approved ahead 
of time (Article 8). Finally, society founders must possess Jordanian citizenship and no society 
can also be a member of another society (Article 24).  
The many restrictions and stipulations placed on forming and operating societies point to 
the Jordanian state’s attempts to control citizens and residents capacities to congregate, 
collaborate, and organize; all these activities emerge as potential threats. The timing of the new 
law is also noteworthy. Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood underwent significant structural and 
political changes during 2008, and the Muslim Brotherhood controls the wealthiest charity 
organization in Jordan, the Islamic Center Charity Society.33 The state’s increasing concerns and 
limitations on foreign organizations also potentially target international human rights groups, 
especially those that do not operate under the protection of memorandums of understanding 
(Human Rights Watch 2016). With minimal legal protections and an explicit prohibition against 
political activities, societies focus on serving their populations in ways that circumscribe 
critiques of the state.  
                                                
33 See Clark (2004) for a detailed account of the ICCS in Jordan. 
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Political scientist Anne Marie Baylouny studies the jamaʿiyya ‘ā’iliyya, or family 
association, in both Jordan and Lebanon (2010).34  She argues that these flourishing collectives 
actually facilitate and reinforce the withdrawal of citizens from formal politics and contribute to 
the further deliberalization of the Jordanian state.35 At the time of her research, during the early 
2000s, over two thirds of the 197 registered family associations had formed between the years of 
1989 and 1999. This decade of growth speaks to the widespread effects wrought by IMF-driven 
structural readjustment policies that were implemented by the government to cope with 
economic decline and obtain some amount of debt relief. “For over one third of the population,” 
writes Baylouny,” kin solidarities have been reorganized, formalized, and registered as 
nongovernmental organizations in an attempt to cope with the removal of basic social 
provisioning by the state” (2006, 349). Their status as jamaʿiyyāt formally places family 
associations in the realm of civil society. Yet, their services are reserved for members, and 
members must be kin.36 Notably, family associations lack “the classic component of a social 
movement, namely, its demand-making and state-centered character” (2006, 350). They focus 
instead on providing low or no interest loans and facilitating employment opportunities for 
members by providing the social connections necessary for doing so.  
Family-based associations’ abilities to create cross-class connections, through kinship 
ties, remain one of their major selling points. The fact that family groups have adopted and 
adapted this new hybrid format testifies to the flexibility and continuity of kinship-based politics 
                                                
34 Following my interlocutors, I choose to translate jamaʿiyya as society. Both society and association, however, 
appear interchangeably in both popular and academic translations.  
35 To apply the framework of deliberalization might in fact overstate the extent and impact of the government’s 
liberalizing overtures made during the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
36 Part of Baylouny’s larger argument, in fact, is to show how different families and communities have learned to 
contract or expand their qualifications for kinship based on their position within Jordan’s political economy. The 
latter is shaped by the Royal Family’s long-standing strategy of cultivating loyalty from Jordan’s powerful 
indigenous families through public sector employment and military leadership (Massad 2001; Shryock 1997). 
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in Jordan.  The jamaʿiyya ‘ā’iliyya differs from a jamaʿiyya like the al-Nur Society in terms of its 
criteria for membership and mission statement, yet they also lack this state-centered character. 
Instead they direct their critical energies toward reforming issues described as social or cultural, 
such as the marriage of minors, women’s low participation in the workforce, or promoting 
entrepreneurship. Given the enduring influence of personalistic patronage networks, described 
locally as wāsṭa (and translated into an array of terms, including favoritism, nepotism, 
connections, and corruption), considerable anxiety and paranoia can accompany civic initiatives, 
lest they draw the ire of someone powerful. These structural realities influence local disability 
activism, where conversations often remain vaguely critical of state mechanisms designed to 
support disabled persons (or the lack thereof). They become explicitly and intensely critical, 
however, of problems attributed to family, culture, and society.  
Disability on global and local scales 
If my interlocutors insisted on the superior quality of care provided to disabled people in 
the West, they puzzled over how this fit into a broader narrative of the West as both immoral and 
exploitative. Working in Jordan during the geopolitical era carved out by the post-9/11, pre-
Trump, unending rhythms of the global War on Terror, many families either asked me to confirm 
or in fact insisted that the United States discriminated against Arabs and Muslims, especially 
those doubly marked by disability. In spring of 2014, I witnessed some of Jordan’s most active 
disability rights activists and DPO leaders level this charge against a U.S. government liaison. 
The American official hoped to convene a roundtable discussion on Jordan’s success in 
promoting disability rights (a premise vehemently objected to by all of the local experts in the 
room). Instead, he found himself on the defensive, denying that disability status affected visa 
processing. Draft executive orders on immigration issued at the beginning of the Trump 
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administration, however, suggest that visa denial on the basis of disability may, in fact, become 
explicit policy, framed in terms of protecting taxpayers and protecting against “undesirable” 
immigrants (The Washington Post 2017).37  
Learning with and from intellectually disabled people and their families, my fieldwork 
forced me to confront my own preconceived assumptions about Down Syndrome, my lack of 
familiarity with the neurodiversity movement, and the normative ideas about intelligence and 
capacity that shape my own perceptions of personhood. I often found myself on the receiving 
end of questions about U.S. disability rights legislation that I realized I knew very little about, 
accumulating a list of research topics about specific components of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA). My own 
relative segregation from disabled people prior to my fieldwork, especially those with 
intellectual and developmental impairments, sharpened my critical perspective on “inclusion” 
and the belief that this has been realized successfully in countries like the United States. It also 
heightened my appreciation for the key role that state-market interactions play in shaping 
accessible and inclusive schools and workplaces, major topics of discussion and points of 
contention among families of disabled children in Jordan and around the world.  
The modern concept of disability in the Arabic-speaking Middle East emerged as part of 
a broader proliferation of human rights and development initiatives that have taken root on 
regional and global levels. As a transnational movement, disability rights advocates and scholars 
grapple with a range of ontological, epistemological, and political problems. These can be 
                                                
37 A Canadian case worth mentioning is that of a Costa Rican professor at York University who was denied 
permanent residency explicitly because his 13-year-old son with Down Syndrome would place an “excessive” 
burden on the Canadian healthcare system (McQuigee 2016). At the time of writing this dissertation, what’s more, at 
least one “Muslim” ban attempt by the administration has failed, but a second, slightly more circumscribed ban is in 
effect. 
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glossed as the what, who, where, when, and how of disability. The vastly different political 
capacities, economic resources, and constructions of personhood that shape attempts to 
reimagine and improve the human condition complicate these interrelated questions. In Jordan, 
as in many other parts of the world outside North America and Western Europe, the United 
Nations (UN) and its capillary institutions serve as key conduits for disseminating disability 
rights discourses, legislative priorities, and strategies for adapting universally imagined protocols 
into local realities. The UN has increased its focus on disability over the past several decades, 
with the following declarations and initiatives standing out: The UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Mentally Retarded Persons (1971), the International Year of Disabled Persons (1981), and the 
International Decade of Disabled Persons (1983-1992). Additionally, 2003 marked the beginning 
of the Arab Decade of Disabled Persons, a designation decided on during the 2002 UN 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESWA).  
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) – 
which was adopted in 2006, ratified in 2007, and entered into force in 2008 – is the world’s most 
powerful international disability rights instrument. Jordan, along with 81 other countries, signed 
the convention on the opening day of March 30, 2007. The CRPD boasts the highest number of 
first day signatories in U.N. history. In this project, I approach the CRPD as a symbolic artifact 
of the international, institutional human rights culture that Jordan seeks to emulate in the drafting 
and passage of its own laws, such as the 2007 Law No. 31 On the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities.38 The CRPD does not actually define disability. Instead, the preamble “recognize[s] 
that disability is an evolving concept and that disability results from the interaction between 
persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full and 
                                                
38 In 2017, Jordan passed an updated Law on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
  32 
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others” (United Nations 2006).39 Rather 
than compare these two texts (see Al-Azzeh 2012), I am more interested in following whether 
and how local communities incorporate symbolic instruments like the CRPD as they attempt to 
rework local structures for managing and making sense of bodily and mental difference.  
Down Syndrome on global and local scales 
Down Syndrome appears to offer a clear and generalizable inclusion/exclusion criteria: 
the presence or absence of one of three possible chromosomal signatures and a consequent 
spectrum of secondary characteristics and health complications (National Down Syndrome 
Society). Yet even the very name of the condition reflects a specific history. Debates over 
whether and why mitlāzamat Down, or simply Down, should replace the popular colloquial 
description of monghōlī occurred throughout my fieldwork. Both terms, however, reflect deeper 
historical relationships between Down Syndrome and medical research (Wright 2011).40 The 
prevalence of monghōlī in Jordan gestures to a largely unexcavated global history of Trisomy 21 
and its migration via missionary, colonial, and development medical practices.  
                                                
39 This distinction between impairment and disability reflects decades of scholarship and activism on the part of 
disabled persons, intellectuals, and activists. The disability-impairment distinction plays a central role in the social 
model of disability, whose origins can be traced to the “fundamental principles of disability” published by the 
British Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation ([1976] 1997). Decades of developing, revising, and 
debating the social model have followed.  The disability-impairment distinction also lies at the heart of a substantial 
body of criticism across disciplinary boundaries (Corker 2001; Dewsbury et al. 2004; Goodley 2014; B. Hughes and 
Paterson 1997; Snyder and Mitchell 2000). The more humanistic roots of North American disability studies have 
somewhat offset the intensity of this debate in American academia (Davis 1995; Garland-Thomson 1997; Siebers 
2010). Robert Edgerton’s work on competence (1967) and Michael Angrosino’s work on group homes (1998) 
provide examples of anthropological research on intellectual disability. Jani Klotz (2004) provides a comprehensive 
overview of Edgerton contributions to the study of intellectual disability, while Luckin (1986) and Gerber (1990) 
offer critical reflections on Edgerton’s research trajectory and impact. Kasnitz and Shuttlesworth have criticized 
Anthropology’s lack of engagement with disability and/or disability studies (1999), but there is a growing field of 
disability anthropology that synthesizes contributions across disciplines (Friedner 2015; Ginsburg and Rapp 2013; 
Hartblay 2017; Keating and Hadder 2010; Nakamura 2006, 2013). 
40 Down Syndrome, writes Richard Newton, “is not a medical condition but represents a common recognizable 
variation of the human form created through a random biological event. Nonetheless, as we will see, people with 
Down syndrome present with many common medical conditions and some that are more specific to the condition” 
(2015, 1). Nevertheless, it is widely perceived as a medical diagnosis in itself. 
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In 1866, John Langdon Down first described the condition of “mongoloid idiocy” based 
on his ethnological evaluation of residents at the Royal Earlswood Asylum for Idiots, where he 
served as superintendent after graduating from medical school in London.41 Down was interested 
in contributing to the scientific debate of his time: the unity or diversity of the human species. He 
used cases of demonstrated “degeneration,” as evidenced in the form of “mongoloid idiots,” to 
argue that humans must ultimately be members of the same species since racial devolution was 
possible; if the case was otherwise, such deterioration could not occur. The inappropriateness of 
the many epithets derived from this early medical category, based as it was on the scientific 
racism of the 19th and 20th centuries, has become a focal point of both international and Jordanian 
awareness campaigns and initiatives organized by local organizations.42  
Awareness that the international community no longer uses this term – albeit with a 
localized interpretation as to why43 – speaks to the close engagement between Jordan’s disability 
advocacy communities and transnational networks. It also reflects changing sensitivities to a 
term that connotes “ugly” or “stupid” and that families object to as a cruel and untrue 
representation of people with Down Syndrome. These shifting language norms remain somewhat 
tenuous, however. At least in some cases, when individuals became comfortable around me and 
adopted casual modes of conversation, they would revert back to using the term monghōlī but 
                                                
41 The condition was clinically described by others before Down formally published and publicized his arguments. 
42 A statement published in the Lancet in 1961 by 19 prominent genetic scientists first raised the issue of changing 
the name (Rodríguez-Hernández and Montoya 2011). In 1965 the Mongolian delegation to the World Health 
Organization made a request that the term no longer be used, and henceforth it disappeared from WHO publications, 
setting a global precedent that paralleled national conversations (Howard-Jones 2012). The National Down 
Syndrome Society’s preferred language guide also details the labels’ further transition from Down’s Syndrome to 
Down. John Langdon Down did not have Down Syndrome, rendering the “apostrophe ‘s’ [that] connotes ownership 
or possession” inappropriate (National Down Syndrome Society). 
43 Most Jordanians did not explain this shift to me in terms of repudiating the original racism of the label, a history 
they may or may not be aware of. Rather, they described this impetus as a corrective to properly recognize national 
and ethnic identities. They described people with Down Syndrome as “looking Mongolian,” but since they were 
obviously not from Mongolia, the epithet did not make sense. I also encountered a separate objection based on the 
recognition of monghōlī as a demeaning slur, although people did not consider the nature of this offensiveness to 
stem from racism, scientific or otherwise. 
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then correct themselves, sometimes even apologizing to me. These modifications reflect a 
recognition that the term is no longer seen as appropriate, but it also suggests that this knowledge 
has not yet become part of the widespread representational habitus.  
These micro level negotiations serve as a reminder of the simultaneously transnational 
and local fields in which definitional politics unfold, as well as my own positionality in relation 
to them. The ways families and experts claim, question, and reject possible relationships between 
Down Syndrome and disability illuminate the particular stakes that different actors invest in 
disability and the disability rights movements. The reception of these categories reflects deeper 
histories concerning the nature and meanings of difference.  
VI. Economies of care: disability, religion, and kinship 
Throughout my research, I struggled to craft questions on the role that religion played in 
shaping intellectual disability in Jordan. Families rarely invoked Qur’anic verses or hadith 
(sayings of the Prophet) to engage in exegetical debates about disability, practices that have 
provided a wellspring of ethnographic research and theoretical innovation for anthropologists 
working with Muslim communities (Deeb 2006, 2015; Fadil and Fernando 2015; Hirschkind 
2001; Mahmood 2005). Most members of disability rights and advocacy organizations in Jordan 
do not identify their work through explicitly religious idioms, aligning themselves firmly with 
principles and practices of the global human and disability rights movements. And neither 
mosques nor religious figures played major roles in helping families care for disabled children. 
My questions on this topic often elicited complaints about the perceived lacunae of such support. 
My interlocutors nevertheless embraced a model of inclusion based on incorporation into 
a moral community, and religion plays a central role in how families and individuals imagine 
society. Many families ponder – sometimes seriously, but more often in jest – the possibility of 
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leaving Jordan to seek better services and opportunities for their children elsewhere. When Hiba 
asked Imm Rami if she had any family connections in the United States, the latter reacted 
strongly to the implications of the question. “My husband might consider [leaving Jordan], but 
my family is here! And it’s too hard to be Muslim there. They don’t have religion, and they don’t 
raise their children properly.” Hiba disagreed. “I have a friend raising her family in Britain, and 
all three daughters wear hijab.” Imm Rami was not convinced. “It’s easier to be Muslim in 
Britain,” she proposed. Hiba then asked for my opinion on the matter. I granted that life could be 
challenging for Muslims in the United States, especially under the present political 
circumstances, but it depends which part of the country one lived in (my default answer to all 
questions about the United States). I pointed to Dearborn, Michigan as an example of this 
diversity of circumstances, explaining they would be more likely to walk down the street hearing 
Arabic and seeing women wearing hijab than not. “Religion is not in the hijab, Christine,” 
replied Imm Rami. “Religion is in one’s heart (al dīn mish fīl hijāb. Al dīn fīl qalb).”  
While parents in Jordan discuss their children’s right to state-funded social services and 
their desire to see subsidies for the private sector, things they imagine as fully accessible in “the 
West” (al-gharb), most do not desire the accompanying moral economy of personhood. The 
ways people enact hierarchical and interdependent relations between humans and God shape the 
shared and lived realities of disability in Jordan. There is, in other words, a spiritual economy of 
disability that shapes local disability worlds. I take this term from anthropologist Amira 
Mittermaier, who describes how young people in Cairo explain their motivation to do volunteer 
work as part of their duty to do good deeds for God, rather than a civic responsibility or form of 
activism (2014). Additionally, I draw on the work of Kathryn Burns, who defines a spiritual 
economy to express, "the inextricability of the material and the sacred, relying on a very old 
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sense of ‘economy’ as the managing of a house (Greek oikos) and pointing to the spiritual goals 
orienting such an activity” (Burns 1999, 3). This sense of economy aptly captures the equally 
moral and material dimensions of caring for one’s kin. Care involves protecting and sustaining 
one’s house (bayt) – a word that encompasses the structures, resources, and people connected 
through ties of kinship – as part of fulfilling one’s duties to God.  
Spiritual economies exist alongside and intertwine with other systems of value, however, 
and this is especially true in relation to family. An adult son who neglects the wellbeing of his 
aging parents will generate strong social sanction from those around him. A woman who fails to 
meet her mother-in-law’s standards for cooking might generate more sympathy, but she will 
nevertheless be urged to adapt and fulfill her obligations in this acquired role. Parents who 
neglect their children generate disapproval and often outrage. This is decidedly the case when the 
child in question is perceived to be uniquely vulnerable and in need of extra care. Family 
members who fail to provide the kinds of care expected of them are considered morally 
compromised and may be described as bad Muslims. But this framing does not preclude 
recognizing problems as resulting from the pressures and conflicts wrought by circumstance.  
Logics of delayed reciprocity animate relationships of obligation and care between kin, 
and the acute lack of alternative, non-kin structures for providing care labor perpetuates and 
maintains this system.  As one mother explained to me while fretting over her eldest son’s 
increasingly poor performance in school, “Parents here depend on their children for the future. I 
encourage my son to excel not just for his own personal growth, but also for the sake of my own 
wellbeing when I am older. I will depend on him.” For parents of children with Down Syndrome, 
the progression of kinship-based relations of care, which are already fraught and prone to moral 
failure, becomes an even more complicated process. Children and adults with Down Syndrome 
  37 
also care for their parents in various ways. In fact, parents often describe children with Down 
Syndrome as kinder and more emotionally perceptive than their children without Down 
Syndrome. Nevertheless, disability disrupts the normative economies of care that kinship futures 
rely on. 
VII. Ambivalent Inheritance  
To speak of kinship futures inevitably entails looking to the past. Kinship, and the various 
forms of inheritance transmitted through family lineage, stretch backward and forward in time 
Inheritance exists on multiple registers and speaks to the centrality of genealogy as identity, 
moral substance, and political power in Jordan and in the Middle East more broadly. It also 
gestures to the expansive reach of biogenetic knowledge and its entanglement in these 
historically deeper forms of genealogical reckoning. The geneticization of health and illness, 
family, and marriage play increasingly important roles in shaping Down Syndrome in Jordan. 
Inheritance nevertheless extends beyond and remains irreducible to genetics. This is why 
families can accept chromosome-based explanations of Down Syndrome but remain quietly 
unconvinced of their implications for family reputation. Inheritance represents a convergence of 
preparation for the future and remembrance of the past.  
Nevertheless, inheritance remains a lesser topic within contemporary kinship studies, 
perhaps because it grates against present interests in the flexibility and creativity that can be 
marshaled to construct kin. Daniel Miller notes that many anthropologists and sociologists today 
analytically frame kinship as relationships built through practice. In choosing to do so, however, 
they end up avoiding ethnographic data that commonly “show an almost obsessive concern with 
kinship as formal and normative” (Miller 2007, 538). Even Marshall Sahlins notes this tension in 
his influential essay, “What Kinship Is, part one,” where he famously proposes that kinship be 
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understood as “mutuality of being” (2011, 2). He acknowledges that, “people’s freedom to revise 
their kin relationships… does not mean that the relationships as such are under revision – or 
otherwise without determinate properties and codes of conduct” (2011, 5, my emphasis). Miller 
draws this tension out more explicitly, suggesting that “flexibility and negotiation are a direct 
result of the struggle people have in trying to retain clear principles and formal expectations in 
kinship” (Miller 2007, 540).  
The moral validity conveyed by marriage produces recognized genealogical descendants 
who are entitled to inheritance, assets, and their father’s family name. Inheritance, in turn, 
encompasses the material and immaterial legacies that the present generation carries from the 
past and protects for the future. As families encounter Down Synome, many questions about 
inheritance emerge. First and foremost, parents and relatives frequently articulate concerns about 
whether Down Syndrome is wirāthī (inherited). Answers to this query – by professionals and 
laypeople alike – usually conscript biomedical objects like genes and chromosomes to explain 
how Down Syndrome develops and why. Biogenetics translate quite smoothly into local 
understandings of inheritance. Genealogical configurations of identity, power, and historical 
time, however, extend far beyond this new medium, both in Jordan and in the broader Arab 
Middle East (Samin 2015; Shryock 2013).  
Families experiences with disability make them confront the ambivalence of kinship. 
Ambivalence, writes Michael Peletz, articulates the “simultaneous experience of powerful, 
contradictory emotions or attitudes towards a single phenomenon” (2001, 413). Peletz argues 
that to study kinship is to study experiences of ambivalence and violence. The data gathered by 
early ethnographers demonstrates as much, but they chose to mute the analytical significance of 
these darker forces given longstanding disciplinary investments in kinship as a tool for 
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maintaining solidarity, reciprocity, and structural cohesion. To some degree, a positive 
investment in social solidarity continues to animate kinship studies. Yet anthropologists 
increasingly grapple with modes of violence, exploitation, abandonment, and neglect that appear 
to be as equally central to the practices and politics of kinship (Biehl 2005; Garcia 2010; Weiss 
1994; Weston 1991).  
My own work asks how ambivalence and violence comingle with acts of care to variably 
transform the actors involved in such exchanges. Ambivalence, not to be confused with 
ambiguity, produces the affective and intersubjective realities of Down Syndrome in Jordan. The 
power of disability intrudes into families’ lives with particular force. It can be destructive, but it 
can also be generative. In some cases, it ultimately transforms how individuals and families 
understand themselves and their communities. My interlocutors would often speak of people 
with Down Syndrome through what anthropologist Rayna Rapp has described as “double 
discourses,” exceptional but average, normal but different, a blessing but a burden” (1999, 293). 
They are, in other words, an ambivalent inheritance. 
VIII. Organization of the dissertation 
The dissertation’s structure reflects my argument that Down Syndrome changes over time 
and across space. I chart how individuals and families in Jordan age in relation to each other and 
under historical, political, and cultural conditions that enable and constrain the futures they 
imagine possible. Through their attempts to build and secure different kinds of kinship futures, 
families shape the current realities of disability in Jordan. Each chapter in the dissertation 
focuses on how these dynamics assemble during a significant moment in the life course: Birth 
and diagnosis (Chapter Two), early and middle childhood (Chapters Three and Four), and 
adolescence (Chapter Five). The concluding chapter considers life in terms of the inevitabilities 
  40 
of aging and death. I discuss how nonsecular futures provide significant content for imagining 
Down Syndrome in the present (Chapter Six). 
Chapter Two has two main aims. First, I offer readers a snapshot of the social and moral 
geographies that shape how families, and especially mothers, react to diagnoses of lifelong 
intellectual disability. Because the dissertation’s temporal arc serves as part of my larger 
argument about the relationship between disability and futurity, birth and diagnosis provide a 
natural starting point. I approach diagnosis as a set of processes that generate different narratives 
for families and both reveal and expose them to various risks. Diagnosis generates intense 
anxieties about children’s future marriage prospects, and in the aftermath of diagnosis, women 
often encounter anger and suspicion from other family members. Their experiences reveal how 
the local care economy relies on a kinship-based and gendered distribution of re/productive 
labor. This labor operates through evaluations of normality. Impairment and disability both 
illuminate and unsettle investments in the normal, and families adopt different strategies to 
protect themselves from risk. 
In Chapter Three, I introduce the concept of a moral orientation to capture how mothers 
work to cultivate acceptance (taqabbul), which they contrast with the rejection (rafaḍ) of Down 
Syndrome that they describe as endemic to society. The idea of a moral orientation builds on 
Hayder Al-Mohammad’s critique that the “anthropology of ethics” has remained focused on an 
individuated, ethical “self.” By following how mothers work to produce and inhabit this moral 
orientation, I demonstrate different possible ways of being-with disability in Jordan (Al-
Mohammad 2010, 426). The orientation of acceptance is neither straightforward nor uncontested, 
instead encompassing disputed paths to becoming a “good” mother. 
  41 
Chapter Four turns to childhood, a stage of life that Jordanians widely equate with 
participation in systems of formal education. This chapter “zooms out” to explore how the 
concept of inclusive education has come to dominate discussions of childhood disability in 
Jordan, much to the frustration of parents, as well as some teachers and specialists. The 
disruptions that intellectual disability poses to parents’ visions of their child’s long-term welfare 
can affect their immediate choices about schooling and their assessments of education as an 
abstract value. Discussions about schooling, I suggest, index widespread anxieties about the 
difficulty of safeguarding children’s wellbeing and economic security in the context of regional 
insecurity and global economic restructuring. Educational discourses, meanwhile, connect 
children to state and cosmopolitan visions of citizenship, development, and modernity in ways 
that often ignore complex realities and constraints of everyday life. 
Chapter Five considers what happens as intellectually disabled children experience 
adolescence and puberty. Aging without achieving social standards for maturity, intellectually 
disabled adolescents experience form of “embodied asynchrony,” a term I borrow from Allison 
Kafer (2013, 48). The ambiguity that certain intellectual impairments introduce generates 
explicit conversations about sexuality, bodily integrity, and what it means to be an full member 
of society. Intellectual impairments limit adolescents’ capacities to meet the criteria for the 
successful performance of adult gender norms. Yet the stakes are not everywhere the same. 
While young women are policed and their bodies potentially surgically altered, intellectually 
disabled young men are far less likely to experience the same degree of invasive surveillance. 
For both young men and young women, however, adult personhood remains frustratingly out of 
reach. 
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The final chapter returns to the concept of kinship futures. I explore how parents and 
siblings wrestle with questions about the passage of time and confront anxieties when 
considering the inevitable: death. I highlight how nonsecular dimensions of relationality and 
accountability shape families’ imaginations of the future and their perspectives on the burdens 
and literal blessings of caring for and being cared for by disabled kin. I conclude by gesturing to 
some of the other disability worlds present in Jordan, and I contemplate how these worlds will 
continue to expand while remaining grounded in local moral worlds and kinship futures.   
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Chapter 2. Risk 
I. Diagnosing Down Syndrome  
When Imm Sara and her sister brought six-month-old Sara into the Society for the first 
time, both women were already well versed in the clinical details of Down Syndrome. They 
confirmed with Hiba, the main early intervention specialist at the Society, that Sara was trisomy, 
meaning all of Sara’s cells possess three copies of chromosome 21. They also listed many of the 
future health risks and developmental delays Sara might face. Born with a heart defect 
commonly found in children with Down Syndrome, Sara remained under the close supervision of 
doctors as they waited to see whether the infant would require open-heart surgery. During this 
first conversation, Imm Sara began articulating her husband’s desire to know “whether or not 
there was any treatment.” Hiba began to make a dramatic exclamation that practically drowned 
out the last words of Imm Sara’s sentence. “Imm Sara! This is a syndrome (mitlāzama), as in, her 
whole life!” Staff and parents bristled when confronted with conflations between Down 
Syndrome and disease or sickness (maraḍ). They insisted instead on the distinctiveness of 
mitlāzamat Down as a mode of being in the world. 
A baby’s birth triggers social transitions and transformations for a host of actors 
connected to and through this new life. Spouses become parents, parents become grandparents, 
children become siblings, and so on. The unexpected diagnosis of a baby with Down Syndrome 
marks an additional set of transitions and transformations. Charles Rosenberg describes 
diagnosis as that which, “links the individual to the social system; it is necessarily a spectacle as 
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well as a bureaucratic event. Diagnosis remains a ritual of disclosure: a curtain is pulled aside, 
and uncertainty is replaced-for better or worse-by a structured narrative” (2002, 255). For 
families in Jordan, diagnosis has not yet achieved the formalization or predictability of ritual. 
Multiple possible narratives emerge, and they hang together tenuously –if at all. “It is 
significant,” Rosenberg continues, “that most of us think of [diagnosis] as a discrete act taking 
place at a particular moment in time” (2002, 256). In reality, diagnosis unfolds as a “collective, 
cumulative, and contingent process” (2002, 256).  
This chapter examines the collective, cumulative, and contingent risks – and the new 
possibilities – that a diagnosis of Down Syndrome reveals and creates for families in Jordan. 
Ulrich Beck (1992) and Anthony Giddens (1991) argue that a defining feature of modernity is 
the degree to which perceptions of risk dominate contemporary social, political, and economic 
life. The concept of risk evolved out of 17th century developments in theories of chance and 
probability (Hacking 1975, 1990). As God(s), fates, and tragedy ceded their explanatory 
authority to science and rationality, the notion of “chance” emerged, reconfiguring 
understandings and experiences of causality and human agency. Kaja Finkler explains, “a chance 
event was merely one whose causes were not known, but it was now deemed possible to 
calculate mathematically the probability of an event that involved human beings” (2003, 52). 
From mathematically produced projections of chance, one could then calculate risk. Today, the 
concept of risk holds enormous influence across the fields of public health, epidemiology, and 
clinical medicine, as well as in biopolitical governance more broadly (Foucault 1990, 2008). 
Ethnographers and historians are careful to point out, however, that different risks emerge as 
most meaningful for differently positioned social actors.  
Diagnosis provides an ethnographic window into experiences and complexities of the 
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risks that converge at the nexus of disability, personhood, and what Finkler describes as the 
“medicalization of family and kinship” (Finkler 2003, 52, see also 2001). How diagnosis in 
Jordan enters into and disrupts networks and bonds of kinship, in turn prompts families to reflect 
on the stakes and risks of cultivating relatedness. The necessity and the costs of maintaining 
close social ties, especially among kin, are revealed through family members’ attempts to come 
to terms with a child’s diagnosis.44 The intensity of this process ebbs and flows over different 
moments in a family’s life cycle. Because this dissertation’s overall temporal arc mirrors my 
broader arguments about disability and temporality, diagnosis provides a natural starting point. 
In cases of congenital disabilities, birth and diagnosis occur in close succession, if not 
simultaneously. In parts of the world where pregnancy and childbirth have become heavily 
biomedicalized, diagnosis may precede and alter the course of an impending birth. Given the 
limited use of prenatal screening and diagnostics in Jordan, however, the diagnosis of Down 
Syndrome continues to occur postnatally, and this adds another distinctive temporal dimension to 
the diagnostic process.  
Diagnosis attaches itself to familial futures and pasts, portending various kinds of risks 
that affect family members unevenly and unequally. In tracing how the temporal and 
intersubjective threads of diagnosis weave family members together and split them apart, I focus 
on the experiences of mothers and their disabled children. The next section of this chapter, 
“neither sick nor normal,” examines the importance of attempting to distinguish between 
sickness and disability for my interlocutors. Ultimately, however, Down Syndrome remains 
uncertainly positioned between these two domains, both in Jordan and elsewhere. In the section 
that follows, “marital prognostics,” I consider some of the reasons why the diagnosis of a baby 
                                                
44 In fact, as anthropologist Morgan Clarke observes, “closeness” (qarābah), [is] perhaps the nearest equivalent in 
Arabic to the English “kinship” (2007, 380). 
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with Down Syndrome generated marital conflicts for parents and also prompted extensive 
projections forward in time. Families worried about future marriages and whether disability 
would diminish the marital prospects of siblings and cousins, in addition to the more complex 
question of marriage for the child living “under diagnosis” (Martin 2009). The reasons for these 
prognostications intertwine in the fourth section, which focuses on “moral etiologies.” Inspired 
by anthropologist Sherine Hamdy’s work on political etiologies (2008; 2012), I use the concept 
of moral etiologies to examine how biogenetic and genealogical renderings of inheritance 
reinforce stigma against Down Syndrome and foster gendered distributions of blame and 
accountability. The final section turns to another kind of possible future, one currently 
materializing through the use of prenatal screening and diagnostics. Although still limited in 
application, the presence of these technologies has created morally fraught and previously 
unimagined capacities for knowing, and thus being able to change, kinship futures. 
II. Neither sick nor normal 
For many Jordanians, the label of Down Syndrome carries the moral authority of modern 
biomedical and therapeutic expertise, which they seek to harness in their attempts to rework the 
stigma of the commonly used moniker monghōlī. The latter remains a common way to describe 
people with Down Syndrome and has obvious and problematic racial connotations.45 Down 
Syndrome’s uneasy relationship with contemporary biomedicine, however, quickly becomes 
apparent to family members through their negative interactions with doctors, hospitals, and in 
their pursuit of healthcare more generally. Staff members at the Society make a point to ask new 
                                                
45 Monghōlī is also connected to the medical history of Down Syndrome. Most Jordanians are not, however, familiar 
with monghōlī’s origins as a now-discredited medical category (the same can be said of most Americans, for that 
matter). Jordanians link Down Syndrome and biomedicine together as indexes of a proper modern understanding of 
the condition. They contrast this with the stigma of monghōlī. See the Introduction for a fuller discussion of Down 
Syndrome and monghōlī. 
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mothers how they received their child’s diagnosis.46 When Hiba posed this question to Imm 
Abud during her first visit, the latter reacted strongly to the prompt. Imm Abud described her 
experience with doctors as awful. Rather than first discuss their son’s Down Syndrome with her 
and her husband, their doctor announced that Abud was monghōlī in front of both their extended 
families, who had congregated to meet the new baby. “It should have been between us, in her 
office,” she exclaimed, the tone of her voice conveying dismay and still-raw emotion. Imm 
Abud’s husband was furious, and he initially wanted a divorce.47 While the marriage ultimately 
survived this turbulent moment, members of their extended and immediate family distanced 
themselves from Imm Abud and her son. Even Imm Abud’s own children could not understand 
why their mother decided to “keep” their youngest brother.48 “They stay away from him, and 
they treat him like he’s sick,” she explained, “but he’s not sick (huwweh mish murīd)!” Although 
a few years had passed since the initial shock of Abud’s diagnosis, relations with her family 
remained strained. When Hiba asked for her husband’s contact information, a standard procedure 
of the intake interview, Imm Abud paused and suggested that she provide them with one of her 
daughters’ phone numbers instead.  
Families who receive a diagnosis of Down Syndrome in the first days of their child’s life 
are better positioned, at least in theory, to secure earlier and more comprehensive health and 
therapeutic interventions than those who find out months or even years later. Popular 
representations of Down Syndrome in Jordan, as in the United States, place significant emphasis 
on the cognitive impairments associated with the condition. For many individuals and their 
                                                
46 The atmosphere surrounding these exchanges of information was usually conversational and open, and dialogues 
flowed in and out of more general discussions with other mothers and staff members.  
47 This additional detail led her and Hiba to a brief side conversation about why some men react this way. “Mish 
insān!” exclaimed Hiba (he has no humanity)! 
48 I was unsure what “keeping” versus “leaving” a child entailed. When I later asked Hiba, she explained that she 
thought not keeping a child meant “putting him in a residential center and acting like he’s not part of the family.” 
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families, however, health problems that include, “heart anomalies and conditions, 
hypothyroidism, leukemia, digestive ailments and celiac disease, [and] strong susceptibility to 
life-threatening pneumonia,” emerge in daily life as the most consequential aspects of the Down 
Syndrome (Pohlman 2010, 54). These chronic bodily vulnerabilities foster an intimate 
dependence on and appreciation for medical technologies, the pursuit of which families frame as 
acts of love, care, and obligation. 
Ethnographies of biomedicine have explored how global and local histories of inequality 
transform and rework medical practices (Street 2014; Wendland 2010). Medical anthropologists 
have effectively challenged biomedicine’s singularizing assumption that bodies everywhere 
operate in fundamentally the same ways, tracing the historical and local circumstances that forge 
situated “local biologies” (Lock 1993, 1995, 2017; Lock and Nguyen 2010). They have also 
produced searing critiques of biomedicine as complicit in creating and reinforcing processes of 
social abandonment, inequality, racism, and political violence (Biehl 2005; Bridges 2011; 
Comaroff 1993; Farmer 2003; Hamdy 2012). Yet biomedicine can also provide opportunities. 
For example, it offers life-saving vaccinations against infectious diseases, although the 
pernicious effects of structural inequality increasingly undermine vaccination efforts (Barrett et 
al. 1998; Farmer 1999). Biomedical technologies can also offer life-changing solutions for 
previously intractable conditions like infertility (Bharadwaj 2016; Franklin and Ragoné 1998; 
Inhorn 2003; Inhorn and Birenbaum-Carmeli 2008). Some scholars have even suggested that, 
“medicine can also be empowering for the postcolonial indigenous subject,” capable of wielding 
tools and measurements in efforts to make claims against a historically oppressive state 
(Meekosha and Soldatic 2011, 1393; c.f. Salmon 2007).  
Like Imm Abud’s, most families’ earliest engagements with Down Syndrome come as a 
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complete surprise, described in terms of shock (saḍma), and they unfold through interactions 
with biomedical actors and institutions.49 Unofficial assessments or premonitions sometimes 
precede a delayed formal diagnosis. In these cases, family members turn to Google, Facebook, or 
even an older child’s biology textbook, to search for information or confirmation. Doctors 
approach diagnosis as a collective ritual, properly located within the extended family, or as a 
private dialogue between patriarchal authority figures. Imm Abud criticized her doctor for 
publicly revealing Abud’s diagnosis, locating this news as rightfully belonging first and foremost 
to husband and wife in their new roles as parents. The doctor clearly disagreed, choosing to 
provide the details of their son’s conditions to the larger kin group assembled at the hospital.  
Conflicting interpretations about the proper disclosure of diagnosis, however, reveal 
tensions beyond those of doctor-patient miscommunication. They gesture instead to broader 
uncertainties in contemporary Jordan about how to fit impairment and disability into available 
notions of health, normality, and difference. Veena Das and Rennu Addlakha, drawing on long-
term research in northern India, suggest that:  
A focus on kinship not as the extension of familial relations into community, but 
as the sphere in which the family has to confront ways of disciplining and 
containing contagion and stigma, yields startling revelations about disability and 
impairment as located not in (or only in) individual bodies, but rather as “off” the 
body of the individual and within a network of social and kin relationships. (2001, 
512)  
For families living in Amman, this description of impairment and disability as “‘off’ the body 
made intuitive sense to me. The connective (Joseph 1993) and networked qualities of impairment 
raise troubling questions about qualities of personhood, kinship, and social value in the face of 
embodied difference. The anxiety and shock experienced during diagnosis merge with rapid 
                                                
49 Approximately 97% of births in Jordan take place in either a clinic or hospital, a reflection of the country’s almost 
total medicalization of childbirth (Department of Statistics [Jordan] and ICF International 2013). 
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attempts to manage and mitigate disability’s feared consequences on collective family reputation. 
The marital troubles and mother blame experienced by Imm Abud fit into a widely observed 
response pattern that unfolds in the wake of diagnosing congenital disability in Jordan. Even 
individuals who align themselves against this reaction pattern identify concerns about marriage 
and heritability as serious obstacles they will inevitably confront among family and friends or, at 
the very least, in their wider community.  
Care networks in Jordan rely on a gendered distribution of re/productive labor, which in 
turn takes shape through perceptions of normality. Impairment and disability illuminate and 
unsettle investments in being “normal,” and families adopt different tactics to accommodate and 
protect the sanctity of their status as such. New framings and networks of disability advocacy, 
however, open up space for families to negotiate with the hegemony of normality. “The opposite 
of ṭabīʿī,” Imm Zahra once argued, while sitting with a group of mothers, “is maṣnūʿ 
(manufactured), which makes no sense in relation to people!” Imm Zahra was playing with the 
semantic flexibility of the word ṭabīʿī, most closely associated with word for nature, ṭabīʿa. All 
humans are ṭabīʿī, she sought to imply, because God creates all life. Given the scope of this 
oneness, natural and normal blend together in meaning. Congenital disabilities occur for different 
(and sometimes unknowable) reasons, and they can cause serious hardship. To call Down 
Syndrome abnormal or unnatural (mish ṭabīʿī), however, marked one as guilty of a serious 
misrecognition; God doesn’t make mistakes. Other interlocutors made similar arguments in 
claiming their children’s radical equality before God. Their attempts to create spaces for 
belonging within their kinship networks, however, rely on hierarchical relationships of 
protection, guardianship, and vulnerability.  
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Evaluations of normal depend on an individual’s capacities to fit within preexisting 
family structures and roles. Certain impairments, and the assumptions able-bodied and able-
minded persons hold about their disabling effects, seriously threaten the abilities of persons with 
Down Syndrome to “fit” at different points in time. The increasing medicalization of disability in 
Jordan plays a complex role in these evaluations of normality and their disabling consequences. 
Many of the social factors that contribute to the stigmatization of disability superficially align 
with medical concepts, especially with regard to inheritance. The local beliefs and social 
structures that define inheritance, however, rely on the importance of genealogy as a kind of 
moral substance and the ultimate power of divine authority. These dimensions of inheritance 
ultimately extend beyond and encompass the medical domain.50 Parents seize on medical 
knowledge as a new resource with the potential to challenge the nonmedical structures of power 
and stigma that families encounter. Yet medical authority intersects with other modes of 
patriarchal power and social inequality to imperil women and their children in special ways, as 
the following example illustrates. 
Damages: what does an extra chromosome do? 
I met Reham at a free dental clinic hosted by the al-Nur Society. Clearly in her teens, she 
was the oldest person with Down Syndrome in attendance at this particular event. Many of the 
other families, whose children were much younger, watched Reham intensely, as though she 
                                                
50 In Mariam Coker’s research on stigma and mental illness in Egypt, respondents were not particularly concerned 
with the labels applied to different mental illnesses. They focused instead on whether the person’s condition affected 
their ability to fulfill expected social roles. When shown a series of vignettes featuring persons exhibiting behaviors 
associated with various psychiatric disorders, “it was alcohol abuse, not the strange behaviors and words portrayed 
in the psychotic vignette, that elicited the greatest need for social distance” (Coker 2005, 925). Research participants 
used medicalized understandings of mental illness to contextualize and minimize the stigma of such conditions, 
which they recognized as potentially temporary and importantly amenable to treatment. Alcoholism, however – 
perceived as a moral failing against the teachings of Islam, contagious in its damage to social reputation, and 
associated with unpredictable violence – elicited more stigmatizing responses.  
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could offer them a glimpse into their own child’s future. Reham was friendly, outgoing, and 
funny. She walked around the room with gusto, properly introducing herself to the many new 
acquaintances that filled the clinic. Her own mother and grandmother stayed somewhat more 
aloof, observing the scene at large and the rest of the parents in attendance. Reham began 
attending the Society after meeting several families at the clinic day, and I often chatted with her 
mother when she dropped Reham off in the morning or came to pick her up early in the 
afternoon. Eventually, I asked if she was willing to talk with me in greater depth, and she 
suggested we meet in a café at a nearby mall. 
 Imm Reham recalled the details of Reham’s birth and younger years quite clearly; they 
seemed in some ways still fresh, despite the fact that Reham was approaching her 18th birthday. 
Imm Reham’s husband worked in the pharmaceuticals industry, and they had moved around the 
Middle East for his work when Reham was younger. Imm Reham was well educated, well 
traveled, and had several close family members living in Europe, the United States, and the Arab 
Gulf. Although we began to talk about Reham’s Down Syndrome in terms of the moment of 
diagnosis, Imm Reham shifted our conversation to earlier points in time.  
I saw people like [Reham] when I was younger, before I was married. You can 
tell from their eyes, more than anything else. But I didn't know anything scientific 
about them, that their name was Down Syndrome. I knew them like everyone 
knows them, as monghōl. When Reham was born, I didn't know anything was 
wrong for a month. But in the nursery at the hospital, I noticed her eyes. She is 
different.51 After that, after a month, my husband told me that she has an extra 
chromosome. I also thought ‘Oh it's better?! Maybe she will be a genius!’ He told 
me, “No, this extra chromosome, it damages. It doesn't make things better.”  
Imm Reham’s husband eventually admitted to her that the doctors informed him of Reham’s 
condition as soon as she was born. 
                                                
51 Imm Reham code-switched throughout our conversation, turning to English to express particular words and 
phrases that I represent in her speech with italics. 
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Women consistently reported this experience of doctors bypassing them entirely and 
delivering diagnoses directly to their husbands. This selective communication did not endanger 
Imm Reham or her daughter, but the biased informational route often has grave implications for 
both mother and child. Strong models of normality and difference shape how families respond to 
diagnosis. In turn, their responses often reveal the primacy of agnatic ties and patriarchal bonds 
during moments of post-diagnosis shock. Imm Reham witnessed one such situation play out 
within her own extended kinship network. She explained: 
I have a relative, she gave birth to a girl with Down Syndrome. One month before 
me. Her daughter is practically the same age as Reham. They are divorced! As 
soon as the girl was born, when the mother returned home after the hospital, the 
lock on the door was changed. “Go to your family,” [her husband said]. There are 
different reactions. But no, my husband, he loves Reham very much, and his 
family and my family. Everyone.  
Several months later, while visiting Imm Reham and Reham at their family home in a suburb of 
northwest Amman, we again spoke about Imm Reham’s relative and her daughter with Down 
Syndrome.   
The daughter died. Very recently. She got sick, and they couldn’t afford to take 
her to a hospital where she could get direct ICU care. She died on the hospital 
bed. The hospital refused to release the body to her mother. They insisted on 
waiting for her father, who had literally never seen her in his entire life. 
Eventually, his family showed up to claim the body and pay the expenses. They 
dealt with the burial, and the mother had no say. 
Imm Reham shook her head in dismay. Reham and her relative’s daughter experienced Down 
Syndrome in vastly different ways. Their “extra chromosome” intersected with larger structures 
of power and materialized through the contingent dynamics of kin relations, marital ties, and 
financial resources. Diagnosis and its consequences hinge, in part, on the relationship between 
parents as spouses. But these marital ties do not shape diagnostic trajectories alone. Families 
strive to distinguish between maraḍ and mitlāzama in order to create a space for Down Syndrome 
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apart from disease and beyond monghōlī. They nevertheless situate Down Syndrome in relation 
to the enduring primacy of kinship and its reproduction through marriage. The following section 
explores why diagnosis so deeply affects the marital ties families imagined as part of their 
futures, which in turn, significantly shaped how individuals and families relate to Down 
Syndrome in the present. I describe this intimate connection between diagnosis and future 
marriage through the concept of marital prognostics.  
III. Marital prognostics 
The points of tension and conflict that emerge in the previous narratives – sickness, 
normality, privacy, gendered blame, divorce – provide ethnographic specificity to the collective 
and structural forms of stigma that mark families and individuals in Amman’s changing 
disability world. Families’ negotiations of stigma cluster around one key term: ʿayb (shame, 
although I aim to complicate this translation). In Jordan, discourses around what and who counts 
as ʿayb circulate through everyday exchanges and in different social and relational contexts. 
Parents and older relatives chastise wayward children with “‘ayb!” – for failing to properly greet 
an older relative, stealing their siblings’ toys, or running out in front of guests not properly 
clothed. In this delivery, ‘ayb functions as a direct but relatively gentle form of admonishment 
akin to “that’s rude!” ‘Ayb can also draw attention to more serious social breaches, deployed to 
call out young men for hassling a woman on the street or uttered in response to the makeup-
heavy, kissy-face selfie a friend’s daughter posts on Facebook. This use of the term conveys a 
public statement akin to, “that’s not right.” I start with these deployments to situate ‘ayb as a 
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well-established mode for articulating social criticism and calling attention to public52 breaches 
of decorum and moral standards.  
Yet ʿayb itself has also emerged as the object of widespread critique among my 
interlocutors. Families explicitly link the importance of ‘ayb to practices they increasingly 
consider problematic, such as the stigmatization of disability. The term thus belongs to the zone 
of what Michael Herzfeld has described in terms of cultural intimacy, or "the recognition of 
those aspects of cultural identity that are considered a source of external embarrassment but 
which nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality" (Herzfeld 1997, 
3; Shryock 2004a, 2004b). By following how behaviors identified as ‘ayb shape daily and 
changing interactions with Down Syndrome, the dangers that disabilities pose within families’ 
local moral worlds emerge more clearly (Kleinman 1999). These dangers are complex and 
multifaceted, but families connect them to the marital problems and prognostications provoked 
by diagnosis. What, then, does ‘ayb ultimately signify, and why is it considered problematic, 
both analytically and in social practice? 
The anthropology of ʿayb 
Accounting for the relationship between ‘ayb and disability brings me to a field of 
anthropological work that has, over time, become the subject of intense and widespread 
criticism.53 In its most direct translation, as shame, anthropologists have conventionally 
approached ‘ayb as intimately bound up with the value, distinction, and perception of honor 
(sharaf). Anthropologists working in the Mediterranean region during in the middle of the 20th 
                                                
52 I do not use the word public here in its classic Habermasian sense, but rather to convey the kinds of social space 
generated by the presence of non-intimates. 
53 Paul Dresch, describing his fieldwork in Yemen during the late 1980s, notes by that time that already, “honour 
had fallen under ban among Mediterraneanists” (2000, 110). My work on ‘ayb both confirms his observation while 
problematizing why this must necessarily be the case. 
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century, influenced by prevailing theories of structural-functionalism,54 argued that the existence 
of an “honor-shame complex” provided evidence for the region’s cultural unity (Abou-Zeid 
1966; Campbell 1964; Pitt-Rivers 1954, 1966).55  While individuals’ engagements with the 
concept of an honor-shame complex reflect the particularities of their fieldsites and theoretical 
orientations, they shared some basic assumptions. To quote from the paradigmatic volume edited 
by J.G. Peristiany, Honor and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society: 
Honor and shame are social evaluations and thus participate in of the nature of 
social sanctions, the more monolithic the jury, the more trenchant the judgment. 
Honor and shame are two poles of an evaluation. They are the reflection of the 
social personality in the mirror of social ideals… Honor is at the apex of the 
pyramid of temporal social values and it conditions their hierarchical order. 
Cutting across all other social classifications it divides social beings into two 
fundamental categories, those endowed with honor and those deprived of it.” 
(Peristiany 1966, 9–10, my emphasis) 
Several critiques have taken this early “Mediterranean” school of honor and shame to task.56 
Michael Herzfeld (1980) argues that ethnographers paid far too little attention to the specific 
linguistic terms and social context[s] that shaped indigenous terminologies of honor. Uni Wikkan 
suggests that male anthropologists uncritically accepted men’s descriptions of honor and shame 
at face value while failing to give equal consideration to the ways that women shape and 
                                                
54 Coombe (1990) notes that “the fundamental inadequacies of structural functionalism have not been remedied by 
subsequent explanations or interpretations of the honour/shame complex that adopt such divergent perspectives as 
materialism (Schneider 1971), economic determinism (Davis 1977), and structuralist symbolic analysis” (223). 
55 The easy elision between Mediterranean and Middle East obscures a considerably different set of geopolitical 
circumstances. 
56 Turning briefly to the study of shame outside the contested project of Mediterranean anthropology reveals 
strikingly parallel tensions and concerns that gesture to similar disjunctures between lived importance and academic 
discomfort. Fung, writing about childhood socialization in China, describes shame as “the quintessential sociomoral 
emotion” (Fung 1999, 181). She notes, however, that, “contemporary Western theorists tend to treat shame 
negatively and primitively as a problem to be solved or a disease to cure; shame is often associated with children, 
savages, and neurotics [Greighton 1990; Schneider 1977, 1987]” (Fung 1999, 182). The emphases in Chinese 
culture on “face, criticism, and evaluation,” speak to the central importance of shame in developing personhood. 
Yet, Fung argues, relatively little attention has been directed to studying the processes through which shame 
becomes meaningfully embodied and incorporated into social interaction and structures of dominance because of a 
reticence on the part of scholars to engage a discredited term. 
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participate in their local moral systems (1984; see also Abu-Lughod 1985, 1986). A gendered 
bias responsible for distorting the primacy of honor in the ethnographic literature resulted in the 
relative neglect of shame as productive of its own complex moral terrain. “Could this be,” asks 
Wikkan, “why those who study honor and shame always insist that they are binary terms, and 
always focus their discussion on honor, as if it were dominant” (1984, 635).57   
In my own work, rather than approach honor-and-shame as elements of a fixed moral 
code, I draw from more recent scholarship that approaches honor and/or shame as differently 
situated and variably connected means for motivating actions and justifying reactions. In other 
words, honor and/or shame are invoked as situated modes of practice connected to specific moral 
projects. Anthropologist Morgan Clarke, for example, describes honor as the sense of  “shared 
responsibility for a group’s common public standing… and the importance for that public 
standing of sexual morality, a highly gendered domain” (2007, 380). He situates this shared 
responsibility within the larger moral world of his interlocutors, where the importance of social 
closeness deeply shapes people’s sense of being in and negotiating the world around them. My 
own ethnographic data show ‘ayb as a commonsense and effective way to articulate judgments 
on proper socialization and moral legitimacy. It seems critical to note that when I prompted 
interlocutors to explain the relationship between disability and ʿayb, they found it completely 
strange to describe ʿayb in any terms other than ʿayb itself. Describing a similar phenomenon 
with regards to the role of ʿayb in her own fieldsite, Wikkan suggests that, “shame is, to use a 
distinction made by Geertz, an 'experience-near' concept… [people] do not, except fleetingly and 
                                                
57 In an exchange between Wikkan and Kressel, the latter chastises Wikkan by cautioning her that, “an incomplete 
survey of terms regarding shame and honour in the cultural setting may distort the linguistic analysis and theoretical 
conclusions that follow” (Kressel and Wikkan 1988, 168). He follows this by wondering why Wikkan did not 
address other forms of the term “shame,” concentrating only on ‘ayb. Wikkan’s responded that her “whole analytical 
premise… is based on carefully contextualized data on occurrence and non-occurrence of the various terms in 
clearly identified groups,” rather than relying on an Arabic dictionary as a meaningful key to social practice and 
value” (Kressel and Wikkan 1988, 170). 
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on occasion, recognize that there are any ‘concepts’ involved at all' [I976, 224]” (1984, 637).58 
Yet my interlocutors did in fact clearly identify concepts and make connections between ʿayb 
and other aspects of their moral world. The following examples illustrate the kinds connections 
they did – and did not – make.  
When I asked why families hid children with disabilities or what they were hiding from, 
the response connected ʿayb with culture; “this is our culture, a culture of ʿayb (hadī hiyya 
thaqāfatnā, thaqāfat al-ʿayb).” Despite the difficulty of describing what qualified something as 
‘ayb, families clearly link it to hiding children with Down Syndrome, both as the animating logic 
for this practice and as a judgment against it. In other words, some families feel that children 
with Down Syndrome cannot be presented to their larger kin and social networks, so they hide 
them. Other families, however, consider this very behavior and the thought processes enabling it 
as inappropriate and wrong.  These linkages, in turn, provide an ethnographically grounded 
approach to tracing how ‘ayb functions both as a designation of moral risk and a public form of 
moral censure, the exact targets of which can and do change over time. In the following 
discussion, Hana repeatedly connects ʿayb to the importance and risks involved in marriage. This 
connection, in turn, links back to the importance of collective reputation and the moral 
significance of genealogies addressed in the next section. 
Being and feeling ʿayb 
I first met Hana through her brother Jamil, who has Down Syndrome and attended a 
social event at the Society. Hana and Jamil were close; they lived with their parents in a northern 
                                                
58 Many of the key terms also translated as honor – ‘ard, sharaf, others – did not enter into the discursive field of my 
research. Sharaf appeared in local print sources to refer to a specific category of crimes – jarīmat al-sharaf (honor 
crime) – committed by the (usually) male relatives of a woman accused of endangering her family’s reputation and 
honor. I frequently encountered idioms of honor, however, in the context of hospitality exchanges. “Bitsharifna/ 
sharaftūna (you honor/have honored us), a gracious host will proffer upon greeting, serving, and saying farewells to 
her guest. 
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suburb of Amman on a large family compound that included a small parcel of land, an 
abundance of fruit trees, and an enviable breeze. Hana had a Bachelor’s degree in Arabic 
literature and taught English in a private high school. Sitting in a coffee shop on one of the busy 
streets surrounding the University of Jordan, I asked Hana to tell me more about her brother’s 
diagnosis. Relatively young at the time of her brother’s birth, Hana did not recall many details. “I 
remember that we knew Jamil was Down Syndrome from the hospital, from his birth.59 It was a 
shock (ṣadma) in the beginning. I was young. I didn't really understand. But I remember my 
mother's face, my father's face…” She trailed off for a moment and then continued: 
Most of the people in my mother and father's families accept Jamil. [But] there 
are some people who said "no.” They don't want to deal with him… The most 
important thing is that we treat him like he's a completely normal person, 100% 
(shakhs tabī'ī mi’a bi mi’a)… We didn't feel haraj (embarrassment).60 People here 
feel haraj and thaqāfat al ‘ayb – to have a Down son, monghōlī, that this is ‘ayb. 
Of course, this is a wrong understanding! 
Hana identified both her mother and her father’s families as distinct and important networks for 
measuring the effects of Jamīl’s Down Syndrome, reflecting the roles of paternal and maternal 
kin in shaping families’ perceptions of Down Syndrome.  
In Hana’s explanation, ‘ayb functions as both a feeling – “people here feel haraj and 
thaqāfat al ‘ayb” – and as a quality inhering in people or things, “to have a Down son… this is 
‘ayb.” Possessing both affective and effective dimensions, ‘ayb encompasses how families feel 
                                                
59 The National Down Syndrome Society and Global Down Syndrome Society have issued statements against the 
use of “Down’s” as an adjective. However, I frequently encountered Down being used this way in local 
conversation. It’s interesting to not that while issues surrounding person-first versus identity-based language are 
hotly debated across North American disability communities, I have rarely encountered Down Syndrome discussed 
in this conversations. Arabic grammar, however, allows for an easier adoption of Down Syndrome into identity-
based language. 
60 Haraj was not a word I heard families invoke as frequently as ‘ayb. However, in local journalistic coverage of 
disability issues, the terms haraj, khajal, ‘ayb – and less frequently ‘ār – appear to be used somewhat 
interchangeably (Al-Riahi 2017). Interestingly, haraj can also connote a sense of confinement or constraint, which 
aligned with a common set of images that people utilized to describe culture and tradition and burdensome, heavy, 
or consisting of walls.   
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about disability, and it motivates them to respond in certain ways. I asked Hana to explain where 
the idea that Down Syndrome is ‘ayb originated. “From society!” she exclaimed, as if this were 
the only possible answer. “From the customs and traditions. [People with Down Syndrome] look 
strange, so people can't think ‘this is a normal person’ (shakhs 'ādī)… People feel ashamed 
(haraj wa khajal).”61 The significance of ‘ayb attests to the significance of marriageability in 
shaping one’s status as an adult person and in a family’s reputation and future security. When 
families talk about disability and ‘ayb, they speak to the importance of being deemed normal, a 
quality that gestures to moral and increasingly medicalized qualities.62 The centrality of 
“normal” to the marriageability not only of individuals, but more importantly, of family 
collectives, reinforces and naturalizes gendered hierarchies of able-bodiedness and able-
mindedness.63  
Like many of my interlocutors, Hana turned to the social stakes of marriage to explain the 
content and consequences of thaqāfat al-ʿayb. After describing the equation of disability with 
‘ayb as a product of “society,” she shared the following news segment to demonstrate her point:  
A month ago, I heard a story – if you can imagine – this girl was 3 years old and 
had Down Syndrome. Her father did not accept her (ghayr mutaqabbal ilhā), and 
he wanted to marry another woman to have normal children. Can you imagine?! 
We're in 2015, and there are people who still think like this. But there are also 
people, like you see at the Society, the families are happy and love their kids. But 
the majority of people don't accept… abnormal children (ibnā' ghayr tabī'iyyīn). 
                                                
61 Here, khajal convey shame in the sense of disgrace; it can also signify shyness, timidity, and bashfulness; “Are 
you shy, Christine, (intī khajlāna)?” Female hosts would often tease me in their attempts to pile endless helpings of 
food on my plate, and in so doing to demonstrate the intimacy between guest and host. In that context, shame 
obtained the positive sense of embodying gendered ideals of modesty, deference, and appropriate conduct. 
Similarly, ‘ayb could also be used in constructive and positive ways, such as in the example of socializing children 
to adhere to norms of etiquette. 
62 In the context of disability and marriage, my interlocutors clearly posed the stakes of the issues at hand in terms of 
‘ayb. 
63 I use this term and distinguish between these two dimensions of ableism, following Kafer (2013). 
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Existing marriages, children, and the hegemony of normality intertwine in Hana’s example, and 
they hinge on perceptions of maternal responsibility, a point I will return to below. But what kind 
of children are normal children? I asked Hana for more clarification on the role of ‘ayb in 
generating this scenario. “I understand the word,” I began, “but what does it mean here?” She 
thought about this and then offered the following explanation, concretely grounded in questions 
of future marital risk:  
[There is the] idea that when their children marry in the future, when people come 
to marry the girl – especially the girl – people will say “Ah… her brother is 
monghōlī. No no no. We don’t want this. Maybe she’ll give birth to a monghōlī 
baby. They think there is inheritance (wirātha). There isn’t! But just a little while 
ago I saw a program on Ro’ya [a local TV channel] about Down Syndrome. They 
asked people in the street: “Would you marry a girl who had a brother with Down 
Syndrome?” Most people said no. They told them it’s not inherited, and people 
said, “Maybe it’s inherited. Maybe not” And some people said, “Stay away. Why 
bring problems (laysh ajīb mashākil)?” 
Hana does not describe ‘ayb in terms of ‘ayb. In fact, she doesn’t use the word at all. Instead she 
points to the persistent concerns about marriage and the potential for “bringing problems.” 
Marriage exposes families to risk; disability – real or feared – intensifies these risks, which are 
embodied and social in nature. Normal children grow up and get married, and disability threatens 
this future for all children involved – or does it? 
  Note that the reporter clearly stopped to ask men on the street, as the question he posed 
was “would you marry a girl who had a brother with Down Syndrome?” Hana did not believe 
that Jamil’s Down Syndrome affected her older and younger brothers’ marital pursuits. In her 
own life however, she acknowledged that: 
When some people came to ask for my hand and found out I had a monghōlī 
brother, they distanced themselves… So then others suggested, “don’t let Jamil 
enter [the room]; that way people can’t see him.” I said to them, “On the contrary, 
they will see him from day one. Anyone who wants to marry me needs to see him. 
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And anyone who doesn’t like him… See you later! Allah maʿak (God be with 
you)! 
Women spoke candidly about the risks that the presence of Down Syndrome posed to their own 
and others’ marriageability.64 Unlike in the past, however, new framings of disability have 
empowered women like Hana – with the support of her family – to judge the marital potential of 
a suitor and his family based on their attitudes toward a member with Down Syndrome. Hana 
was not the only young woman I met who dismissed encounters with prejudice as indicative of a 
suitor’s ignorance and the sure sign of a poor match. Women’s abilities to position themselves 
and make such claims, however, require some degree of social and cultural capital, in addition to 
familial support. The fact that perceptions of disability as ‘ayb can themselves be subject to 
critique, and in some instances by using the same terms (‘ayb becomes ‘ayb) clarifies the work 
that ‘ayb does as a mode of moral exposure. Rather than accept disability itself as a form of 
exposure, families attempt to stigmatize disability stigma, exposing the moral weakness and 
backwardness of others.  
IV. Moral etiologies 
Biogenetic explanations for chromosomal disorders appear to make a good deal of sense 
in Jordan. The transmission of chromosomes follows pathways that overlap with the genealogies 
that families cite and use to trace their histories and origins. The biogenetic expression of Down 
Syndrome, however, which can only be described in terms of randomness and risk, does not 
seem to disrupt enduring concerns about its hereditary transmission and/or potentially contagious 
qualities. “Maybe it’s inherited, maybe not.” This ambiguity persists precisely due to the 
                                                
64 Had I worked more with fathers and brothers, perhaps a different perspective would have emerged. Mothers and 
sisters, however, described the stigmatizing effects of disability as explicitly gendered and threatening the 
marriageability of women, rather than men. 
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entanglements of genealogy and morality. The alacrity with which chromosomes and genes have 
been assimilated into local understandings of relatedness and genealogy suggests this preexisting 
compatibility. So much so that anthropologist Marcia Inhorn has argued:  
Certainly in the Sunni Muslim world… pre-existing Islamic imperatives regarding 
'pure' lineage, coupled with Islamic prohibitions against adoption, not only 
privilege but, in fact, mandate biological as opposed to social construction of 
families... biogenetic relatedness – glossed as nasab, or blood relations – is an 
absolute imperative. (2003, 120) 
Morgan Clarke, in contrast, drawing on his fieldwork with Islamic theologians, jurists, and IVF 
practitioners in Lebanon, arrives at a somewhat different conclusion. He writes that: 
The question remains as to whether nasab ('filiation') can indeed be seen as a 
gloss for biogenetic ‘relatedness,’ and classically at least the answer is no. Nasab 
is legitimate relatedness. All children born to a married couple are considered in 
Islamic law, both Sunni and Shiite, as the children of that couple. (Clarke 2008, 
163 my emphasis) 
Clarke’s distinction points to the fact that a child born out of wedlock cannot claim nasab. 
Irrespective of biological paternity, from an Islamic legal perspective the illegitimate child 
cannot claim a place in their father’s patriline.65 Beyond legal distinctions, however concerns 
about sexual morality, and belief in the role of marriage as necessary for preventing social crisis, 
exist across different sectarian and religious communities.  
The values often glossed as 'honor and shame' in an anthropological literature that 
extends across the Mediterranean and throughout the Middle East are of enduring, 
if variable, importance. Public standing or 'reputation' (sum'ah) is tied to, among 
other things, sexual propriety, in particular the sexual continence of female 
relatives. (2008, 159) 
                                                
65 The advent of paternity tests has raised bioethical quandaries across Muslim societies. See Shabana (2012) and 
Hasso (2010) for analyses of an infamous public paternity dispute that played out in the Egyptian media. 
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Even for communities that do not draw on nasab, children born out of wedlock may be denied 
recognition by their father’s family and stigmatized by their mother’s, as they embody evidence 
of moral indiscretion.  
Inhorn and Clarke, along with many scholars who explore the role of new reproductive 
technologies (NRTs) in reshaping ideologies and practices of kinship, focus on these innovations 
in relation to the absence of desired children (Carsten 2004; M. Clarke 2009; Franklin and 
McKinnon 2001; Roberts 2012a; Strathern 1992). This latent pronatalism, however, leaves 
unconsidered the acts and processes intended to cut or deny ties of kinship, especially in cases of 
illness or impairment (Biehl 2005; Scheper-Hughes 1992; Weiss 1994). While illegitimacy, from 
a legal perspective, may entail a form of social death in Arab communities, marital legitimacy 
does not protect children or their mothers from the potential consequences of being labeled 
abnormal. Chromosomes aside, other substances, qualities, and dangers can be passed through 
family lineage.  
Anthropologist Sherine Hamdy uses the concept of “political etiologies” to describe how 
patients in contemporary Egypt “make meaning out of illness and explain kidney disease in 
terms of the social, economic, and political ills afflicting Egypt as a whole” (2008, 554). The 
meanings that families in Jordan make out of disability lack the sharp biopolitical edge of 
Hamdy’s Egyptian interlocutors, or those of families dealing with the fallout of Agent Orange 
after the Vietnam War (Gammeltoft 2014) and disasters like Chernobyl (Petryna 2003). The 
state, in particular, recedes from the meanings that families make out of congenital disability in 
Jordan. Yet these meanings nevertheless involve politics of the most intimate and enduring kind, 
potentially serving as moral indictments of family lineage. This is especially the case for 
congenital disabilities. An increasing focus on consanguineous marriage as a public health risk 
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has added yet another layer to the already fraught dynamics of marriage, lineage, and perceptions 
of moral culpability. These dynamics culminate in what I describe as moral etiologies, keeping in 
mind that the moral always involves different scales of power and politics. Moral etiologies 
unfold where scientific ambiguity and patriarchal authority can position women as agents of 
culpability. Women, in turn, draw on scientific ambiguity and spiritual certainty to challenge the 
legitimacy of existing moral etiologies. 
Mothers as (clinical) risks 
During an eid celebration at the Society during the summer of 2015, Imm Zayna stood 
chatting with a group of mothers while we waited for the sun to set. She looked around at her 
peers, her face pregnant with thought. “I suppose,” she began, “that I’m the oldest mother in the 
room…” Her speech trailed off and she focused her sights on baby Zayna, who was fast asleep in 
her arms. Imm Zayna did not need to finish her thought, however, before being met by a chorus 
of “tsks.” Imm Munir threw her arms out in front of her, “sister, the mother does not cause Down 
Syndrome (ya ukhti, al-imm mā tasabbab Down)!” Three or four other women seated around us 
nodded vigorously in agreement.  
In fact, maternal age remains the only statistically significant correlation with increased 
risk for Down Syndrome. The majority of babies with Down Syndrome, however, are 
nevertheless born to women under the threshold risk of 40. This is because the under-40 
population accounts for the majority of pregnant women. The presence and predominance of 
younger and first time mothers at the Society conformed to this distribution. In my own non-
representative total sample of 68 women, I met only two mothers who gave birth to a child with 
Down Syndrome after the age of 40, and both of their pregnancies were unplanned. Older 
mothers who came into the Society were met with compassion, and occasionally, quieter 
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expressions of contempt. Peers expressed compassion for the challenges they were undoubtedly 
facing and contempt for allowing a presumably unplanned pregnancy to occur. Equally as 
unpalatable to most of my participants was the prospect of an older woman intentionally 
pursuing pregnancy at an advanced age (although the local boundary for advanced maternal age 
did not necessarily align with the medical boundary, set at 35 years).  
Despite attempts to raise awareness that Down Syndrome is not genetically transmitted 
from parent to child, women in particular encounter accusations of passing or somehow more 
generally causing the condition.66 The replication error causing Down Syndrome occurs as the 
result of meiotic nondisjunction during Meiosis I or II. The reasons for this disjunction remain 
poorly understood, despite the fact that Down Syndrome is the most common chromosomally-
based cause of intellectual disability (Antonarakis et al. 1992). In the most common form of 
Down Syndrome, an additional copy of chromosome 21 exists in all cells of the body (resulting 
in an overexpression of the genes located on this chromosome). While genetic in its makeup, the 
condition is not hereditary.67 This slipperiness extends across languages to Arabic, where the 
term wirāthī can serve as a general translation for both terms.68 Thus, Down Syndrome is wirāthī 
but is not wirāthī.  
I once mentioned the persistence of suspicions about inheritance to my friend Serene, and 
she shook her head with an ironic laugh. Serene was a renowned special education expert and 
                                                
66 Approximately 90% of meiotic disjunction errors are in fact of maternal origin (Christianson, Sherman, and Torfs 
2004). The mechanisms and contributing factors to these errors remain poorly understood and do not appear to be 
hereditary (i.e. the risk of meiotic errors cannot be predicted before the actual errors occur). Researchers have 
suggested such varied contributors as genetic predisposition (James et al. 1999) and socioeconomic status (Hassold 
and Sherman 2000). Were local discussions of causality to reach this level of complexity – which admittedly they 
have not – then the skewed distribution of disjunction error to the maternal side would fit with concerning ease into 
the “mother is at fault” narrative.  
67 When discussing my research in the United States, I also frequently encounter the belief that Down Syndrome is 
inherited. 
68 I occasionally heard people make use of the adjective jīniyya in an attempt to avoid this confusion. 
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also a dedicated caretaker for her younger brother with Down Syndrome. When I asked whether 
she thought that emphasizing the non-hereditary mode of transmission responsible for Down 
Syndrome might disrupt local practices of stigma and blame, she shook her head in the negative. 
“Arabs blame the mother when a daughter is born. We all know who is responsible for that 
second X chromosome! And still they blame her!” Serene did not question that a considerable 
portion of the population would be familiar with biogenetic accounts of birth and development 
(they are, to varying degrees); rather, she pointed out an important disconnect. Biogenetic 
inheritance coexists with a second model. This model of transmission emphasizes the importance 
of the womb and operates in a context where men are better positioned to draw on patrilineal 
solidarity and patriarchal authority to blame women for unexpected birth outcomes.69 
In the summer of 2015, during a brief return trip to Amman, I visited Imm Maha, whom I 
had met over two years prior on her very first visit to the Society with her daughter and husband. 
Imm Maha and her family had recently moved out of the basement level apartment they shared 
with several of her kin by marriage in one of eastern Amman’s poorest and most infrastructurally 
distressed neighborhoods. While still located in the eastern part of the capital, their new second-
floor apartment was located some 15 minutes away from their previous home. Her in-laws did 
not take kindly to their son and daughter-in-law’s decision to relocate. The nuclear family of six, 
however, was preparing to welcome their seventh member and desperately needed more room to 
grow. During my visits to the former family compound, I was not able to talk with Imm Maha 
directly or privately. She was simply too busy preparing the day’s next meal and taking care of 
her kin.  
                                                
69 The majority of my research participants did not discuss the possibility that men might also be responsible for 
transmitting Down Syndrome. One mother did, however, express concern that her sons without Down Syndrome 
might also be able to “pass on ” the condition to their own future children.   
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During those previous visits, Imm Maha’s three sisters-in-law spoke for her and in the 
collective about their family’s experiences with Maha, who was 5 at the time of my return.  
Basking in the possibilities for frank discussion that her new house allowed, Imm Maha spent at 
least 15 minutes telling me about how she suffered under her in-laws’, and especially her 
mother-in-law’s, authority for 16 years.  
You know Christine, the situation was so bad. I was under so much stress. The 
doctor told me that it was probably my mother-in-law who caused Maha to have 
Down Syndrome because she put me under so much stress. You know we don’t 
have anything wirāthī (hereditary/genetic) in our family. My husband and I aren’t 
related. I mean I’m from Iraq! He’s Palestinian. 
Imm Maha stressed the “distance” between her husband’s and her own family origins; not only 
were they not related, they weren’t even from the same country.70 This statement reflects how, 
on the day-to-day level, genetics has become integrated into long-standing preoccupations with 
“marrying well.” 71 
While the rules of basic Mendelian inheritance confirm an increased risk for autosomal, 
recessively inherited genetic conditions in consanguineous marriage, the vast majority of 
genetically inherited traits and illnesses are transmitted through far more complex mechanisms 
(even the classic example of eye color, in reality, does not conform to a simple inheritance 
pattern). Clinical research on consanguinity and chromosomal conditions like Down Syndrome, 
or sex-linked and more complex multifactorial conditions, has yet to establish evidence for any 
                                                
70 In the Arab Middle East today, consanguineous marriages constitute between 20-50% of all marital unions, with 
nuptials between first cousins accounting for approximately one-third of all cases (Hamamy et al. 2005). In Jordan, 
consanguineous marriages account for 32% of all marriages, although this reported rate could benefit from updated 
study (Khoury and Massad 1992). The rate of marriages between parallel paternal first cousins (fathers are brothers), 
however, decreased significantly in marriages contracted after 1980 (Hamamy et al. 2005). Arab states, along with 
international development and health organizations, recognize the economic benefits of understanding the exact 
nature and extent of correlative and causal relationships between consanguineous marriage and genetic disorders, 
inherited conditions, and disabilities. 
71 A parallel discourse about the risks of consanguineous marriage also exists among Islamic scholars who note that 
“there are longstanding traditions within the Islamic corpus warning against such marriages” (Clarke 2007, 390). 
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direct inheritance patterns (El Mouzan et al. 2008). Complicating matters, historically extensive 
practices of endogamous marriages may also affect locally expressed rates of illness and 
disability at a level of population genetics that cannot be accounted for by the degree of 
consanguinity between spouses (Bittles 2002). These subtle but significant complexities tend to 
disappear from dominant representations of consanguinity in global public health and 
epidemiology (Shaw and Raz 2015). Imm Maha nevertheless incorporated the basics of genetic 
distance into her own moral etiology. The fact that she and her husband were not even from the 
“same country” further testified to the degree of duress she experienced at the hands of her in-
laws. Once safely removed from their watch, she reworked the dominant paradigm of mother-
blame and placed moral culpability on the shoulders of her mother-in-law. 
Alternative genealogies: “Alhamdulillah he is from God”: 
Men and women are not the only actors who play significant roles in moral etiologies. As 
Jordanian families encounter and make sense of Down Syndrome, scientific moral authority, 
geneticized risk, and culturalized blame intersect with powerful beliefs in the limits of 
knowledge, the intentionality of God’s creation, and the power of fate (qadr). Elizabeth Roberts 
notes that, “the critical medical anthropology and STS default is still to leave deities to the side” 
(Roberts 2016, 213). Even Margaret Lock’s paradigm-shifting framework of local biologies 
focuses on the dialectics of nature-culture relationships as defined in secular terms. This division 
becomes fuzzier when God operates as an active agent in the creation and material formation of 
life. For most of my interlocutors, God factors into diagnosis and determines the boundaries and 
soundness of existing and emerging moral etiologies. By emphasizing uncertainty and chance as 
chief causes of Down Syndrome, the certainty and completeness of God’s wisdom enables 
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families to frame stigma as un-Islamic.72 This indigenous mode of critique proves compelling 
even when parallel accusations of scientific ignorance fail. 
At the same eid celebration where Imm Zayna voiced concerns about her age, I spent 
time chatting with Imm Khalil. Khalil, who had very recently become an older brother, attended 
the Society almost every day. As I inquired about the new baby’s health, I caught Imm Sami’s 
eye, and she came over to join us. Both women had fled the growing destruction of the Syrian 
civil war with members of their immediate and extended families in tow. After they exchanged 
greetings and congratulations about the new baby, Imm Sami turned to me. “Where are you 
from?” she asked. I explained myself while wondering why she looked so familiar and whether 
she was the mother of someone at the Society. After hearing a description of my project, Imm 
Sami exclaimed, “Well do you want to come to talk me?!” I replied that I most certainly did. She 
then clarified that she was in fact the mother of a young man with Down Syndrome whom I had 
come to know quite well. 
A few weeks later, I showed up in the working class neighborhood of Amman where 
Sami and his family had made their temporary home in exile, along with many other Syrian 
families. Sami waited dutifully on the street corner, tasked with signaling that I had arrived at the 
correct building. When I spotted him, I sighed with relief that we had reached the right place. I 
pointed to Sami and asking the driver to drop me off by my friend’s son. He complied, shooting 
a curious look my way but saying nothing. I wondered, in turn, whether this look was directed at 
me or at Sami, or perhaps the combination of us together. I hopped out of the cab and Sami 
                                                
72 While this could presumably slide into a framing of Down Syndrome as a “punishment” sent by God, I never 
encountered such a belief. While it was known that God might send trials and tribulations, the idea of disability as a 
“curse” was thought to mischaracterize God’s relationship with human beings and His qualities of mercy and 
generosity. That being said, the existence of this idea, even if invoked as a foil against proper understanding, 
suggests that my interlocutors were aware of such a reading. For the most part, families explain the damaging stigma 
surrounding disability as a consequence of the cultural and political-economic importance of marriage and collective 
reputation, which facilitate un-Islamic attitudes toward disability.  
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guided me into their home, an unassuming apartment building sandwiched between a car repair 
center and a barbershop.  
After preparing our Nescafe, Imm Sami and I settled in to our conversation. I asked Imm 
Sami about her pregnancy. Like many of her Jordanian counterparts, she recalled an intensely 
medicalized experience in Syria. Noting that she did not get pregnant until a few years after 
getting married, she nevertheless described the process as “very normal.” 
When I was pregnant, in the 9th month, the doctors watched me very closely. 
There was a German doctor who was watching over me. There was nothing 
wrong at all. And every now and then they would show me the ultrasound and tell 
me that the child was normal and was moving and that there was nothing wrong. 
As in the case of Imm Reham, who had only suspicions of Reham’s difference until a month 
after her birth, Sami’s doctors chose to selectively communicate his diagnosis solely to Imm 
Sami’s husband. Neither of the men in question, however, reacted like Imm Abud’s husband, 
who initially sought a divorce, or Reham’s relative’s father, who did in fact divorce his wife. 
Many of the men I met during my research did not publicly blame or actively seek retribution 
against their wives, regardless of their own private emotional responses.   
Imm Sami’s official exposure to her son’s diagnosis came unexpectedly and unpleasantly 
at a hospital emergency room: 
They told Abu Sami that his son was born monghōlī. In colloquial Arabic we call 
it ‘monghōlī’. They don’t use the words Down or Down Syndrome.  Did you 
notice that? … At the beginning, they hid it from me. They told me that there was 
nothing wrong, but that he was just sick. They didn’t tell me with what. Fifteen 
days later, he had jaundice. He was yellow! So, we went to the hospital, Abu 
Sami took me. He dropped us off in the emergency room. We were waiting for 
the doctor and then a second doctor came and said “Who is that, the monghōlī 
child?” I asked him what monghōlī meant and he told me it means that the child is 
disabled. And he apologized a lot, but I was very angry. I told him, 
“Alhamdulillah, He is from God.”  
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In her response to encountering the diagnosis of monghōlī, Imm Sami removed her son from the 
realm of genetic alterity by locating him within the moral genealogy shared by all human beings; 
Sami was “from God,” and that was something no legitimate doctor could dispute. Each time I 
visited Imm Sami at her home, however, she emphasized the impact of the gossip she endured 
about the etiology of Sami’s Down Syndrome. “There was talk from our relatives that [it was 
because] I was old and that I got married to one of my relatives and because it took me a while to 
get pregnant.” Returning to these memories on a later visit, Imm Sami added, “But even in 
America they don’t know where Down Syndrome comes from.” The fact that Down Syndrome 
exists in the United States, despite the absence of consanguineous marriage practices, carries 
symbolic value for many families. This is especially the case for individuals married to a 
relative, precisely because it challenges the widespread assumption that consanguinity somehow 
plays a role in their child’s condition.  
Many of my interlocutors are also aware that enormous gaps in scientific knowledge 
about Down Syndrome persist.73 Families value scientific uncertainty for the space it gives them 
to make claims against existing moral etiologies of Down Syndrome (Whitmarsh et al. 2007). 
Imm Sami mentioned the positive influence of a family friend in this regard, who also happened 
to be a nurse.  
She told us that he came to us like this from God and that Inshallah we will have 
children who are better than him. So we accepted him, and Abu Sami accepted it. 
And even three years later, he told me that if I got pregnant it would be fine, and 
even if I didn’t, it would be okay... Three years later, I got pregnant with Jawwad. 
I was afraid, but I prayed that God would give me a brother or sister for Sami. 
And then I gave birth to Jawwad. This convinced our relatives that the reason 
[Sami has Down Syndrome] was not because I was old or because my husband 
and I are related.  
                                                
73 Down Syndrome remains one of the least funded genetic conditions that receive support from the NIH. In 2011, 
the NIH spent $20 million on Down Syndrome compared to $169 million on autism research, $29 million on fragile 
X syndrome, and $23 million on cerebral palsy (Diament 2012). 
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Not knowing why Sami was born with Down Syndrome enabled his mother to challenge her 
relatives’ accusations. The arrival of their younger son, born without Down Syndrome, amplified 
the productive value of this uncertainty and inconsistency. At the conclusion of his wife’s story, 
Abu Sami added his own thought, the final pronouncement on the matter: “It was from God.”  
As families attempt to forge new moral etiologies, science and religion do not emerge as 
conflicting domains of knowledge production. Science, in general, confirms the goodness and 
generosity of God; it is a gift and a tool for the benefit of humankind. Whether through the 
register of science or faith, human mediation inevitably imposes constraints on the benefits and 
limits of scientific knowledge. These limits are also morally prescriptive, expressed through the 
conviction that human beings cannot, and, more importantly, should not know everything. This 
stance has significant implications for how mothers engage with increasing opportunities for 
gaining knowledge about disability before it occurs.    
V. Past perfect futures: New temporalities of diagnosis 
Prenatal screening and diagnostics belong to the category of biomedical innovations 
initially referred to as new reproductive technologies, or NRTs. This label includes, among 
others things, ultrasonography, amniocentesis, in vitro fertilization, and preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis. No longer quite so new, although still dynamically evolving, NRTs are now more 
commonly referred to as Artificial Reproductive Technologies (ARTs). Feminist scholars, in 
particular, have documented the acutely gendered dimensions and consequences of these 
technologies, which operate primarily – though not solely – through female bodies (Inhorn 1994, 
2003; Rapp 1999). Ayo Wahlberg and Tine Gammeltoft rightfully point out that while ARTs are 
most commonly framed as novel means for creating life, they are used just as much to select 
against bringing certain kinds of life into the world. Wahlberg and Gammeltoft employ the term 
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Selective Reproductive Technologies (2014), or SRTs, to call attention to these equal capacities 
for creation and termination. 
Prenatal screening and diagnostic tests identify risk by analyzing fetal and maternal 
biomarkers. Practitioners and recipients of these tests code the results in different ways, as 
genetic, embodied, familial, and societal. For the mothers I met in my research, the risks that 
prenatal screening and diagnostics are capable of identifying paled in comparison to the moral, 
social, and epistemological risks posed by the technology itself. Women support and completely 
embrace robust medical monitoring to ensure the overall health of both mother and fetus. They 
are deeply concerned, however, by the specific kinds of knowledge that screening and 
diagnostics provide and the ethical dilemmas created in the process. Although the technologies in 
question remain relatively circumscribed in local practice, they serve as powerful catalysts for 
thinking through the stakes of maintaining family ties and the consequences of altering kinship 
futures.  
While Beck argues that calculations and attempts to minimize risk have “colonized the 
future,” the ways that women in Jordan discuss prenatal screening and diagnostics demonstrate 
how risks coexist and gain value in the service of differently imagined futures (Beck 1998, 12). 
These conversations usually focus on the absence of prenatal screening and diagnostics, which 
some women frame as a symptom of the healthcare system’s underdevelopment, an anomaly in 
what is often otherwise considered one of the best systems in the region. The overwhelming 
majority of women who discussed this topic with me, however, expressed anxieties about the 
kinds of knowledge that prenatal screening and diagnostic technologies could bring into the 
world. They did not question the veracity or the reliability of the science. They doubted the 
wisdom of using it.  
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One day, while I talked with a few mothers sitting in the reception room at the Society, 
Imm Hamza arrived with her younger brother and her firstborn son, both of whom have Down 
Syndrome. Imm Hamza and her sisters took turns covering their transportation to various 
activities and doctors’ appointments, as their own elderly mother was no longer capable of 
driving. Imm Hamza happened to arrive at a moment when two other mothers were comparing 
their shared experiences of not having received a prenatal diagnosis of Down Syndrome. Imm 
Hamza jumped in to the conversation with her own thoughts on the matter. “I was surprised that 
with all the advances of modern medicine, they didn’t catch beforehand that Hamza was Down. 
But it’s better that way,” Imm Hamza continued. “What would I have done if I had known?” 
This past perfect contemplation of an already impossible future provides insights into the moral 
stakes of knowing – and doing – versus not knowing. Many mothers point to the intensity of 
postnatal diagnosis as one of the reasons they are capable of developing relationships and 
relating to each other, even while living in significantly different worlds of opportunity and 
constraint. Despite the absence of prenatal screening and diagnosis from their own experiences, 
the more distant accessibility and symbolic potency of these tools generates intense reflection 
among mothers of children with Down Syndrome.  
Would you want to know? 
Not long after World Down Syndrome Day 2015, Imm Zahra and I discussed our 
impressions of the festivities, which were coordinated by the Society in conjunction with various 
government ministries and a few corporate sponsors.  During a conference on Down Syndrome 
and related medical issues held at a large public hospital in northern Amman, a younger woman 
stood up to ask the panel of health professionals a question. How was it possible, she wanted to 
know, that despite attending appointments consistently throughout her pregnancy, the doctors 
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never diagnosed her baby with Down Syndrome? I brought this moment up with Imm Zahra as 
we sat and debriefed. I was curious to hear her perspective on the woman’s question. “It’s 
impossible,” said Imm Zahra. “Aside from it being expensive, we cannot have these tests here 
because abortion is haram.”74  
I countered this point, arguing that screening and diagnosis don’t necessarily lead to 
abortion. They could be used to better prepare families for the medical, emotional, and financial 
demands that come with raising a disabled child. Imm Zahra brushed this aside as hakī fādī (just 
words, or useless talk, in its kindest translation): 
If a mother knows beforehand, even if she doesn’t abort, she will be so sick with 
worry – What will her husband say? How will the children find out? What will 
the neighbors say? – that she will not take care of herself properly… In the US, 
it’s not very important what people say, but here it is very very important. 
Through her anxiety, the mother may harm the fetus. Unless there is a danger to 
the mother, there shouldn’t be any knowledge beforehand. This is something up to 
God. God creates what exists in this world.  
She then turned to the other women present throughout the room and asked for their opinions. 
They all agreed; it was better not to know. One of them then turned to me. “What about you 
Christine? Would you want to know?” I sat and contemplated the question. Would I even have 
the option, I wondered, of not knowing?  
The value of knowledge, as configured in the highly medicalized and individualized 
culture of American childbirth – or perhaps nuclearized might be a more accurate description – 
defines a woman’s ethical agency as the pursuit of knowing everything she can. In her 
ethnography of amniocentesis in New York City, Rayna Rapp demonstrates that women who 
                                                
74 In Islamic legal thought, abortion becomes definitively haram only after 120 days of pregnancy, when ensoulment 
occurs (Hessini 2007). Before 120 days, scholars contend that that abortion is “unconditionally permissible, 
permissible in case of having an excuse (‘udhr), and generally reprehensible and forbidden [Wizaˆrat, vol. 2, p. 58]” 
(Ghaly 2008, 116; see also Rispler-Chaim 1999). 
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decide not to pursue amniocentesis or terminate pregnancy following a positive result were 
subject to intense moral scrutiny (Rapp 1999). Genetic counselors, doctors, and nurses assessed 
women’s maternal fitness in ways that reflect the intersections of race, class, and gender in 
metropolitan New York. Most of the women I worked with in Jordan, however, consider it 
unethical to assume that one could know everything. They viewed not knowing as a kind of 
protection against human weakness, a form of God’s mercy. “I’m not sure,” I responded to the 
question.  
As in the United States, pregnancy and childbirth in Jordan have become heavily 
medicalized processes.75 According to the most recent Population and Family Health Survey, 
between 2007 and 2012, 99% of Jordanian women received prenatal care from a medical 
professional and 78% of women made 7 or more prenatal care visits over the course of their 
pregnancy (Department of Statistics [Jordan] and ICF International 2013). Almost all Jordanian 
women during this period gave birth in a medical facility.76 Yet the current reproductive 
healthcare regimen makes minimal use of prenatal screening and diagnostics. Despite the 
popularity of ultrasonography for the purpose of producing images, the technology rarely plays a 
diagnostic role (Maffi 2013, 141). The prohibitive cost of certain equipment and the 
corresponding laboratory tests certainly plays a role in this lack of services (Maffi 2013, 141). 
Equally pressing, if not more so, are questions surrounding constructions of personhood, the 
                                                
75 While the WHO’s range for safe C-section rates falls between 5-15%, Jordan’s stands at 28%, a level of excess 
comparable to the United State’s own elevated rate of 32% (CDC 2015). 
76 Doctors attended 76% of these births, while midwives attended the remaining 24% (Department of Statistics 
[Jordan] and ICF International 2013, 110). 
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criminalization of abortion,77 and deep attachments to kinship as a fundamental organizing 
principle of society.  
Despite the medicalization of pregnancy and childbirth, fertility, conception, and 
childrearing remained fundamentally connective social processes in Jordan. Women identify the 
wishes, contributions, and resources of other kin, alongside God’s will, as essential for both 
creating and raising children (see Roberts 2012). In asserting that it is better not to know, the 
nature of disability does not particularly enter into the equation for women like Imm Hamza and 
Imm Zahra. They understand, more than most, the challenges of raising a child in a deeply 
disabling society. But there are other factors at play, chief among them a desire to accept the 
authority of God and submit to His will. Submission, as a core aspect of adult moral personhood, 
involves an active struggle to cultivate moral continuity in the face of contradictory impulses and 
possibilities (Asad 1993; Das 1995; Mahmood 2001; see Deeb 2006 on commitment).  
 “It was my right to know”: 
Imm Maryam did not share the perspective of the women at the Society that it was better 
not to know. Unaffiliated with the al-Nur Society, Im Maryam nevertheless was familiar with 
many of the same families through the pages of Facebook and by running in overlapping social 
circles. I was introduced to Imm Maryam and her daughter, who was a toddler at the time, 
through a special education consultant who appeared with her on local TV shows where they 
sought to educate the public about Down Syndrome. When I visited her family at their home just 
                                                
77 Jordan’s restrictive stance on abortion is ostensibly based in religious law, or sharia. Yet the category of sharia 
often obscures the highly syncretic nature of postcolonial legal systems across the Middle East and North Africa. 
Historian Amira Sonbol, for example, describes Jordan’s legal system as “a patchwork of fiqh (Islamic theological 
interpretations)… molded together with a dose of imported pre-World War I Western gender philosophy” (Sonbol 
2003, 8). Current state policy has been slow to address or even acknowledge the heterogeneous corpus of opinions 
that exists among Islamic religious scholars on the issue of selective abortion. The diversity of regional laws on the 
issue can be understood, in part, as reflecting this lack of consensus. 
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outside the northern boundary of greater Amman, Imm Maryam candidly described the shock of 
her daughter’s diagnosis to me; it was a narrative she had told many times before in different 
spaces and for different audiences. Four days after returning from the hospital, baby Maryam 
developed jaundice. Her older sister and one of her older brothers volunteered to take Maryam 
back to the hospital. When they arrived, she told me, “The doctor took one look at Maryam and 
said she was monghōlī.”  
Imm Maryam’s children decided to keep this news from their mother until further tests 
could be run. They enlisted their father’s help to make appointments for Maryam at other local 
hospitals. Imm Maryam learned what was going on when one of her sisters-in-law called to ask 
whether or not she was “going crazy” waiting to hear if her daughter was monghōlī.  
The world started spinning. I dropped the tray of food I was carrying. The first 
thing I did was go and read from the Quran to remember God (dhakart Allah). 
May came out of her room and said they were going to head out for another 
appointment about the jaundice.  I said that they were all liars and they would do 
nothing of the sort. “She’s MY daughter. I’ll take her!” We went to four different 
hospitals, and they all said the same thing, “your daughter is monghōlī.” At the 
last clinic, I was speaking with a young doctor in her twenties. “Please don’t tell 
me Maryam is monghōlī,” I said. The doctor responded that Maryam definitely 
was monghōlī and that she would probably die as a baby. If not, she said, Maryam 
would live to be 25 at most, with a mental age of 4. And death would be better.  
Imm Maryam stopped and reflected on this memory with a sad smile. She struggled after 
receiving Maryam’s diagnosis, crying, overwhelmed, and angry. “My husband was more 
accepting than I was,” she recalled with a small laugh. “He would tell me, ‘Alhamdulillah 
[Thank God]. Some people have cerebral palsy, or autism!’ Alhamdulilllah,” she confirmed. I 
asked Im Maryam if she wished she had known about Maryam’s Down Syndrome during her 
pregnancy. She thought about the question. “I’m not sure if I had found out beforehand, whether 
or not I would have kept my baby. But it was my right to know.”  
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Imm Maryam was convinced that her doctor had realized Maryam’s diagnosis but 
decided not to tell her. “It would have been my decision,” she continued. “And I had a right to 
make it. I don’t know. Maybe I would have aborted, or maybe I would have feared God. But it 
was my right to know. Maryam’s birth was a cruel surprise; a mother is free [to make her own 
decisions] (al-imm hiyya hurra).” While her stance clearly differed from that of the women at the 
Society, that it was better not to know, Imm Maryam held many of the same key assumptions as 
her peers. The two alternatives she outlined were either aborting or “fearing God,” the latter of 
which was clearly the moral choice for her. Yet it was the relationship to knowledge that she 
ultimately focused on. What continued to bother her most was her sense that she had not been 
given the chance to know and make her own choice. “A mother is free.” Imm Maryam was a 
fierce advocate for her daughter. Maryam had transformed her world, bringing her new burdens 
and responsibilities, but also new opportunities. Imm Maryam was the first to admit that she was 
devastated by the “cruel surprise” of her daughter’s diagnosis. She talked openly about the 
stigma she and her family encountered. This was stigma she had herself perpetuated before her 
own daughter was born with Down Syndrome. The process of caring for Maryam launched her 
mother into an unexpected – and initially undesired –project of moral becoming, to paraphrase 
Cheryl Mattingly (2014). And yet Imm Hamza’s question about the uncertainties of this past 
perfect future remained; without the knowledge of Down Syndrome that Imm Maryam gained 
through lived experience, what would she have done if she had known?  
Women do not view prenatal diagnostic technologies through a simplistic moral 
dichotomy of good and bad. Prenatal diagnosis figures as one node in a constellation of factors 
and moral hazards that animate the risks of relatedness. The new temporality introduced through 
prenatal diagnosis exposes the morally ambivalent and highly selective nature of their broader 
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kinship world. Kinship in Jordan unfolds as a high-stakes process of choosing and rejecting 
alliances; it is the ultimate selective technology.78 Its critical importance for survival – especially 
through marriage – plays a significant role in creating the stigma that exists against disability in 
the first place. Women do not choose for their children to be born with Down Syndrome, but 
they do not want others to choose against them. They criticize a simplistic equation of disability 
with risk, pointing to the unknown and unknowable aspects of kinship futures. Many women 
sense the possibility – one overwhelmingly supported by the ethnographic record – that these 
technologies, if made widely available in Jordan, would create and distribute knowledge 
unequally. In so doing, they would create new dangers and dilemmas that, as women, wives, and 
mothers, they would be forced to navigate. As Imm Zahra put it, “God creates what exists in the 
world.” In that certain truth mothers find powerful moral protection against the risks of choice. 
VI. Children of Adam 
“We are all children of Adam.” I frequently encountered this refrain as my interlocutors 
shared their thoughts on the existence of disability in the world and the nature of human 
difference. This phrase speaks to a worldview that situates human relations in terms of both 
divine and genealogical networks of descent. These networks are capable of accommodating 
radical equality before God and vastly asymmetrical social hierarchies of power and authority. 
As families encounter and navigate the different temporalities of diagnosis, contemplating 
futures saturated by prenatal testing, they outline a series of morally ambiguous risks. While 
almost all my interlocutors articulate an explicit commitment to Islam, the demands and 
exigencies of family life create compelling, and sometimes antagonistic, moral imperatives. God 
is defined in terms of his mercy and compassion, family members generally less so. 
                                                
78 Thanks to Andrew Shryock for providing this pithy description during a public lecture. 
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Common threads of experience connect the women (and sometimes men) who arrive at 
the Society. These include family hostility, social stigma, biomedical uncertainty, and emotional 
pain and resilience. Their experiences differ in significant ways as well, reflecting personal 
qualities and characteristics of women’s relationships with spouses and kin, as well as structural 
factors of class, education, and social and financial capital. The birth of a child with Down 
Syndrome creates opportunities for new connections and alliances, some of them life-saving and 
life-altering. These connections unfold in the context of political and affective circumstances 
where social solidarity remains closely intertwined with bonds of kinship. This reality shapes 
disability alliances and activism in Jordan in ways that might appear frustratingly apolitical from 
the perspective of North American and European rights models. It would be a mistake, however, 
to underestimate the capacity of these kin-like groups to affect change on personal and political 
levels, since kinship itself provides the substance of both personhood and politics. Diagnosis is 
only a beginning, and a partial one at that. It unfolds within longer and broader familial 
trajectories stretching backward through genealogy and forwarded into kinship futures. The 
gendered labor involved in caring for a disabled child and the gendered ideologies of modernity 
that animate disability rights in Jordan position mothers as key agents of change and subjects of 
censure. 
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Chapter 3. Acceptance 
I. Disability, modernity, and “good mothers” 
Uncertainties about caring for disabled children provide a new domain for ongoing 
debates about the proper performance motherhood. This extension illuminates how gender and 
disability in Jordan remain inextricably linked and intersubjectively embodied through kinship 
roles and relationships. During disabled children’s earliest years of life, mothers encounter 
intense scrutiny of their choices, their character, and the quality of their relationships with 
spouses and families. Many women experience constant and sometimes agonizing anxiety over 
the wellbeing and future status of their child. The intensity of this anxiety stems, at least in part, 
from a medicalized understanding that these formative early stages of life will “determine” a 
child with Down Syndrome’s future degree of disability.79 Women in Amman who seek out the 
currently expanding opportunities to understand, care, and advocate for a child with Down 
Syndrome find themselves engaging with kin and non-kin in unanticipated and unfamiliar ways. 
In doing so, they submit themselves and their families to exposure and scrutiny. These risks 
bring with them the potential for transformation, pain, and a host of unpredictable consequences. 
Mothers become activists and advocates, found community associations, form Facebook 
communities, and pursue new degrees. They also face marital problems, familial estrangement, 
and physical and mental health issues.  
                                                
79 Most of my interlocutors understand disability through a highly medicalized paradigm, replicating diagnostic 
labels and measures of “severity” as inherent in bodies themselves rather than reflections of the interactions between 
impairments and social structures. However, they do also challenge the emerging medical hegemony over disability 
by drawing on a nonsecular framing of human difference and diversity. 
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In this chapter, I map the boundaries of an emerging moral orientation toward Down 
Syndrome: acceptance (taqabbul). Noting the tendency within anthropology to remain focused 
on an individuated, ethical “self,” Hayder Al-Mohammad proposes paying closer attention 
instead to the ethical nature of being-with others (2010, 437). My introduction of acceptance as a 
moral orientation builds on Al-Mohammad’s argument by delineating how mothers evaluate 
themselves and each other in their attempts to come to terms with their child’s disability.80 I use 
the concept of orientation to capture the multiple modes of being-with disability that mothers 
cultivate over time. Women in my research widely frame acceptance as one half of a binary that 
they contrast with rejection (rafaḍ). Acceptance requires various kinds of work: work on one’s 
child, work on one’s self, and the work of building care networks through relationships with 
family, teachers, health professionals, and extended kin. The orientation away from rejection and 
toward acceptance reveals the shifting and disputed practices involved in becoming a “good” 
mother in relation to a child deemed different. What acceptance involves in affective, practical, 
and imaginative terms, however, remains open to debate, even among women who appear to 
share common goals, beliefs, and parenting experiences.  
The moral (re)orientation toward acceptance draws from languages of modernity and 
backwardness that have enjoyed currency among colonizers, nationalist reformers, Islamic 
reformers and revivalists, and techno-development specialists across the Middle East and North 
Africa (Abu-Lughod 1998; Adely 2012; Eickelman & Piscatori 1996; Osella & Soares 2009; 
Mitchell 1988, 2000, 2002; Salvatore 1997; Shryock 1997; Starrett 1998; Sukarieh 2012). Lara 
Deeb’s pious Shiʿi interlocutors living in the marginalized suburbs of southern Beirut described 
                                                
80 I do not place particular importance on distinguishing between ethics and morality. As both Fassin (2012) and 
Mattingly (2014) note, there is very little consistency in how these terms are deployed either within anthropological 
writing or in empirical reality. 
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their social world and its problems in terms of “things being mutaqaddum (progressed/advanced) 
versus mutakhalluf (backwards) [and] of how life was ‘abl (before) as opposed to al-yawm 
(today/now)” (2006, 16). The notion of takhalluf (backwardness) also resonated with the families 
who participated in my research. They described rejection as the vestige of a disavowed and 
morally inferior past, which nevertheless was extremely difficult to move beyond. In their own 
words, disability stigma reflected problems endemic to Arab culture (thaqāfa) and oppressive 
traditions (taqālīd).  
The inability to progress beyond tradition indicates the persistence of society’s takhalluf 
and results in the evident hostility toward disability. The broad concepts of culture and tradition 
that my interlocutors draw on become clear in the moral significance that families attribute to 
genealogical identity, which in turn informs the perceived benefits and risk posed by marriage. 
For families of intellectually disabled children, in particular, takhalluf acquires heightened 
significance. The term is also used as a clinical label for mental retardation, which is increasingly 
recognized as pejorative in its own right.81 Parents play with and redeploy these semantic 
ambiguities in their critiques of disability stigma. “As Muslims,” the mother of a five-year-old 
girl with Down Syndrome once told me, “we know God made this child. The takhalluf is ours, 
not hers.”  
In the next section, I explore the content and boundaries of rejection. As a mode of moral 
evaluation, rejection does not constitute a single or unitary object of critique, but it nevertheless 
remains the consistent foil for acceptance. I then turn to the question of acceptance, identifying 
two crucial kinds of work through which women cultivate this orientation. The first entails 
                                                
81 Some parents and specialists considered the use of takhalluf in a clinical context, like the term “retardation,” an 
inappropriate generalization. They instead invoked more differentiated languages of disability, impairment, delay, 
and tried to use specific diagnostic labels whenever possible. 
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mothers working on their children, particularly through training bodily habitus in the pursuit of 
normalization. The second entails mothers working on themselves, specifically by cultivating 
particular emotional states and forms of discipline. I briefly discuss the gendered dimensions of 
this work and the roles men play in cultivating acceptance, at least within the limits of my own 
observation. Finally, I analyze the relationships and collective identities that mothers forge 
through their common links to Down Syndrome, which they position uncertainly between a 
stigmatized, medicalized diagnosis and a core aspect of their child’s identity. Throughout, I give 
close attention to how class, status, and social capital shape the ways that women relate to and 
judge each other as mothers. 
II. Rejection 
Women described the existence of maternal and familial rejection to me as evidence of 
society’s “backwardness,” the product of a culture that denies disabled persons – and children 
more generally – the rights and value afforded to them within Islamic and human rights 
frameworks. In making a distinction between Islam and human rights, I do not mean to imply 
that they are inherently separate domains. Rather, I gesture to the different kinds of subjects each 
of these moral projects envisions as the bearers of rights. For most of my interlocutors, basic 
assumptions about God, divine creation, and human weakness are groundwork for their 
engagement with liberal human rights discourses. The latter discourses seem perfectly legible 
and relevant. They diverge from the framework of rights expressed through Islam, however, in 
the desirability and feasibility they attribute to personal autonomy and freedom. Interlocutors 
blamed “culture” (thaqāfa) for marking disability as ‘ayb (as shameful or a form of moral 
exposure). The connections between culture, disability, and ‘ayb become clearer as women 
reflect on the risks involved in forging new marital ties, a necessary process for reproducing 
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families’ moral genealogies. Mothers often draw on principles of rights and diversity, nested 
within the moral framework of Islam, to challenge the status quo.  
Families’ failure to accept and embrace disabled children, my interlocutors contend, 
enables and normalizes the failures of the wider society. This reasoning reflects the positioning 
of the family at the center of their shared politico-moral cosmology. While most mothers 
describe acceptance and rejection primarily through vocabularies of feelings and emotion, I use 
the concept of moral orientation to capture the affective, social, material, structural, and temporal 
dynamics of being-with disability. Rejection, by contrast, does not constitute a moral orientation 
but amounts instead to an immoral position. It is subject to critique and social sanction, although 
it is widely regarded as the norm. Rejection looms large in the public imaginary as an indictment 
of society’s moral hypocrisy, underdevelopment, and weakened family bonds. It operates 
through exclusionary social structures that encompass children with intellectual disabilities and 
extend outward to encompass their families as well. Families may attempt to build their own 
exclusionary structures around a disabled child in an effort to protect the collective reputation of 
the family.  
For example, when Imm Reham’s niece Aisha secured a new job at a local restaurant, 
everyone was very proud of Aisha for taking on this new responsibility. But then, according to 
Imm Reham: 
Reham told her cousin, “I want to come and visit you!” Aisha responded, “Yes, 
okay! But don’t tell anyone you are my relative.” It was ringing in my ears. I 
cannot forget it, even now. Last week my husband suggested we go to visit Aisha. 
I told him, “You can go with the boys, but Reham and I will stay here.” Look, 
Aisha’s free [to do what she wants]… But I get angry. Aisha can say whatever she 
wants, and I can feel whatever I want. 
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Slights such as these, where family members deny or refuse to recognize their disabled kin as 
such, cause pain and anger,82 especially given that kinship ties still structure much of the 
socializing and entertainment that provide life’s more pleasurable moments. They also point to 
the subtle but rippling forms of isolation and marginalization that damage and diminish the social 
networks of individuals with Down Syndrome and their kin, especially mothers. Engagement 
parties, weddings, and funerals prove especially fraught terrain, but even a quotidian event, like 
visiting a restaurant, can become an experience of rejection. When one of Reham’s other cousins 
got engaged, Imm Reham remarked with delight and astonishment that both she and Reham 
received invitations to the young woman’s engagement party. This gesture touched Imm Reham, 
and even more so because the young woman in question was not their kin.  
Mapping the social topography of rejection: 
Rejection indexes the various fault lines that mark Amman’s social topography. Women 
from “the Governorates” (al-muhāfaẓāt, which colloquially refers to all of the Governorates 
outside Amman) and from eastern Amman are described as most likely to reject a child with a 
disability. These women and families, in particular, thus require consistent intervention to 
mitigate rejection and promote acceptance. After one of my first visits to a Jabal Ahmar, a poorer 
neighborhood in east Amman,83 Hiba, the early intervention coordinator at the al-Nur Society, 
was very curious to hear my impressions of the “other half” of the city. During this visit, I met a 
visually impaired young girl who was a neighbor of the family. She navigated around the space 
                                                
82 Ethnographic research on disability around the world has documented families grappling with similar kinds of 
social isolation and stigma (Das and Addlakha 2001; Gammeltoft 2008; Landsman 1998). Disabled persons 
themselves write about these experiences at length in auto-ethnographic and personal accounts (Garland-Thomson 
2014; Kafer 2013; Murphy 1987; O’Toole 2015). For an account that hits close to home, see the recent 
Anthrodendum blog post, “What I Wish I Knew about Anthropology and Disability: Notes toward a more enabling 
anthropology” (Friedner, Kasnitz, and Wool 2018).   
83 This particular neighborhood had originally been part of the Mohammad Amin informal Palestinian refugee camp. 
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of their small, narrow house largely by touch and managed quite well. The same strategy, 
however, could not help with her schoolwork. She was falling behind in class and would likely 
fail the school year. When I shared this story with Hiba, she became upset:  
They need to go to the Ministry (of Social Development)! The thing with people 
in places like Jabal Ahmar, is that they complain about how hard things are and 
how there’s nothing for them. There is. Things are not as bad as they say. Blind 
children can go to school! Things are not that bad, Christine! … I once had a 
mom come in [to the Society]… Her seven-year-old was in Pampers. Pampers! 
At seven! How can this be? Why haven’t you taught her? She said it was 
impossible! No, it’s not. 
At some point during Hiba’s impassioned outburst, Kawthar walked into the room. “Kawthar, 
Hiba instructed her coworker, “Explain to Christine what families in East Amman are like.” 
Kawthar turned to me. “They just want someone to find them a center where they can deposit 
their kids, and that’s it.” The stereotypes Hiba and Kawthar invoked were in fact at odds with 
their own variable experiences working with families from eastern and western Amman. Both 
women frequently analyzed, with considerable nuance, the unpredictable, heterogeneous effects 
of class and capital on families’ acceptance and mothers’ commitment to their children. The 
availability and utility of these stereotypes nevertheless speaks to the social politics involved in 
acceptance, which overlap and bleed into distinctions of class, ethnicity, education, and piety, 
inevitably in complicated ways.   
Families living in East Amman face a significantly longer commute to the Society, which 
increases their likelihood of missing appointments or failing to show up for events. These 
outcomes only exacerbate the narrative common among staff and mothers from west Amman 
that poorer families are less dedicated to their children, and thus, less capable of undertaking the 
work that acceptance demands. Sarah Tobin argues that a powerful, self-consciously middle-
class identity is emerging in Amman, which “is less about monthly income, and more about a set 
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of social and cultural practices that bring together this diverse society into a new kind of 
imagined community” (Tobin 2012, 100; Schwedler 2010). In her analysis of Jordan’s relatively 
uneventful “Arab Spring,” Tobin describes this the members of this middle class as: 
Articulat[ing] a kind of suburban consciousness. They have some level of post-
high-school education; they are conversant in Western — particularly American 
— cultural references of leisure, including coffeeshops, malls and TV shows. 
Many Jordanians hone their English by watching “Friends” episodes with Arabic 
subtitles. They are a population who “want peace”… They are consumers of 
political information put forth on blogs, news and Internet sites, but are not 
otherwise politically engaged. Instead, they organize around certain places and 
times for consumption and around economic points for solidarity. (2012, 100) 
Elsewhere, Tobin also discusses how many of these new patterns of consumption intertwine with 
activities and commodities associated with Islamic education, travel, business, and celebrations 
(Tobin 2016). These all point to the importance of a distinctly Muslim middle-class in Jordan, a 
phenomenon also explored in other contexts (Clark 2004; Fischer 2017; Maqsood 2017).  
Some of my interlocutors live lives in no way approximate this description of middle-
classness, while others most certainly do or aspire to. Those who fall into the categories of 
working-class or urban poor encounter these new possibilities, however, whether through 
siblings who marry well, colleagues at work, or on television – more commonly set to Turkish 
soap operas dubbed into Arabic than Friends. Tobin nevertheless captures the class dynamics 
and modes of calculative thinking employed by many parents, who approach disability advocacy 
as a social rather than a political project. Conspicuously consuming therapeutic and rehabilitative 
services, through what is quickly becoming a booming and lucrative industry, provides an 
avenue for mothers to visibly perform acceptance. These investments of capital allow families to 
make a collective statement, demonstrating that their children are loved and valued (see also 
Kaya 2010).  
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Parsing the moral politics of rejection: 
Parents and specialists in Jordan recognize and make reference to government 
inefficiency and a lack of adequate services as matters of stating the obvious. Yet, they are far 
more likely to interpret other families’ struggles – whether due to finances, lack of information, 
insufficient bureaucratic savvy, or some combination thereof – as signs of backwardness and 
personal weakness rather than as reflections of materially grounded disenfranchisement. This 
analytic aligns quite strikingly with Omnia El Shakry’s research on gendered politics in colonial 
Egypt.  
Discussions on proper mothering, in both the metropole and the colony, 
intersected with philanthropic movements geared toward a pedagogy of the lower 
classes. [They worked to] reconstitute motherhood along middle-class lines of 
rational-economic and scientific-hygienic domesticity and child rearing, effacing 
and recasting class differences under the rubric of an ‘ideal mother.’ (1998, 127) 
For mothers of disabled children in Amman, the rubric of acceptance and rejection works to 
efface and recast class differences in terms of moral legitimacy. Yet, moral legitimacy ultimately 
cannot be reduced solely to the politics of class. My interlocutors explicitly recognize that 
“good” poor mothers existed, as well as “bad” wealthy mothers. In fact, women offer mixed 
interpretations of how class and status shape the likelihood of a family rejecting a child with a 
disability.  
While attending a short seminar for undergraduate and Master’s level students preparing 
to work in the field of special education, the program’s office director took particular interest in 
my project as we chatted during a coffee break. “I know someone you have to talk to,” he 
exclaimed! “She’s a special education teacher working in a resource room at a private school in 
east Amman.” Only a day later I received a call from Reem, who invited me to come to her 
house, where she offered private lessons and speech therapy sessions to supplement her day job 
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in the school. Sitting in the salon of Reem’s one-bedroom apartment, a multi-purpose space that 
functioned as a waiting room for children and their mothers, a salon to receive guests, and a play 
area for her own three children, Reem told me that the most difficult clients to work with are the 
affluent families from west Amman.  
I used to work at a center near the Palestinian Embassy [located between the 4th 
and 5th circles of west Amman’s Zahran street]. They wouldn’t even write this 
one child’s name out because his family didn’t want it known. He was listed on 
his chart as “S.” These people are so “sophisticated,” and they don’t want anyone 
to know about the child! Here in east Amman, people are different. They’re more 
open. They want to help and are more helpful. 
Her interpretation, which diverged significantly from Hiba and Kawthar’s representations of the 
differences between families in east and west Amman, points to the messy entanglements of 
class and morality in creating local disability worlds.  
Rejection functions as a local category for differently positioned women to judge and be 
judged in their performances of motherhood. Rejection indexes backwardness. What exactly 
causes backwardness, and which attachments and practices are marked as backward, remain the 
subjects of contested and conflicting assessments. Families in west Amman are more likely to 
possess the financial capital necessary for pursuing the latest and highest quality services. This 
very privilege, according to Reem, also makes them more sensitive to the possibility that the 
disclosure of disability could damage their position in a high-stakes marriage market. Affluent 
families, according to Reem, are even more vulnerable to the pressures of stigma and inclined, 
for that reason, to hide a child and protect their reputation. Hiding certainly seems easier in the 
well built, spacious high rises of west Amman, where people are less likely to know their 
neighbors or interact with them. The wide, smooth streets in neighborhoods of west Amman 
usually lack pedestrians. Sidewalks hover at perilously high altitudes. Homeowners often plant 
palm trees directly in the middle of existing walkways, lest frustrated car owners attempt to 
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create easy overflow parking spaces. In east Amman, the cramped and deteriorated living 
conditions lead to the spillover of domestic life into the streets and onto the roofs. This closeness 
makes intimacy a more inevitable and matter-of-fact dimension of daily life, whether one desires 
it or not. Ultimately, however, the material realities of care – therapies, medicines, wheelchairs, 
hired labor – along with the various entertainment and leisure activities that determine quality of 
life, all require capital.  
Families from Jordan and elsewhere, educators, specialists, and both local and foreign 
humanitarian and development workers all describe “hiding” as the epitome of a non-modern, 
shame-motivated response to disability. The family ashamed of disability hides their child. 
Parents often insist, “Everyone here rejects disability. Everyone hides.” When pressed to 
account, then, for their own processes of rejecting rejection and embracing acceptance, parents 
generally provide a response that seem no less self-evident to them: “this is my child.” 
Eventually, however, these succinct replies give way, revealing more complex unfinished 
narratives of cultivating acceptance through different kinds of labor. 
III. Acceptance 
Working on one’s child: bodily norms 
Early intervention and rehabilitation therapies operate through technologies of 
objectification that disassemble children’s bodies into a discrete array of functions, delays, and 
risks. It is primarily mothers who, by engaging with specialists, learn to see their child through 
this medicalized gaze. They become (or fail to become) vigilantly attuned to the signs of 
muscular, visual, hearing, speech, and mobility impairments that serve as primary sites of 
therapeutic engagement. Most children with Down Syndrome experience physical delays 
stemming from generalized hypotonia, or poor muscle tone. Because muscular strength provides 
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the critical foundational base for so many early milestones – crawling, grasping, walking, and 
speaking – the provision of therapeutic services early in life can improve how children (and later, 
adults) move, communicate, and function independently.84  
Through early intervention therapies, children’s bodies and behaviors become the targets 
of formative and regulatory maternal labor. Scientific and technical goals for children’s bodily 
and social development provide a framework that some mothers consider alienating and 
unforgiving, while others find it encouraging. These corrective programs assume children’s 
bodies are endlessly malleable in their potential for growth and becoming. Thus, a child’s failure 
to reach milestones indexes a mother’s failures to “work with them.” A somewhat paradoxical 
situation emerges whereby intervening and modifying the bodily and behavioral traits of one’s 
child becomes the means to perform and realize “acceptance.”85 Mothers and the network of 
specialists and support workers who often become their friends and confidants grapple with this 
contradiction. On the one hand, they are expected to do everything in their power to mitigate 
their child’s impairments. On the other hand, they are expected to embrace their child’s 
impairments as part of their person and potentially unchangeable, regardless of how diligently 
they pursue therapeutic interventions. Tracing the ways that mothers evaluate and contest 
acceptance reveals the complexities of living with Down Syndrome and of Down Syndrome 
itself. 
                                                
84 Whether early intervention services produce positive long-term benefits and to what degree remains the topic of 
considerable debate (Connolly et al. 1993; Lynch and Hanson 1993; Hines and Bennett 1996). There are 
methodological challenges involved in measuring the effectiveness of such programs (Majnemer 1998). 
Additionally, they rarely take accessibility and structural inequality into consideration. Regardless, staff, experts, 
and rights activists in Amman insist that early intervention is key to promoting typical development, if for no other 
reason than its ability to help parents emotionally connect to and invest in their child’s growth and progress. 
85 The neurodiversity movement is in fact organized around critiquing this paradox and its underlying implications, 
which reflect a desperate desire to change rather than truly accept the possibility of differently wired 
brains/minds/selves (Cascio 2012, 2015; Hart 2014; Silberman 2015). 
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Coming to terms with physiological, developmental, and social risks created by the 
presence of an extra chromosome and a diagnosis of Down Syndrome, mothers share in their 
children’s vulnerabilities. They feel they can no longer rely on general parenting advice, past 
experience, or their own intuitions once tasked with raising a child with disabilities. For some, 
the anxieties of raising one’s first child with Down Syndrome intensifies this experience. One of 
the most active fathers at the Society stepped into the role of his son’s main advocate because his 
wife was traumatized by their daughter’s diagnosis. Once she gave birth to their second child – 
who did not have Down Syndrome – she became more capable and comfortable with 
participating in the Society. Nevertheless, her husband continues to serve as their eldest 
daughter’s primary support system. Imm Reham, on the other hand, explained that, “because 
Reham was our first child, her normal was our normal.” This statement alludes to the sense of 
contradiction expressed by some mothers who encounter disability activism in the later years of 
their parenting careers. The emergence of Down Syndrome, as an identity, expresses a form of 
difference that some iterations of rights discourses nevertheless seem intent on erasing. Are 
children with Down Syndrome “just like” other children? Many mothers would answer this 
question emphatically in the affirmative: Yes, they are just like other children. Yet they are also 
not like other children in important ways. Rayna Rapp also encountered this tension in her own 
fieldwork with parents participating in a Down Syndrome support group in New York, and she 
describes it in terms of a “doubled discourse of both difference and normalization” (1999, 294).  
Down Syndrome, while arguably a biosocial label, nevertheless remains steeped in what 
disability studies scholar Simi Linton describes as the pathologization of difference that defines 
the medical model of disability (2006, 162). It also marks the presence of chronic and potentially 
urgent medical risks, including “heart anomalies, hypothyroidism, leukemia, digestive ailments 
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and celiac disease, [and] strong susceptibility to life-threatening pneumonia” (Pohlman 2010, 
53). Given these bodily vulnerabilities, growth and development become formal, explicit tasks; 
they are conceptualized and objectified in training programs, checklists, and evaluations by 
experts. Milestones, in turn, are celebrated achievements rather than taken-for-granted products 
of time and nature. Mothers’ concerns with shaping their children’s bodies reflect particular 
orientations towards space and time. The emphasis they place on bodily normalization gestures 
to immediate and long-term goals of incorporating disabled children into the sphere of domestic 
labor and social roles anchored in kinship and hospitality. Specialists and therapists, on the other 
hand, often emphasize exercises and trainings whose benefits they couch in terms of cultivating 
children’s abilities to enter non-domestic spaces and realize their right to be included in 
“society,” most concretely meaning school and then the labor market.  
Family members particularly focus their anxieties and disciplinary energies on children’s 
mouths, given the mouth’s importance for speech. Drooling and the protrusion of the tongue are 
considered problems of special significance; they are aesthetically unsettling. Staff and 
experienced mothers will constantly demonstrate tongue, mouth, and jaw exercises for new 
mothers, providing them with a variety of drills to practice at home. Hiba or Imm Zahra would 
scoop up whichever child happened to be nearby and coo them into acquiescence. They would 
demonstrate oil-based massage techniques meant to facilitate blood flow in the face and alleviate 
skin dryness by moving their fingers in gentle upward strokes around the neck and cheeks of the 
attentive or occasionally miserable child selected for the demonstration. In another popular drill, 
mothers are instructed to take a small piece of date (since any normal household in Jordan will 
have dates stored away) and place it in the corner of their child’s mouth. To retrieve it, the child 
must extend and twist their tongue, exercising the muscles involved. A small chunk of carrot – 
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also beneficial and healthy – can be used to practice the same drill, moving the tongue from the 
upper right to the upper left corner of the mouth and back. For training children to be mindful of 
their appearance, the smallest drop of lemon juice is administered to the tip of the tongue as a 
gentle, bitter corrective.  
These bodily exercises have myriad applications and objectives. Children with Down 
Syndrome struggle to build the muscle tone required for drinking, eating, and speech. They also 
struggle to inhabit social norms where bodily control is of the utmost importance. One day, Imm 
Haydar entered the Society, clearly excited. Imm Haydar’s son was previously enrolled in early 
intervention programming at the Society, and she still liked to stop by and visit with the staff 
members she had grown close to. Speaking at lightning speed in the distinctive accent of her 
native Egypt, she began to share her story:  
Last week, we went to Barshelona (a chain fast food restaurant with branches all 
over Amman). The whole family went. This woman, she was staring at Haydar. 
Just staring. I knew it was about Haydar. So she approached me. “Down?” She 
asked. “Yes,” I responded. “He’s Down.” The woman paused, and then burst out, 
“How can you get him to be so clean? My daughter, everything falls out of her 
mouth. She drools! The food… We can’t take her out!”  
She stopped for dramatic effect. “Can you imagine (takhayyalī)?!” Imm Haydar was shocked by 
this stranger’s admission that she never took her daughter out to eat because of the awkwardness 
she felt about her daughter’s chewing and drooling. Society staff considered Imm Haydar’s own 
son extremely behind in terms of developmental and behavioral milestones. Despite their formal 
opposition to special education centers, they had urged her to enroll Haydar in a full-time 
program so he could receive more intensive attention and hopefully “catch up” to his peers. 
Thus, this stranger’s recognition of Haydar as a “success,” which by extension recognized his 
mother’s and his entire family’s willingness to work with and include him, became an even more 
salient achievement.  
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The social and symbolic importance of the mouth directs both maternal and expert gazes 
in concrete ways. Imm Farid, whose son is in his earlier thirties, understood the importance of 
working on Farid’s speech even without the access to therapeutic knowledge or expertise 
accessible to younger mothers today. 
I would always try to work on his speech at home, to the extent I could, because 
there were no speech therapists… I would bring a mirror and teach him. I would 
ask, “Did you see how [to say this]?” And I would slowly enunciate the letters. I 
would tell him that he has to exercise always so that his muscles get stronger. 
When you speak well, people will accept you. Drool would run down from his 
mouth because his muscles are weak. Alhamdulillah he stopped drooling and he 
started to speak correctly, but it took a long time.   
The attainment of proper speech stood out for Imm Farid as a shared achievement that required 
vigilant bodily training. Enabling her son to speak well would enable him to connect with others. 
The failure to control one’s body in ways deemed acceptable, what’s more, is justification for the 
imposition of control by others. Imm Farid’s decision to train her son through practical, physical 
exercises and drills also gestures to pre-existing local sensibilities surrounding the cultivation of 
the body as necessary for social acceptance and moral standing within the community.   
Historian Omnia El Shakry traces how, in colonial Egypt, tarbiyya (upbringing or 
education) and adab, “a complex of valued dispositions (intellectual, moral, and social), 
appropriate norms of behavior, comportment, and bodily habitus,” served as vehicles for 
articulating visions of both modernity and proper gender roles (1998, 127; on tarbiyya see also: 
Cook 1994; Roald 1994). Tarbiyya and adab offered “resources indigenous to the Islamic 
discursive tradition that emphasized the proper pedagogy for children, cultivation of the body, 
and the moral education of the self as essential for the constitutions of a rightly guided Islamic 
community” (El Shakry 1998, 127–28). Bodily mastery plays a key role in elaborations of 
personhood, and indigenous paradigms of embodied, moral cultivation have long complemented 
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the “modernist disciplining of the body and rationalization of the household” associated with the 
contemporary nation-state (El Shakry 1998, 128). The mutual fashioning of mothers and children 
that I observed in my fieldwork is clearly not a new phenomenon. Regimes of therapy, child 
development, and behavioral training in Jordan both reinforce and extend pre-existing 
sensibilities about mother-child discipline and subjectivity (Kashani-Sabet 2006). Current 
rehabilitative therapies, combined with human and disability rights paradigms, identify disabled 
children as symbolically powerful conduits for creating broader social change. This identification 
in turn deepens the enmeshment between mothers and children.86 While mothers work directly 
with and on their children through modes of early intervention therapy, acceptance also requires 
women to work on themselves. This work takes the form of emotional training and cultivation. 
Working on oneself: Navigating fear 
Through the teacher-student dynamic facilitated in early intervention sessions, along with 
various other formats for engagement – lectures, casual exchanges of information (and rumors 
and gossip), didactic sermons delivered by older mothers to younger counterparts – certain 
emotions emerge as critical sites for mothers to work on themselves and cultivate acceptance. 
One day, Imm Adnan came into the Society carrying her four-year-old son in her arms. She 
encountered a barrage of concerns, and then criticisms, from the older mothers who witnessed 
her entrance. “Sister, does Adnan not walk yet?” inquired one woman. Imm Adnan responded 
that Adnan could walk, but it was hard for him, and she was afraid (khayfeh) of him falling, 
getting sick, or getting somehow separated from her in transit. While her audience remained 
sympathetic to these anxieties, they ultimately urged her to get over them. As his mother, it was 
                                                
86 For a slightly different take on the mother-child nexus, scholars critical of human rights and humanitarianism have 
noted that the conflation of women-and-children with innocence and victimhood serves to discipline those who 
violate ideals of political acquiescence (Babul 2015). 
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her responsibility to teach Adnan to rely on himself (ʿatamid ʿalā nafsu). Was she planning to 
carry him around forever? Looking uncertain and somewhat irritated, Im Adnan sighed and set 
Adnan on the floor, never taking her eyes off him for more than a second.  
“The work of care,” argues anthropologist Cheryl Mattingly, “demands the work of 
cultivating virtues” (2014, 5). Cultivating or suppressing specific emotional dispositions creates 
certain kinds of selves. In pursuing these different ideals of the self, mothers draw from and 
negotiate between different sources of moral authority, the visions of the “good life” they 
engender, and their implications for life with Down Syndrome. As they negotiate and disagree 
about what kinds of mothers they want and need to become, women connect these models of self 
both directly and indirectly to the broader circumstances of vulnerability and uncertainty that 
pervade life in Jordan. Anthropologists have explored how emotions are culturally constructed, 
linguistically shaped and mediated, and intimately linked to social and political contexts. 
Previous work explores these dimensions through analytical frameworks of folk medicines, 
embodiment, affliction, and suffering (Lutz and Abu-Lughod 1990; Lutz and White 1986; 
Robbins 2013; Rebhun 1994; Scheper-Hughes 1992).  
Emotions offer a platform for performing and embodying different orientations toward 
disability. They also indicate how multiple and sometimes-conflicting moral frameworks inform 
women’s attempts to inhabit the subject position of being a “good” mother. Fear (khowf) plays a 
central, if contested, role in how women conceptualize good mothering and how they 
experienced their sense of being-in-the-world. Many women actively seek to cultivate fear in 
themselves and their children. The belief that children with Down Syndrome do not exhibit 
appropriate levels of fear toward various sources of danger – strangers, cars, hot stoves, to name 
a few – looms large in the minds of concerned parents. Women link good mothering with the 
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positive quality of protectiveness, and fear possesses practical utility. Surviving in the urban 
metropolis of Amman, a city often described by inhabitants as difficult and exhausting (mutʿib), 
requires honing various kinds of fear and suspicion. Women need to guard against the possibility 
of being cheated, exploited, or violated, especially by strangers but also by friends and even 
family (MacDougall 2017). Fear, in different degrees of intensity, manifests in the quotidian 
practices that shape how women engage with each other and their environment. Operating with 
either too little or too much fear can cause problems.  
The multifaceted dimensions of fear often emerged during early intervention sessions 
between Hiba and mother-child pairs. During one such winter session, Hiba commented to Imm 
Leen that her daughter demonstrated unusually fearful reactions to her surroundings. Especially 
disturbing to baby Leen was a long purple sash with jingly bells tied to the end that, if given even 
a gentle shake, would send her into fits of screaming and tears. Imm Leen looked thoughtfully at 
her infant daughter, wrapped in a bright pink snowsuit and bearing a striking resemblance to an 
oblong, fluffy marshmallow. With a pensive but deliberate tone she replied, “It’s better she fear 
than not fear.” Not long after this exchange, Hiba was working with toddler-aged Lujayn and her 
mother. Hiba wanted to see if Imm Lujayn had been practicing the various training drills and 
activities she assigned during the pair’s previous appointment. As she proceeded through her 
checklist of inquiries, Hiba expanded her questions to ask more generally about Lujayn’s daily 
activities and routine. Imm Lujayn began to blush, her youthful face framed by her black hijab 
and white underscarf. She occasionally shot nervous glances in my direction while I sat on the 
floor next to her, and she responded mostly in the negative to Hiba’s questions. 
Hiba: Do you let her play on the swings? 
Imm Lujayn: I’m afraid (anā khayfeh)!  
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Hiba: Have you considered enrolling Lujayn in swim lessons? Swimming is very 
good for the muscles.  
Imm Lujayn: I’m afraid (anā khayfeh)!  
Hiba: Im Lujayn! Strengthen your heart (bit’awi ’albek). Children learn from each 
other. Lujayn is lonely. 
Hiba then turned back to Lujayn and began testing another one of the skills on her agenda. 
Quietly, and speaking more to herself than to anyone else, Imm Lujayn responded to Hiba’s 
prompt. “She’s not lonely. Where she is, I am.” Imm Lujayn did not believe her daughter might 
be lonely because she did not recognize Lujayn as lacking horizontal social ties to other children. 
Their vertical bond mattered more; no one would fear for Lujayn like her mother. Other mothers 
of young children articulate similar sentiments. They express anxieties about letting their 
children socialize with peers, let alone cultivate friendships beyond those with their siblings, 
cousins, and neighbors they know best.  
Parents draw on a shared vocabulary of praise when describing people with Down 
Syndrome – “innocent,” (barā‘), “with white hearts” (‘andhum qalb abyaḍ), meaning pure and 
good, or “angels on earth” (malā’ik ‘alā al-arḍ). While ostensibly positive, these characteristics 
nevertheless prove problematic. Having a white heart does not compare with the “strong heart” 
that Hiba urged Imm Lujayn to develop for herself and her daughter. Being a good mother means 
teaching one’s child how to properly and successfully navigate moral dangers, an objective 
requiring both fear and strength. From an expert’s perspective, excessive fearfulness suggests 
that a child is not getting enough stimulation, or perhaps it points to an insecure home life. This 
is one of the reasons Hiba mentioned Leen’s anxious disposition and sensitivity to her 
surroundings. Yet many parents consider fearfulness, even in their youngest children, an apt 
instinct and one made even more critical when navigating the world with a disability. Mothers 
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often feel compelled to maintain constant vigilance and protect their morally innocent children 
from an immoral and threatening world, shielding their white hearts.87   
Fear is seen as necessary, while its appropriateness and moral legitimacy depends on the 
subjects, circumstances, and motivations in question. One afternoon, Hiba and I walked to her 
car while discussing a common issue faced by many of the smaller organizations: namely, the 
length of their employees’ workday (duwwām). Certain services receive much higher demand 
than others, ostensibly requiring specialists working in those areas to log longer hours (given the 
budgeting difficulties posed by the alternative of hiring more employees). The Society struggled 
to find a speech therapist who would commit to the extended hours they hoped to provide. Doing 
so would require staying alone in the building – located in a safe, middle class neighborhood – 
and locking up at the end of the day around 4 or 5pm. I asked Hiba why this issue had become so 
difficult to resolve, pointing out that the speech therapist could always start her duwwām earlier 
if she wanted to avoid rush hour (traffic being my own constant preoccupation and source of ire). 
She explained that I was missing the point. What was the objectionable in this scenario was 
being alone at the Society and responsible for closing (or opening).88  
“We’re afraid, Christine. There are so many stories about violence and rape now. Look – 
the laundry man who just entered the building to pick up a delivery is now pulling out in his van 
– see how he’s looking at us? Maybe he’ll come back tomorrow…” she trailed off. In this 
example, Hiba configured fear as an appropriate and necessary component of mature 
womanhood. Women need to be careful, manage the risks around them, and remain attuned to 
threats on their person or reputation. When taken to an extreme, however, fearful mothering 
                                                
87 These qualities were also problematic for other reasons relating to aspects of personhood and specifically 
adulthood, issues I discuss in chapters Four and Five. 
88 Needless to say, someone had to take on these responsibilities at the Society.  
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acquires negative qualities. Fearing for oneself and one’s children is reasonable. When fear 
prevents a child from interacting with the world, however, it can become an impediment to 
normal development. Precisely because mothers of children with Down Syndrome perceive their 
children as particularly weak in cultivating a proper sense of fear, they disagree with the 
suggestion that they are in turn being overly protective. 
Thus, fear has emerged as highly problematic for educators and activists, who criticize 
the “overprotective Arab mother” as a cultural problem and an impediment to progress for 
people with disabilities. This particular tension reflects broader debates in Jordanian society over 
what I have previously described as the risks of relatedness.89 In her research with elite women 
in a coastal city of Yemen, Anne Meneley discusses the centrality of fear to her interlocutors 
experiences of wellness, pain, and suffering. Zabidi women recognize the existence of “a malady 
called ‘fright’ (fajaʿa),” which women are susceptible to in the wake of experiencing an 
emotional trauma or shock (ṣadma) (Meneley 2003, 21). Fright sickness reflects the ambiguities 
and ironies of social closeness, whereby the people you care most deeply about become those 
most capable of harming you. Tragedies, freak accidents, and violent encounters – a child falling 
into a pot of boiling water, a fatal car crash involving family, the violent mugging of a loved one 
– can all produce fajaʿa. When Meneley began her research in 1989, treatment came in the form 
of a brief burn to the skin; the shock counterbalanced the fright and restored internal equilibrium. 
It is not possible to avoid fajaʿa, which occurs as a byproduct of encounters with life’s 
unpredictable cruelties. Yet women who experience fajaʿa indiscriminately are described as 
                                                
89 In her research on female friendships and ethical self-cultivation in Jordan, MacDougall writes that “to 
contemporary Jordanians, this closeness (tarābuṭ ijtimāʿī) is what distinguishes them as a culture, but it is also what 
is holding them back from progress” (MacDougall 2017, 18). In an astute analysis of a popular music video by the 
Jordanian band Jadal, she explains how young people think through the risks and burdens of maintaining close 
family-based social ties. 
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having a weak heart and are subject to moral rebuke. Meneley writes, “I myself was often 
criticized for having a ‘weak heart’ for my propensity to cry when others were crying, which was 
interpreted by the Zabidis as a dangerous and foolish oversensitivity to the concerns of those 
distant from me” (2003, 30).90 
The moral politics of fear can change with time and circumstance. Returning to Yemen 
after a decade-long absence, Meneley discovered that fajaʿa is now increasingly subjected to 
new modes of reasoning. After a local woman had been the victim of a startling encounter with 
an unknown male, for example, Meneley asked whether the woman had sought out the 
prescribed burn to avert the effects of shock (ṣadma) that lead to fright. Her friend “sniffed, 
saying that they were too 'advanced' (mutaqqaddam) for the burning treatment, which smacks of 
backwardness to those who consider themselves modern” (Meneley 2003). Instead, the woman’s 
family sent her to India to enjoy a restorative holiday. This perception of backwardness attests, 
on the one hand, to biomedicine’s increasing hegemony over local experiences of embodied 
affliction. It also speaks to the increasing importance of piety in local politics of respectability.  
Afflictions of fear become especially problematic when seen as symptomatic of one’s 
lack of faith in God and inability to accept His will. In Jordan, this concern dovetails with the 
middle-class notion that good, pious mothers are tireless in their pursuit of programs for their 
children’s development and enrichment. For mothers of disabled children, in particular, fear 
provides moral-emotional terrain for embodying and engendering contested notions of 
modernity, selfhood, and being-with disability. Unsympathetic and extremely critical 
assessments of women faced as regressively overprotective reveal intersections between gender 
                                                
90 In Meneley’s case, however, her sentimentality as an outsider actually proved endearing to the community of 
women she worked with. Positionality always shapes the production and reception of these norms, especially for 
ethnographies. 
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and disability while attesting to politics of cultivating a self that is both moral and modern, the 
precise boundaries of which shift over time but are nevertheless of enduring importance. 
Working on oneself: Striving for submission 
Both mothers and fathers invoked the term ṣadma, or shock, to describe their feelings 
upon receiving an unexpected diagnosis of Down Syndrome or other lifelong conditions. The 
vast majority of families and specialists consider ṣadma a completely natural response to a 
discovery of such magnitude. The danger of ṣadma lies in prolonging its symptoms: apathy, 
sorrow, crying, depression, and failing to complete one’s responsibilities as a parent, spouse, and 
adult. Shock and fear (khowf) involve different qualities and temporalities. The importance of 
fear is linked to the realities of human – and especially feminine – weakness and vulnerability; 
women value fear for its role in facilitating survival skills and engendering properly feminine 
values of modesty, restraint, and deference.91 Unlike fear, however, women stress the importance 
of overcoming ṣadma. They critique other mothers, and sometimes themselves in hindsight, for 
dwelling too long in a state of ṣadma. Sitting in Imm Maha’s living room with her three sisters-
in-law, I encountered yet another objection to ṣadma. 
I met Imm Maha through the Society, although she did not attend very often, citing the 
difficulty of traveling from her home in eastern Amman. Born and raised in Iraq, her family has 
since scattered all over the world as refugees. Her parents lived in the American Midwest, a 
placed she referred to as “Chicago.” She spoke often about her desire to visit them; she had not 
seen her mother in over 14 years. She and her husband met while at University in Baghdad. The 
couple and their young children sought refuge in Jordan after the U.S. invasion made life in Iraq 
                                                
91 Fear, in this sense, connects to a different gloss of the word shame, or ‘ayb, as used my interlocutors. It closely 
resembles the way anthropologists have described istahya, al haya’, and hasham, which can be translated as shame 
but which also reflect a positively valued sense of modesty (Meneley 1995, 2003; Abu-Lughod 1986; Mahmood 
2005). 
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too unbearable. Imm Maha could not lay claim to anything resembling “free” time at that point 
in her life. She was busy caring for her five children and extended family. She pushed back our 
first meeting repeatedly, as she explicitly wanted me to visit after her in-laws – who also lived 
with her – departed for a month-long trip to Egypt. Climbing the hill to her house for the first 
time, she informed me that even without them, my visit would nevertheless be full of family. 
Upon arrival I was introduced to Imm Maha’s three sisters-in-law. They heard about my visit and 
were keen to ask me questions about Maha (on the assumption that I was studying special 
education and could provide an authoritative disability evaluation). We chatted about Maha’s 
Down Syndrome in the course of getting to know one another. Her sisters-in-law provided most 
of the narration and interpretation of the diagnosis experience, leaving Imm Maha to prepare 
lunch. Not only did she have her own five children to feed, but also her relatives by marriage and 
their children. A steady stream of sons, daughters, nieces, and nephews began to straggle in from 
school and fill the narrow, nearly subterranean one bedroom apartment to maximum capacity. 
When I asked how the family coped with the initial ṣadma of Maha’s diagnosis, everyone 
within earshot issued a chorus of rebuttals. “No, no no! There was no ṣadma!” Alia exclaimed. 
Alia was Imm Maha’s unmarried sister-in-law who lived in a small storage space located in the 
apartment’s cellar. She appointed herself as Imm Maha’s chief representative and my guide to 
the family’s neighborhood.92 From the kitchen, Imm Maha shouted over to us, in agreement with 
her sisters-in-law, “There was no shock, Christine (mā kān fī ṣadma, Christine)! Alia explained 
to me that ṣadma was not something a Muslim felt about the arrival of a child with a disability. 
“Everything is a gift from God. There was no shock because why would we be shocked by what 
                                                
92 This appointment, I would later learn, did not sit well at all with Imm Maha. 
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God has given us?” Ṣadma, as Alia understood it, revealed a lack of faith in God’s plan and the 
intention of His design.93 
 Alia then announced that before we started our lunch she would like me to meet Imm 
Omar, one of their neighbors. Imm Omar also had a disabled daughter, although her situation 
was quite different from Maha’s. As Alia, Maha, and I walked through the narrow alleys of Jabal 
Ahmar, Alia provided me a unique oral map of the neighborhood. She pointed out various 
households and named different kinds of disabilities experienced by the residents inside (Down 
Syndrome, blindness, deafness, cerebral palsy, intellectual disability). In doing so, she conveyed 
an intimate knowledge of the various domestic states of wellbeing surrounding her. We arrived 
at the house of Imm Omar, who was slightly confused by my presence but graciously invited us 
inside nevertheless. Alia explained that I was visiting their family to learn more about Maha and 
about how Muslims understand disability. Alia herself introduced this specification. I never 
explicitly mentioned religion when describing my project, using the more general category of 
“culture” (thaqāfa), although almost every family I met was in fact Muslim. Imm Omar 
responded by showering me with several masha’allahs94 and habībtīs,95 inviting me to join the 
Qur’an study group that she and Alia both attended. She then went to bring Samira into the 
room. 
 Samira was the youngest of Imm Omar’s seven children and her only daughter. She was 
both physically and intellectually disabled. Samira experienced extensive brain damage at birth 
(ḍumūr al-‘aql, literally destruction of the mind). She neither walked nor talked, and her growth 
                                                
93 In her discussion of sadma and the fajaʿa amongst elite Zabidi women, Meneley describes a similar dilemma. 
While the fright women felt from sadma revealed embodied ways of dealing with fear, injury, and loss, many 
women struggled to accept and move on from fright without conveying any sense of diminished faith in God’s plan. 
94 An extremely common way to express praise, literally meaning “God willed it.” 
95 A term of endearment used across different kinds of social relationships; it literally means “my dear one” or “my 
love.” In this context, it conveys a sentiment of “sweet girl.” 
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was significantly arrested. Alia explained to Imm Omar that I asked about her family’s ṣadma on 
learning of Maha’s Down Syndrome. Alia stressed the word ṣadma to Imm Omar and paused 
afterward, giving her friend a knowing look. She then connected this to a second idea that I had 
not actually expressed to Alia. “She has heard that people here interpret disability as a 
punishment from God.”96 Imm Omar responded with a start. “Habībtī! How could Samira be a 
punishment? She is my path to heaven. She is proof that God loves me. She is mine and of me. 
How could I reject her?” At this point in our conversation, Samira suddenly became extremely 
irritated, so Imm Omar rose to carry her daughter back into the house’s interior (we remained in 
the salon space designated for receiving guests during our visit).  
Alia turned to me in her friend’s absence. “Imm Omar accepts her daughter’s disability.” 
Then she paused and thought about it. “No, she submits. This is the meaning of Islam, to submit. 
This is more than acceptance.” In interpreting Imm Omar’s conviction, Alia made a distinction 
between acceptance and submission, and she elaborated a particular orientation toward disability, 
one grounded in the imperative not merely to accept Samira’s disability but to submit to God’s 
will through it. Saba Mahmood uses research with female members of Egypt’s Islamic Revival, 
or daʿwa movement, to critique conventional feminist scholarship for collapsing distinctions 
between agency and autonomy in pursuit of freedom. This leads, Mahmood argues, to a 
“profound inability… to envision valuable forms of human flourishing outside the bounds of a 
liberal progressive imaginary” (Mahmood 2005, 155). Alia initially described Im Omar’s 
orientation toward her daughter as one of acceptance. Dissatisfied with its scope, however, she 
revised this initial description and instead invoked a paradigm of submission. This self-
                                                
96 Most of the families in my research described this belief to be backward and ignorant. Mothers cited ignorance of 
Islam, usually by referring vaguely to the dominance of “culture,” as causing the local and regional stigma 
surrounding disability.  
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correction, I would suggest, is emblematic of how many families’ commitments to their children 
fail to align with a disability rights agenda deeply invested in humanist principles of autonomy, 
equality, and independence. At the same time, submission should not be equated with fatalism, 
passivity, or the rejection of disability. “How could I reject her?” asked Imm Omar. Meneley 
also discusses this false equivalence when discussing why her Zabidi interlocutors would utter 
alḥamdulillah (praise God) upon the death of a child. 
These women contemplate the ironies of fate, eventually, if not easily, submitting 
to the will of God in a manner spoken about in terms of "patience' (ṣabr), 
encompassing both forbearance and endurance… This kind of submission to the 
will of God is a very active one, and is considered in Zabid to be an achievement 
worthy of social respect in this world and of reward in the afterlife… Passivity is 
not part of the way submission is perceived in Zabid. (Meneley 2003) 
Meneley’s interlocutors, like my own, struggle to recognize and accept God’s will as the ultimate 
and intentional organizing force behind life’s trials and challenges. They nevertheless attempt to 
align their own personal sense of agency as belonging to and within this divine agentive force.  
Suad Joseph and Iris Jean-Klein have both written about gendered kinship dyads – those 
of brother-sister and mother-son – as critical for mutually elaborated forms of personhood and 
self in Lebanon and Palestine, respectively. Joseph’s model of “connectivity” (1994) and Jean-
Klein’s of “cross-subjective self-enactment” (2000) analytically trace how forms of personhood 
take shape through broader structures of patriarchal and state power. Similarly, I would argue 
that kinship dyads, in contexts of disability, serve as key conduits through which individuals 
cultivate their relationships with God, which is part of their self-cultivation as moral subjects. 
Imm Iyad, a volunteer at the Society, explained to me that when the doctors’ confirmed her son’s 
Down Syndrome: 
I didn't depend on other people that they would lighten my burden. I worked on 
myself. I have conviction (qanāʿa). If someone has any problem or disaster, if he 
  111 
himself from his heart is not accepting and convicted... Alḥamdulillah this is 
something from God. Everyone talks, but I have conviction. I worked on myself - 
du'a (prayer), closeness to God. I became closer to God. I felt that was a test and a 
lesson for me. I became closer to God, alḥamdulillah.  
Imm Iyad stressed the active, ongoing, and varied kinds of work that adapting to Iyad’s Down 
Syndrome required of her. Prayer, deciding to continue as a teacher (rather than leave her job as 
she initially intended), and becoming an active member of the Society all represented different 
avenues for this work. The labor, care, and moral stakes at hand were never just about Iyad. 
Rather, Imm Iyad brought these life events into her own relationship with God and her ongoing 
project of moral self-development. She became closer to God as a result of this work.  
 It would not be accurate, however, to present submission as a distinctively “Islamic” 
practice in contrast to the possibilities afforded by acceptance. Doing so would miss how 
“religious beliefs and timeless theological truths about God’s purpose in creating human life gain 
new meanings when they are uttered in social and political-economic contexts that constrain, 
define, and enable possibilities of how that human life is lived” (Hamdy 2012, 247). For my 
interlocutors, basic assumptions about God, creation, and the nature of humanity frame their 
responses to diagnoses of disability and the work they undertake to create acceptance in 
themselves and others. Whether from a teacher at the Society, a mother who volunteers and 
spends time together there, or an activist with a higher degree from the United Kingdom, I 
constantly encountered the assertion that disability was ultimately God’s will (irādat Allah).97 
This timeless truth frames how families assess and deploy acceptance in the context of their own 
familial and communal circumstances.  
The distinctiveness of submission emerges as both a process and product of disengaging 
                                                
97 This did not preclude robust discussions about developing public health and education projects to minimize rates 
of preventable disabilities (such as those caused by malnutrition, poor maternal health care, and consanguineous 
marriage).  
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with classed-based identity politics and practices of acceptance in favor of kin-oriented forms of 
normalization that are expressed through a distinctly Islamic idiom. The latter requires far fewer 
modes of consumption. Maha’s family very rarely participates in Jordan’s formal disability 
services sector, yet Maha’s life is full of play, attention, and care from her parents, siblings, 
cousins, aunt and uncles, and grandparents. Maha’s day-to-day routine involves more social 
interaction than many of the children I encountered at the Society, whose mothers dutifully 
showed up for weekly early intervention sessions and progress checks. When Imm Maha could 
manage to attend lessons or appointments, the specialists involved in her care marveled at 
Maha’s clear ability to thrive, especially in terms of her speech development. At the same time, 
the potential for long-term negative effects from the lack of consistent early intervention services 
may cause greater challenges for Maha and her family in the future.98 
IV. Being-with disability as a collective project 
Processes and practices of state institutionalization that unfolded during the 19th and 20th 
centuries have intimately shaped the history of disability in many parts of the developed world. 
In most cases, powerful eugenics movements agitated and provided key support for 
institutionalization initiatives, reflecting the mutual interests and concerns of lawyers, doctors, 
politicians, and majority opinion (Asch 2001; Carey 2003; Carlson 2001; Phillips 2011). The 
Jordanian state, however, possesses neither the longevity nor financial capacities to facilitate 
large-scale institutionalization of children or adults with intellectual disabilities.99 Intervention 
                                                
98 When I returned to Amman a year later, Imm Maha had enrolled Maha at an UNRWA-run special education 
program near their new home instead of a regular kindergarten program. She explained that this was due primarily to 
Maha’s continued difficulty with toilet training. 
99 The role of eugenic thinking in the Arab Middle East remains somewhat of a puzzle. The topic requires further 
historical investigation, as well as consideration of how local categories of race and ethnicity converge and depart 
from those favored by eugenics movements elsewhere in the world. Work on eugenics during the Ottoman Empire 
and early modern Turkey remain the exceptions to this gap (Alemdaroğlu 2005; Çağlı 2016; Salgirli 2011). 
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into families through Arab/Muslim women, however, has long provided a means for state and 
non-state institutions to remake embodied social relations in the Middle East, especially through 
the paradigms of public health and hygiene (Boddy 2007; Fahmy 1998; Maffi 2013; Najmabadi 
1991).100 I initially approached the al-Nur Society as an example of anthropologist Paul 
Rabinow’s concept of biosociality. “If sociobiology is culture constructed on the basis of a 
metaphor of nature,” Rabinow writes, “then in biosociality nature will be modeled on culture 
understood as practice. Nature will be known and remade through technique” (Rabinow 1996, 
99). Rabinow documents biosociality at work by conducting ethnography in emerging 
communities forged between strangers who shared genetic conditions, or even predispositions to 
conditions. Genetic affinities and labels of risks create new kinds of social identities, ones that 
can be brought into existence only through the mapping of the human genome. An organization 
centered on Down Syndrome would seem to fit into this model.  
The work of building community 
The more time I spent at the Society, the less biosociality seemed capable of capturing 
the intimate and emotionally intense ways that participants became entangled in each other’s 
lives. Members’ often absent desire to organize politically around disability (or Down Syndrome 
specifically) and make claims on the state further muddled the application of a biosocial 
framework.101  Problematizing biosociality’s increasingly expansive reach as an analytical 
paradigm, Elizabeth Roberts argues that, “the concept should not be applied to every social 
grouping formed around a biological identity or disease status. Biosociality involves an 
                                                
100 Similar dynamics exist in Israel. However, significantly higher rates of prenatal screening and diagnosis, 
selective reproduction, and the institutionalization of persons with disabilities have resulted in a different sociology 
of disability that merits its own discussion (Weiss 1994, 2004). 
101 Claire Beaudevin raises similar hesitations about applying the framework of biosociality in her analysis of the 
Oman Hereditary Blood Disorders Association (2013). 
  114 
empirically traceable reimagining of the nature of the social and the biological in the face of new 
biomedical and genetic knowledge or diagnostic technologies” (2008, 81). Noting the discernible 
lack of patient or identity collectives surrounding infertility in Ecuador, Roberts suggests that 
“the absence of biosocial collectives has to do with the devalued nature of citizenship in Ecuador 
and the retraction of the social welfare sector of the state” (2008, 83).  
While collectives such as the al-Nur Society have become a visible part of the disability 
advocacy landscape in Jordan, both the fragmented and hierarchical nature of citizenship and the 
privatization of social service provision significantly shape the goals and identity politics of 
many local organizations. Legally speaking, political disengagement remains an official 
precondition of the organizations’ right to exist. When speaking at public events, or when writing 
for public audiences on Facebook, parents102 – but very rarely specialists – use kinship-oriented 
plurals to convey the nature of their alliances: “God bless our children, and protect them”; “The 
Nur families have gathered for iftar.” These invocations of relatedness reveal and reflect the 
importance of kinship to the Society’s goals, which are not centered on creating individual 
subjects-with-disabilities empowered to make claims on the state. They focus instead on the 
critical importance of compelling kin to recognize and value individuals with Down Syndrome 
as family members, affording them all of the rights and privileges (and obligations) that this 
recognition entails.  
Rather than reimagine the social, parents connect through Down Syndrome by drawing 
on widely intelligible forms of kin roles and kin-like obligations. Doing so fosters feelings of 
closeness, grounded in shared experience. In turn, these sentiments afford families the license to 
                                                
102 Some parents (or other relatives) become known “personalities,” organizing events, producing Youtube videos, 
and facilitating dialogues either on their personal Facebook pages or on public group pages. I distinguish these kinds 
of public figures from experts - medical doctors, psychologists, special educators, child development specialists, 
human rights advocates, and disability activists – who rarely invoke this possessive and kin-based language. 
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criticize, ask, intervene, compel, and of course, clash with each other. Often, tensions that 
emerged between the Society members had to do with the very question of what it means to be 
part of a collective that is ostensibly not defined in terms of kin. In her research with African 
American families who have children with chronic and life-threatening illnesses in Los Angeles, 
Cheryl Mattingly offers her own alternative to biosociality, writing that:  
Parents’ ability to respond to the call or needs of their vulnerable children, and to 
create a social world in which their children can be better cared for, become 
primary moral projects… Furthermore, these are social moral projects that change 
shape over time, requiring the development of communities of care. (2014, 5) 
This idea of a moral project geared toward building communities of care more closely captures 
the family-like, intimate, and ethically charged engagements that unfold between Society 
members. 
“That’s the Problem with Arab Women!” 
 Imm Fadi is a former employee in Jordan’s booming tourism sector, and she lives in an 
affluent neighborhood of western Amman with her husband and their 20-year-old son Fadi, the 
youngest of three children. One day, while ostensibly at the Society to pick up Amer after youth 
club, she lingered to chat with Imm Adil and her oldest daughter Lamia, who often accompanied 
her mother and Adil to his training sessions. Imm Adil was frustrated with Adil’s continued lack 
of speech and what she perceived as a general failure to progress since beginning early 
intervention classes and speech therapy. Drawing on her own experiences, Imm Fadi told Imm 
Adil that when she needed a break from Fadi, she asked her husband to take over. “I get out of 
the house and head to Mecca Mall, buy a coffee and a croissant from Cafe Paul, and sit and 
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watch the people go by. To clear my head, I mean. All mothers need alone time,” she insisted. 
“And this is a problem with Arab women!103 They don’t take care of themselves!”  
 Imm Adil nodded and laughed with a smile on her face but countered quite matter-of-factly 
that such a scenario would be impossible for her. “I have all my children to take care of! Plus, 
my husband would never accept this.” Imm Fadi responded in an admonishing tone. “You must 
marry someone who has confidence in you! There has to be confidence between you two!” Im 
Adnan objected to the implications of this statement for her own marriage. “There is confidence 
(thiqa)! But his mentality (‘aqlu) is simply different,” she shrugged. “He didn’t even want Lamia 
to attend university because it is coed!” These easy transitions between discussions of child 
development, marital relations, and self-care offer just one example of how Down Syndrome 
takes shape neither as a discrete category nor a specific sociopolitical identity. It participates in 
and is shaped by ongoing conversations about what it means to be a modern woman and a good 
mother.  
Not in front of other people!  
 During World Down Syndrome Day 2015, a conflict emerged that offers insights into the 
fraught and messy interpersonal relationships fostered by al-Nur Society and other collectives 
like it. While brief, this moment reveals the complex interplay of intimacy and estrangement that 
emerges between women linked through their children with Down Syndrome. Whenever I 
attended conferences on disability in Jordan, the question-and-answer sessions, usually described 
as “dialogue sessions” (jalsāt hiwāriyya), proved raucous affairs. They culminated in frustrated 
                                                
103 I was unclear how Im Fadi positioned herself in relation to this statement. As a member of Jordan’s Circassian 
minority, she may have been subtly referencing the cultural distinctions between Arabs and Circassians that 
members of the latter community often mentioned to me. The Circassian families I met tended to attribute to their 
Arab friends and neighbors more orthodox religious commitments and social conservatism, which they often 
describes as constraining. 
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parents screaming, sometimes at the speakers, sometimes at each other, and other times at 
everyone, or no one in particular. Imm Hana, an active volunteer in the society, served as an 
unofficial moderator for one such event. During a transition between panels of speakers, she 
began a public rebuke of sorts, which she directed toward the dwindling crowd that remained to 
attend the day’s final session. Imm Hana rhetorically asked the audience members why people 
with Down Syndrome continued to face so many obstacles and forms of social exclusion. Then 
she provided her own answer: “It’s because families don’t have commitment.” She continued by 
making a distinction that speaks to the tension between a biosocial identity of Down Syndrome, 
as imagined in a liberal enactment of citizenship-based disability rights, and the kinship-oriented 
realities of Down Syndrome in Jordan. “You only advocate for your own children and not for the 
rights of children with Down Syndrome.”  
 At one point during this soliloquy, which vacillated between an impassioned rallying cry 
and an uncomfortable invective, Imm Munir called out from the crowd and began to argue with 
Imm Hana. She challenged the latter’s narrative of unmotivated families. Imm Hana then shot 
back that Imm Munir had missed the most recent meetings at the Society and was therefore not 
in place to comment on families’ relative lack of commitment. “Your problem is that you don’t 
follow up on anything!” This entire exchange unfolded in front of the assembly room. Imm 
Munir fell silent at Imm Hana’s accusation. After a few minutes, she got up and exited the room, 
her eldest daughter Shuruq trailing behind her and staring at the floor. Very shortly after, a few 
other women also exited the room. Feeling awkward about the general atmosphere and exhausted 
from trying to follow the multiple back-and-forth conversations happening simultaneously, I 
decided to follow them.  
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 Outside, I found Imm Munir visibly agitated, gesticulating widely with the red sleeves of 
her jilbāb angrily flapping through the air. Imm Iyad, who also happened to be standing outside 
taking a break, joined the commotion. “I couldn’t attend that meeting because Munir was in the 
hospital! In the hospital! He gets sick all the time! I had to be with him, and this puts limits on 
my time!” Imm Munir shouted. One of Imm Munir’s friends, trying to soothe and justify her 
indignation at the same time, reminded Imm Munir that she “should not show our internal 
divisions to these people,” meaning other audience members. Imm Iyad agreed, reinforcing this 
point. “These discussions shouldn’t occur in front of people (ʿadam al-nās), yā Imm Munir!” 
After each counterpoint, Imm Munir repeated somewhat tangentially and with great emotion that 
she couldn’t attend most things because Munir was always in and out of the hospital.   
 In many ways, this scenario played out like a family conflict. Imm Iyad and the other 
women surrounding Imm Munir admonished her for engaging in a public argument and offering 
strangers fodder for gossip (kilām al-nās; lit. people’s talk). These kinds of rebukes are 
classically associated with fears that family members articulate to one another out of concern for 
their individual and collective reputations. Imm Hana criticized families for continuing to 
advocate for their children as such, rather than advocating for their children as children-with-
Down-Syndrome. The social, among this community, is still comprised of kinship-based 
relationships and identities, above and beyond other biomedical or biosocial categories. Imm 
Iyad’s agitation reflects continuing uncertainties about the demands that women can make on 
each other as advocates, especially in light of the very real demands of childcare they constantly 
face and the grinding exhaustion that accompanies their attempts to be good mothers. During a 
brief return visit to Amman in 2016 I learned that Imm Munir no longer brought Munir to the 
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society. Judging from a Facebook post, I surmised that she has since enrolled Munir in a full-
time, private special education center.  
Starting from somewhere: 
At one point in my fieldwork, an American NGO worker contacted the Society with the 
hopes of coordinating a workshop in a rural village located between Amman and Kerak. I 
initially assumed Imm Zahra would be eager to accept, but she expressed major reservations. 
What was the point, she asked me, if families themselves were not willing to do the work 
necessary to improve their children’s lives? I was not so certain, offering a response that 
amounted to something along the lines of, “You have to start somewhere… Don’t you?” Imm 
Zahra disagreed. The fact that this invitation came from an American volunteer (Who was she 
and who did she work with?) rather than a parent did not bode well. She located the seeds of 
change in the family and with individuals in the context of their family roles. You do not have to 
start from somewhere; you have to start somewhere specific – with the family, and especially the 
mother.  
How then, I wondered, did Imm Zahra account for this internal spark? This question was 
one in a series of chicken-and-egg problems that families, teachers, and advocates involved in 
Jordan’s disability worlds debate at length. How does cultural change occur? What are the main 
units in this process? How does it spread? The first time I met Imm Zahra, she told me about the 
traumatic experience of receiving Zahra’s diagnosis. The doctors’ insisted that Zahra would 
likely die. Zahra experienced ongoing heart complications during her early childhood. And, Imm 
Zahra experienced overwhelming anxiety in trying to figure the kind of child that Zahra, with 
Down Syndrome, would become (a very funny and very stubborn child, as it turned out). I asked 
Imm Zahra why she decided to fight her doctors, family, and friends and commit herself to 
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creating change, although perhaps what I really wanted to know was in fact how she did this. She 
responded matter-of-factly, “Because I believed in the rights of my child. God gives us chances. 
Why would I take them away from her?” 
Imm Zahra’s response in no way minimized her commitment to Zahra, but she anchored 
this commitment in a third relationship, her relationship with God. Her recognition of God’s 
sovereignty and Zahra’s rights compelled her to action. Amira Mittermaier describes a similar 
positionality among youth volunteers in urban Cairo who do not describe their work through the 
paradigm civic engagement. Instead, they “embed volunteering (tatawwu‘) within a spiritual 
economy that disrupts the affective underpinnings of altruism … [and] evades compassion” 
(2014, 519). Within this spiritual economy, volunteers’ relationships with and duty to God 
emerge as paramount. They ground their engagement with social inequality in a commitment to 
doing good deeds for God – and the desire to gain rewards. Imm Zahra’s activism and tireless 
efforts to mobilize those around her originate – in part – from an understanding that she owes 
something to God. If she did not advocate for Zahra, she would be guilty of taking something 
away that she does not have the right to take – chances. Kinship and religion are both part of the 
social in Jordan, and it is through these domains, in the form of collectives that draw from both, 
that families are creating new disability worlds. 
V. Acceptance?  
Parents orient themselves towards their disabled child in ways that are flexible, dynamic, 
and changed over time. They involve situated and contextually forged relationships of distinction 
and difference, the social markers that constitute moral personhood (Kittay 2005). Imm Zahra is, 
in many ways, a paragon of acceptance. She works constantly not only to advocate from the 
familiar platforms of human and disability rights but also to promote commitments viewed as 
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radical by many who know her. Disability and Down Syndrome remain new, unsettled terms, 
and they are only just beginning to provide substance for alliances, coalition building, and more 
basic forms of comprehensive care. Imm Zahra, however, often challenges fellow parents and 
advocates to think of Down Syndrome not as a disability at all, framing it instead as a learning 
delay that becomes disabling through the lack of adequate support systems in place. This claim is 
often met with scorn and concern by professionals in the special education sector but also by 
other parents. “Imm Zahra does not accept that Zahra has a disability,” Imm Fadi opined one 
afternoon while we sat together in the Society’s reception room and chatted about recent goings-
on in her life. “Moms come for hope, and they need hope, but we have to be honest, too.”  
Yet, one day, Imm Zahra offered a more nuanced glimpse into her own orientation 
toward her daughter and how life has changed after having a child with Down Syndrome.  
I love Zahra, and my role as a mother is to try and help her to the best of her 
ability. But I’m exhausted. The challenges will not end. I can never let her walk 
behind me. I worry about her burning herself. About her spilling something. 
About her being alone.  
Imm Zahra described herself as exhausted (taʿbaneh), and she cannot envision a future free from 
this exhaustion because Zahra will always have Down Syndrome. Mattingly writes that, “In the 
face of the suffering and challenges of their children, parents often find themselves propelled in a 
quest to imagine a new sort of life for themselves or to become different kinds of persons. They 
are propelled into a new, often unexpected and unwanted project of becoming” (2014, 5). The 
meaning of taʿbaneh is closer to that of illness or being worn down than a mere lack of energy or 
sleepiness; it connotes a state of damaged wellbeing. Given her anemia, low blood pressure, 
constant toothaches, and reliance on chewing ice cubes and coffee beans, Imm Zahra’s body 
revealed the toll of this ongoing project of becoming in ways that were impossible to hide. 
 This chapter has examined how new practices and attitudes toward childhood disability 
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have a variety of consequences for women as mothers, wives, and caregivers. Rather than focus 
only on moral subjectivity or on the identity politics that frame women’s experiences as mothers 
of children with disabilities, I show how these are interrelated by using the concept of moral 
orientation. The orientation toward acceptance captures some of the shifting and changing ways 
that women inhabit – or attempt to inhabit – the subject position of a “good” mother. The figure 
of the good mother coalesces around forms of access, consumption, and engagement heavily 
mediated by class and social capital. A gendered cultural politics informs the construction of 
acceptance as the modern orientation toward disability. Acceptance is most clearly and explicitly 
performed through the visible consumption of therapeutic services, although these are 
recuperated back into the frameworks of family and piety.  
Nadia has both intellectual and physical disabilities, and she can no longer walk. The first 
time I visited Nadia and her mother at their home in East Amman, she took one look at me and 
put her head down, covering her face with her hands. Her brother informed me that Nadia would 
respond to my presence like this; it was a tic she had picked up over the years, although they 
were not certain from where. He gently admonished his sister, saying, “ʿayb ya māmā.104 Several 
hours of my visit had passed before Nadia would cease to shield her face from my eyes. While 
Nadia did own a wheelchair, she was dependent on her mother, her brothers, or her father to 
carry her up and down the stairs of their second floor apartment. Nadia’s father lived with his 
second wife and their three sons in a different part of Amman. He visited Nadia frequently, 
however, because Imm Nadia and Nadia live on the floor above several of his kin. Imm Nadia 
did not find this arrangement agreeable, but she had no means to create an alternative situation 
for herself. No longer capable of lifting her daughter, Imm Nadia would show up at social and 
                                                
104 ‘Ayb in this case functioned as a gentle form of chastisement that roughly translates to “this is 
incorrect/impolite”; children in Jordan are often addressed as māmā or bābā. 
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charitable events ostensibly being held for her daughter – summer parties, special performances, 
Ramadan iftars – alone. The first time I met Nadia was at a support group for mothers of 
intellectually disabled adults living in East Amman. While almost all of the other intellectually 
disabled adults attended a daily crafts workshop, Nadia stayed at home. The community 
organization’s building was wheelchair-accessible to a limited degree, but the workshop space 
was not.  
As we sat discussing their difficult situation, Imm Nadia stressed to me that she did not 
want Nadia to live a secluded life. “There are people who are embarrassed by their children and 
hide them in the house. I’m not embarrassed. Whenever people come to visit, Nadia is always 
present. She greets people, she eats with them, and she sits with them!” When Nadia aged out of 
the day program she attended as a teenager, both she and her mother became increasingly 
restricted to their home. Nadia traveled only so far as the roof deck hovering over her relatives 
living on the floor below, and her mother rarely went much farther. Imm Nadia insisted that she 
was not, nor had she ever been, embarrassed by her daughter. She accepted Nadia as she was. 
Yet they lived their lives largely confined indoors, unable to participate in or consume the 
services and activities available within an emerging disability world that remained quite literally 
out of their reach. Acceptance in the absence of accessibility, under the wider circumstances of 
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Chapter 4. Inclusion 
I. The right of every child 
The previous chapters focus on the earliest phases of a child’s life, tracing how family 
members and kinship networks shape moral frameworks of diagnosis and practices of early 
childhood development, bringing disability into being in the process. Childhood constitutes a 
specific life stage, involving embodied, social, and cultural expectations that vary across time 
and space (Stephens 1995). As babies age into childhood, non-domestic spaces and non-kin 
relations gain importance in their lives. Jordanians today widely equate childhood with 
participation in formal education. When interacting with children, adults and teenagers will often 
ask, “and in what grade are you?” as the natural follow-up to “how old are you?” Across class 
lines, people accept and enthusiastically pursue education as desirable and necessary, though as 
anthropologist Fida Adely has shown, their reasons for doing so remain diverse and complex 
(2004, 2012). Education has also become a focal point for Jordan’s disability rights activists and 
policy makers, where the concept of inclusion (damaj) dominates local and national organizing 
efforts. An expansive network of development organizations and both local and transnational 
NGOs promote inclusive education as the key to building an inclusive Jordanian society. In fact, 
during my fieldwork I rarely encountered a distinction between inclusion and inclusive 
education. Both were described as damaj.105 
                                                
105 An alternate translation relies on the term shāmil as an adjective for inclusive, but damaj, in its noun form, 
remained far more common, at least in my fieldwork. 
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During the spring of 2014, I attended an event held as part of an advocacy campaign 
promoting inclusive education across Jordan. During this time, I was living with Dunia, an older 
woman active in Jordan’s advocacy and volunteer communities. A car accident almost three 
decades prior left Dunia paralyzed from the waist down at the end of her late twenties. In the 
aftermath of the crash, her then newly-established business career ended and her young marriage 
dissolved. The months I spent with Dunia gave me perspective on the realities of living as a 
physically disabled woman in Jordan. We often passed the time watching Indian soap operas 
dubbed into Arabic – her favorite followed a family raising an autistic child and fighting societal 
stigma – or American movies. The plot lines of Forrest Gump and the Dark Knight became 
jumping off points for discussions about political freedom, censorship, or the rise of religious 
extremism. Dunia completed an online Master’s degree in special education, as well as a 
certification course in early education. Her mobility impairments, health issues, and perhaps 
most significantly, her age, limited Dunia’s ability to find paid work, but she was regularly 
invited to various events in and around central Jordan.  
This particular event was held at a public school in the city of Madaba. It was one stop in 
a series of talks organized by the al-Nur Society across several of Jordan’s governorates. The 
day’s program involved lectures addressing inclusive education from the vantage points of 
human rights, citizenship, and pedagogy. A group of mostly-female volunteers from a local 
charity also coordinated art activities, face painting, and games to entertain the young children in 
attendance. As Dunia and I approached the school’s only entrance, she groaned. A series of 
uneven, cement steps stood between us and the door. Ultimately, with the help of three young 
men recruited to lift Dunia and her chair over the lip of each edge, she made it into the building. 
This happened regularly when Dunia left the house, and she had developed a steely disposition to 
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manage such indignities. We entered the auditorium, which was filled mostly with women and 
included several mothers I had met at other events and workshops, as well as teachers and staff 
from a well-known special education center located on the outskirts of town. A group of men 
lingered by the door, looking somewhat uncertain as to the permissibility of their presence. “Of 
course you can come in,” exclaimed one of the organizers. Sensing their hesitancy, she ushered 
them out of the doorway and into empty rows of chairs.  
The president of the local disability advocacy group spoke first. She began her welcome 
speech by asserting that, “inclusive education serves all children. It is their right and is 
guaranteed by the constitution.” I couldn’t help but look at Dunia, who had struggled to even 
make it through the door of the school. Her face was impassive. This was not the only time I 
attended an inaccessible event promoting inclusive education. Over a year later, while 
participating in various events held in celebration of World Down Syndrome day, I attended a 
series of talks held at a government building in downtown Amman. While functional ramps had 
been installed at the main entrance, the stage in the conference hall lacked the same 
accommodations. The physically impaired speaker scheduled to open the conference leaned on 
his cane while surveying the stairs up to the podium. He looked at me and shrugged. “It’s always 
like this.”  
II. Access and inclusion  
What does it mean to advocate for inclusion in the glaring absence of accessible 
infrastructure? What can the inclusive education’s dominance on the agendas of formal activist, 
governmental, and nongovernmental institutions tell us about the “performance of human rights” 
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(Slyomovics 2005) in Jordan?106 Writing about accessibility in Petrozavodsk, Russia, Cassandra 
Hartblay describes a popular meme that circulated among her interlocutors – adults with mobility 
and speech impairments – over the course of her fieldwork. The meme featured various 
examples of nameless, placeless, inaccessible wheelchair ramps marked as distinctly Russian by 
architectural styles and Cyrillic signage. Hartblay also provides her own images, one of a ramp 
impossibly transected by a handrail, and a second with a crumbling lip and awkward position in 
relation to the door, to provide further illustration. The presence of these structures raises the 
obvious question: “What is accessible design if it doesn’t provide access to anything for the 
intended user” (Hartblay 2017, 2)? Access, writes Hartblay, refers simultaneously to “a global 
discourse, a design practice with specific local implications, and a normative concept that people 
with disabilities use to describe the nexus of public infrastructure, mobility, and social 
participation in their daily lives” (2017, 2). Inclusive education also refers to a global discourse 
and a normative concept. Inclusive schools, where they successfully operate, both draw on and 
create different kinds of accessibilities (Friedner and Osborne 2015). In my own fieldwork, 
families understand inclusiveness as a quality and an abstract standard. It cannot be guaranteed 
or even observed through material, spatial, and technological interventions, which ultimately 
both rely on and reproduce the underlying social politics of design. Inclusiveness remains 
elusive. Both supporters and critics in Jordan frame inclusion as a fundamentally moral and 
problematically immaterial ideology. 
In 2014, Jordan’s Higher Council for the Affairs of People with Disabilities (HCD) 
launched a campaign entitled “My Place is Among You” (Makāni Baynkūm). The multimedia 
initiative included press releases in local papers, advertisements on radio programs and TV 
                                                
106 Although I take this phrase from Slyomovics, my own use seeks to convey a slightly more sarcastic and theatrical 
use of the term. 
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series, posters, and the production of at least one large banner – hung on the overpass between 
west Amman’s Shmeisani and 3rd circles. A promotional video shot for the campaign and 
uploaded to the Ammancity Youtube channel opens with the ringing of a school bell, while the 
camera follows young students filing into their classrooms. The picture then cuts to a female 
student sitting in class and fending off another girl’s attempts to grab her hearing aid. “Cut it out 
(khalās),” she cries. A third classmate intervenes, wagging her finger to chastise their 
disrespectful peer. In the next frame, a young boy struggles after someone knocks his walking 
aids out of reach during the rush to lunch. A classmate hurries over, smiles, and hands the 
assistive devices back to him. The voiceover intervenes: “Take care of your peers with 
disabilities. It reflects on your morals and compassion. Their place is among you.” The two 
disabled students featured in the story then assert in unison, “My place is among you (makānī 
baynkūm)!”  
The description underneath the video describes the goal of the Makānī Baynkūm 
campaign as, “promoting community awareness on the importance of the right of inclusive 
education” (Ammancitytube 2014). This emphasis on awareness aligns with the analytical 
framework I have described in previous chapters, whereby families, educators, and activists in 
Jordan agree that cultural ignorance and societal backwardness cause the intense stigma and 
marginalization of disabled people and their families. Rights activists, transnational 
organizations like the United Nations, specialists educated in western institutions, and some 
advocates vocally champion inclusive education as critical for developing Jordan’s families and 
Jordanian society. Yet many parents and teachers, including some who fought – and paid dearly 
– for their children to pursue inclusive educational opportunities, view these claims warily. This 
chapter attempts to work through this wariness. I place the arguments marshaled for and against 
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inclusive education in the context of broader debates about education in Jordan, which link 
schooling to contested ideologies of progress, modernity, and development (Adely 2009; see 
Luykx 1999 for a similar ethnographic study in Bolivia).  
The ethnography in this chapter traces how parents, teachers, experts, and activists 
deploy inclusive education to make broader claims about schooling, education, identity, and 
society. It does not feature the experiences of disabled children in either inclusive schools or 
special education centers. The sobering reality that so few disabled children in Jordan actually 
access schooling of any kind influenced my decision not to conduct fieldwork in an educational 
setting. World Bank estimates place the enrollment rate for school-aged disabled children in the 
Middle East and North Africa at approximately 5% (cited in Peters 2009). More recent figures, 
based on Jordan’s 2015 census, suggest the situation is slightly less terrible: approximately 21% 
of disabled children are enrolled in educational programming of any kind (Madhar 2017; Al-
Nimri 2017). The disparity between disabled and nondisabled children’s schooling in Jordan is 
quite shocking, given that the country’s overall gross primary school enrollment rate is 
approximately 98%.107  
Consistent access to educational institutions remains exceptional for most intellectually 
disabled children in Jordan. I use the term institution intentionally here, as separate special 
education centers remain the primary schooling option available to disabled children in Jordan. 
Both for-profit centers (marākez, s. markez) and non-profit foundations and charities (mu’assasāt 
and jamaʿiyyāt) fall under the domain of the Ministry of Social Development rather than the 
Ministry of Education, a jurisdictional gap that can cause problems for students and families 
                                                
107 Gross primary refers to the total enrollment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a 
percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education in a given school-year 
(FHI360 2014). Two percent of Jordanian youth do not complete primary school (FHI360 2014). 
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(Alodat, Almakanin, and Zumberg 2014).108 In this fractured system, most families experiment 
with different possible educational trajectories. Over time, they mix enrollment at private or 
public centers with attempts at mainstream schooling, and most also experience periods when 
their school-aged disabled children receive no formal educational programming whatsoever. 
These inconsistencies of access and exposure, needless to say, disrupt children’s learning 
processes and compound existing learning difficulties. A pernicious cycle emerges in which the 
myriad structural barriers to education reinforce the pervasive stereotype that intellectually 
disabled children “can’t learn.”  
Many advocates of inclusive education describe parents who do not support inclusive 
education as in denial and lacking a progressive, modern stance on disability rights. They draw 
on the discourses of social critique I have outlined in previous chapters and redeploy them to 
label critics of inclusive education as guilty of the "backwardness," attributed to culture (thaqāfa) 
and ignorance (jahl). The ethnographic moments that follow, however, demonstrate the 
multidimensional and situated qualities of parents’ skepticism toward or rejection of inclusive 
education paradigms. Parents who decline to support or pursue inclusive education do not 
believe their children are any less deserving of education, friendship, and growth outside the 
home than nondisabled children are. Quite the opposite, in fact, is true. Many parents end up 
drawing a distinction, however, between education and schooling. They consider education 
necessary for advancement in today’s world and for personal development. They also articulate 
                                                
108 According to Al-Khatib and Al-Khatib (2008), as of 2007 the Ministry of Social Development supervised 69 
centers that provided educational services for approximately 2,700 students classified as having mild to severe 
intellectual disabilities (Directorate of Disability Affairs, 2007). They estimated that this number accounted for “5% 
of the target population” in Jordan based on an international prevalence rate of 2% (2008, 111). The authors do not, 
however, conclude that the other 95% of children with intellectual disabilities are necessarily out of school. Rather, 
they argue, at least some portion of this population remains “hidden” in mainstream education by a lack of diagnosis 
(2008, 111). This issue tends not to be relevant in case of children with Down Syndrome, who display phenotypic 
features that often mark them as “intellectually disabled” regardless of the degree to which their own personal 
learning challenges fall on a spectrum of disability. 
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serious doubts about whether any schools in Jordan could actually provide a quality education 
for their children. This is especially the case given the precarity steadily encroaching on daily life 
and eroding possibilities for stability, let alone upward mobility.109 Parents describe schools as 
spaces of violence, risk, and neglect, and they wonder what kinds of parents would choose to 
ignore these realities for the sake of ideals.  
Dominant rights discourses in Jordan present education as a universal and abstract path to 
liberal enlightenment (Abu-Rabia-Queder 2008). They depict inclusivity as a straightforward 
process and moral good, and they rely on a nationalist-developmentalist framework that 
positions schools as critical partners for promoting citizen identities and developing civic 
commitments. Parents, in turn, view education as critical for individual and familial survival. 
Inclusive schooling, from their perspective, will not necessarily guarantee effective education, 
thus diminishing its value. Parents are well are that inclusion, in the holistic vision presented by 
advocates - requires changes far deeper than the spatial and material configurations in Jordan’s 
schools. How can they expect teachers and students – strangers – to create inclusive 
environments when they cannot even count on their own families to do so? The ongoing 
privatization of education in Jordan only exacerbates parents’ skepticism and adds another layer 
of complexity to everyday practices of inclusion in the context of neoliberal capitalism. 
In the following sections, I provide a brief overview of inclusive education philosophy 
and scholarship to contextualize the ideas that families in Jordan encountered through formal 
disability right channels. I then situate these ideas in relation to more critical voices of 
                                                
109 My interlocutors pointed to multiple factors in articulating this sense of precarity, among them regional 
instability, the Syrian civil war, unemployment, rising costs of living, and the recent devastating Israeli offensive 
against Gaza (Operation Protective Edge). The latest refugee crisis has placed immense burdens on Jordan’s school 
system. During the time of my fieldwork (2013-2015), many schools ran double shifts or far exceeded their stated 
classroom capacities in an attempt to provide Syrian children with education. 
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researchers conducting work on disability in the Global South, and I situate their arguments in 
relation to anthropological and area studies perspectives on education and schools. I then turn to 
a collection of ethnographic moments that provide different examples of how and why parents 
deftly critique an abstract ideal of “inclusion” while also continuing to reject and fight the 
existing discrimination against their children. 
III. Inclusive education: An overview 
What does inclusive education look like, and who is it for? “The term has become most 
closely associated with the global movement to educate all students with disabilities in general 
education classrooms” (Barton 1997, 45). More broadly, however, “the basic premise… is that 
schools are about belonging, nurturing, and educating all children and youth, regardless of their 
differences in culture, gender, language, ability, class, and ethnicity” (Artiles and Kozleski 2007, 
357). A truly inclusive educational system would render redundant the very qualifier of 
“inclusive” and eliminate the special education industry. Inclusive education theorists share this 
fundamental commitment to the elimination of special education. 
It is not primarily a question of the quality or adequacy of what is offered in a 
special school. Even a superbly well organized special school offering the highest 
quality curriculum and educational input to its children has no right to exist if that 
same education can be provided in a mainstream school. [Dessent (1987:97)], 
quoted in Barton (1997, 235).  
Despite the clarity and consistency of this position, critiques have emerged regarding the 
(geo)politics of theorizing inclusive education from the standpoint of universalizing ideals rather 
than the concrete historical and social contexts that shape systems of schooling and ideologies of 
education. Inclusive education, Slee acknowledges, actually entails a fundamental “oxymoron.” 
Schools were never really meant for everyone… As an historical artifact, schools 
were established for a minority of privileged students… The relatively recent 
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advent of mass compulsory schooling merely elaborated the processes of social 
stratification and exclusion through a range of dividing practices in the school 
(Slee 2001, 172; See also Khan 2012).  
The institution of inclusive education ultimately aspires to radically transform schools and 
rewrite their very purpose.  
While Slee recognizes schools as an “historical artifact,” he nevertheless writes with this 
artifact squarely located in the United Kingdom. The contributors to a special issue of Childhood 
entitled “Education, childhood and disability in countries of the South– Re-positioning the 
debates,” 110 problematize the clear hegemony of first-world assumptions that dominates 
scholarship on inclusive education. They vocalize a shared concern with “the naïve transfer of 
toolkits and indexes, developed by Northern-based academics, funded by international 
organizations, who have little experience of realities of schools” beyond the industrialized 
democratic nations that comprise the Global North (Singal and Muthukrishna 2014, 298). Editors 
Nidhi Singal and Nithi Muthukrishna, point to the strikingly consistent representations of 
“disabled children’s childhood and education in the global South” through reductionist 
paradigms of neglect, oppression, and abuse (2014, 293). These paradigms, they note, call for 
“the liberalization and emancipation of people with disabilities in the South on the basis of the 
‘enlightened’, ‘civilizing’ work of Northern scholars and agencies” (2014, 293). In keeping with 
my observations on the work that inclusion does in Jordan, I would add to Singal and 
Muthukrishna’s description only that local elites play a significant role as mediators of such 
discourses.  
                                                
110 Regarding their choice of terminology, Singal and Mutukrishna write that, “Over the years ‘North/South’ has 
become shorthand for highlighting the complex set of inequalities and dependencies between countries divided not 
by geographical boundaries, but by fundamental economic inequality. Significantly, most countries of the South also 
share the legacy of having been conquered or controlled by modern imperial powers, resulting in a continued legacy 
of dependency, poverty and exploitation… the core of the North comprises countries which were the imperial 
powers and now continue to be the major centers of global capitalism” (2014, 294) 
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Anthropologists of education have pursued wide-ranging engagements with inclusion, 
raising questions of power and privilege in and between classrooms and non-school spaces. In 
fact, disability and special education remain less central in the (American) anthropology of 
education than issues of race, ethnicity, language, and class (for exceptions see McDermott and 
Varenne 1995; Mehan, Hertweck, and Meihls 1986; Rogers 2002; Smardon 2008). In the 
anthropology of education, inclusion operates more commonly as an analytic than as a subject of 
investigation in and of itself. Studies of inclusion in the field of education, however, frequently 
do focus on disability, special, and inclusive education. They also emphasize the use of 
“ethnographic case studies” and “ethnographic methods,” although they mobilize the term 
somewhat differently. Ethnographic, in this deployment, reflects an emphasis on intensive 
qualitative fieldwork within school settings more so than gesturing to an analytical relationship 
between fieldwork and theorizing. In other words, inclusion itself does not emerge as an 
ethnographic focus but is instead defined at the outset and then measured through qualitative 
participant observation and interviewing.  
If educational studies and anthropology arguably marshal ethnography in distinct ways, 
studies of schooling in the Arab world tend to fall into one of two additional camps: broad policy 
evaluation and/or quantitative analyses, with “number toting often reinforcing a sense of 
‘deficit’” (Mazawi and Sultana 2010, 5). Throughout the region, reformers at different historical 
moments and of various ideological convictions have seized upon education and schooling as 
critical means for pursuing their contested visions of modernization and development, especially 
in relation to reshaping gender norms and relations between women and men (Najmabadi 1998; 
Shakry 1998). Despite the abstract preoccupation with education, observes Fida Adely, and 
especially in relation to gender and development, “surprisingly little of the scholarship in the 
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region has paid attention to schools as important institutions in the lives of girls and/or the 
meaning of education for young women and their families” (2012, 14). Ethnographic research on 
education in the region continues to expand, however, and is guided by a focus on analyzing the 
relationships between schooling, the state, and religious revitalization movements (Eickelman 
1992; Hefner and Zaman 2007; Herrera and Torres 2006; Starrett 1998; see Adely and Starrett 
2011 for a comprehensive overview). 
Adely’s 2012 monograph, Gendered Paradoxes: Educating Jordanian Women in Nation, 
Faith, and Progress (2012), draws on fieldwork conducted primarily at a girl’s high school in 
northern Jordan. Her research explores how schools provide a critical space for young women, 
their teachers, and their families to negotiate the meanings and purpose of education. Education 
in Jordan plays an increasingly powerful role in defining the parameters of successful Jordanian 
womanhood. While schools provide students and teachers quotidian spaces to interact and 
negotiate divergent constructions of Jordanian identity and gendered morality, education also 
represents “an idea, a discursive project of global development” (Adely 2012, 15). Adely 
addresses, in passing, the various forms of inequality reproduced through differential access to 
private versus public schooling, as well as the tiered educational system that assigns lower 
performing students to a vocational track after 10th grade. Yet as my own research in Jordan 
shows, some students fail even to reach the high school level (a point she also notes). Those with 
unaddressed learning disabilities and perceptible intellectual disabilities, whether formally 
diagnosed or informally recognized, encounter structural barriers that prevent them from 
accessing the Jordanian educational system at all, let alone successfully graduating.  
Like education more generally, inclusive education intersects with discursive projects of 
human and disability rights, and ultimately the practices and ideologies of subjectivity and 
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citizenship that these projects encompass. The Jordanian constitution guarantees the right to free 
public education from grades 1-12, while Law No. 33 on the Welfare of Disabled Persons, 
passed in 1993, introduced specific legislation guaranteeing Jordanians with disabilities the right 
to education. Law No. 31 on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, informed by Jordan’s 
participation in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD), later replaced the 1993 Law.111  In its 2007-2015 National Strategy for Persons with 
Disabilities, the Higher Council for the Affairs of Persons with Disabilities (HCD)112 repeatedly 
cites a commitment to inclusive education as one of the key strategies for promoting the rights of 
persons with disabilities. The document, in fact, dedicates a significant portion of text 
exclusively to the topic of inclusive education (Al-Azzeh 2012, 149). This commitment aligns 
with Article 24 of the CRPD, which states that, “Parties shall ensure an inclusive education 
system at all levels” (2007). Inclusive education, according to the CRPD, means that, “Persons 
with disabilities are not excluded from the general education system on the basis of disability, 
and that children with disabilities are not excluded from free and compulsory primary education, 
or from secondary education, on the basis of disability” (2007).  
Though families unanimously denounce the barriers to schooling, lack of education, and 
illiteracy that disproportionately affect disabled children and adults in Jordan,113 they 
                                                
111 Jordan signed the CRPD on March 30, 2007 and ratified the convention in the following year. While the passage 
of Law 31 and the ratification of the CRPD occurred almost simultaneously, Jordan was also involved in many 
stages of drafting and negotiating CRPD content between 2002-2006, presumably shaping the drafting of the 
domestic law (Al Azzeh 2012, 18). 
112 The HCD was created in 2007 after the passage of Law No. 31 on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. It 
oversees and coordinates relevant policies and programs affecting persons with disabilities and ensures the 
implementation of Law 31 to the fullest extent. In practice, most of my interlocutors believed it functions most 
concretely to provide financial support to families who could not afford quality special education and therapeutic 
programs and to offset resource room tuitions in mainstream schooling programs. While the HCD was charged with 
overseeing the implementation of Law 31, its actual powers to compel various ministries to action remained unclear 
at the time of my fieldwork, limiting its ability to effect change on either policy or practical levels. 
113 The literacy rate among youth and young adult populations in Jordan currently reaches 99% (FHI 360 2014). 
Among disabled youth (older than 15 years of age) illiteracy rates currently stand at 33% (Mahbuba 2016). 
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nevertheless remain ambivalent about the promises and assumptions embedded in available 
framings of inclusive education. My interlocutors often invoke the description hiber ‘alā wara’, 
or ink on paper, to describe legal and policy instruments like Law 31 and the UNCRPD, if they 
are even aware of their existence. This evocative turn of phrase highlights the perceived gap 
between formal performances of the state’s commitment to rights, which usually result in yet 
more ink on paper – reports, documents, agreements, initiatives – and the realities of daily 
injustice, inequality, and sheer infrastructural lack. Inclusive education still belongs to the 
deceptions and empty promises of ink and paper. According to most parents, it is class and 
capital that most decisively shape their children’s access to formal education, but even financial 
resources fail to guarantee full inclusion. 
IV. Paying for inclusion: The commodification of education  
Over my two years of fieldwork I was able to attend events held in honor of World Down 
Syndrome Day (always held on March 21st to honor three copies of chromosome 21). The 
celebrations, which coincide with “Mother’s Day” in the Middle East, offer families an 
opportunity to congregate in one space and interact with the representatives of the formal 
political and legal institutions that, on paper, affect persons with Down Syndrome. The 
conference portions of the day usually involve informational presentations, some sort of cultural 
performance featuring persons with Down Syndrome, and a social portion with entertainment 
activities and free lunches for all participants. Toward the end of one presentation on damaj 
(inclusion) by an expert from the Higher Council for Disabilities, a conversation between two 
audience members seated a few rows behind me reached the tone of an argument and caused a 
good amount of distraction for those within earshot. One of the disputants, a middle-aged man, 
grew so frustrated that he jumped up from his seat and made a dramatic exit from the auditorium, 
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yelling loudly and speaking more rapidly than I could understand. I turned to the other 
participant in this exchange, Imm Fadi, whom I knew from the al-Nur Society, and I asked her 
what made this man so upset.  
She told me that his son had Down Syndrome, and he had grown increasingly frustrated 
by the HCD representative’s talk because it was completely divorced from reality on the ground 
(al-arḍ al-wāqiʿ). He could not afford to pay private school fees for his son, so he felt that 
listening to a presentation on inclusion was useless, because “private school is the only way to 
access any sort of inclusive program.” Then she shrugged. “Hey, we paid for damaj and it still 
didn’t help.” Imm Fadi and her husband worked for a private-sector tourism company and are 
now retired. They have three children, and 20-year-old Fadi is their youngest. Fadi experiences 
many health complications, some of which are a result of his Down Syndrome. Imm Fadi has 
struggled to figure out how she can best serve and advocate for her son. I had previously 
interviewed Imm Fadi, and much of our conversation centered on her preoccupations with the 
different educational systems Fadi participated in during his childhood and adolescence. 
[Fadi] went to a preschool. At the first one, people started to figure out he was 
Down, and they started to hide him. I told them "No. My son will not be hidden. I 
want people to take him and accept him." They told me they couldn't do this, so I 
took him to another nursery, and they accepted him directly.  
Returning to the previous chapter’s theme of moral orientation, Imm Fadi accepted her son, and 
the work of acceptance required her to relocate Fadi to a preschool that would not hide him. This 
work also entailed the expenditure of significant capital. 
[Then] he went to Amman Superior (a private school). It's known that they take 1 
or 2% [students with] disabilities and integrate them. He stayed there for a year or 
two. But he didn't benefit. They just go into the class and go home. There was no 
training or learning (tadrīb aw taʿalīm). There was no ihtimām (care, attention). 
After that he went to al-Shams Academy (another private school)… He spent 3 
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years in KG, and it was the same problem… They didn't know how to work with 
disabilities.  
Imm Fadi sent her son to two different private schools to include him in regular schooling and 
avoid the special education system. In Jordan, while families often find public schools to be 
wholly unwelcoming, private schools often demonstrate more willingness to work with families 
– as long as they are willing to pay.  
He stayed with them until he was ten, and he would go to the resource room and 
take Arabic and math. And they had activities for sports, arts. But there wasn't 
follow-up. There was no shadow teacher.114 There was a resource room with one 
teacher and maybe 10 students, 12 students.  
Resource rooms represent Jordan’s current approach to inclusion.115 The majority of the parents 
and specialists I spoke with perceive them quite negatively, and for a variety of reasons 
supported by existing research on this semi-inclusive approach. Resource rooms offer suffer 
from a lack of coordination and cooperation between the resource room teacher and the general 
education teacher, in addition to student crowding in the resource room and inadequate teacher 
training116 (Al-Khatib 2007; Amr 2011). Resource rooms, moreover, do not comply with the 
definition of inclusive education that Jordan adopted in its Law on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities or the definition of inclusive education provided by the CRPD (Alodat, Almakanin, 
and Zumberg 2014, 224).  
When Fadi began resisting his school day schedule, his mother decided that her options 
                                                
114 Italics represent Imm Fadi’s use of this term in English. 
115 As of 2007 there were 511 resource rooms in public schools, serving a total of 12,300 children in grades two 
through six (Al-Khatib and Al-Khatib 2008, 109). While students with intellectual disabilities may be included in 
these rooms, they are not categorized as such. In the absence of in-school diagnostic/evaluation procedures, school 
staff members classify students more broadly as having “learning disabilities.” I also occasionally met children with 
intellectual disabilities who attended only the resource room classes at a mainstream school via individual 
arrangements with school administrators and resource room teachers.  
116 These topics have received consistent attention in unpublished Arabic language dissertation and master’s theses 
by students at Jordanians universities, many under the supervision of Dr. Jamal Al-Khatib. Other unpublished 
Arabic language reports are housed in the Ministry of Education. 
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were running out. 
He didn't want to go inside. He didn't want to go with the routine, to return to 
class. So, they contacted me over the phone and told me they were trying to get 
him inside, but they couldn't... And there was more than one complaint. So, I 
thought about it, and I decided, okay, let me look for a center (markez), a center 
for disabilities markez khās li-l-iʿāqāt)… And of course, I didn't want to pick a 
place where I'd have to fear for him, a place that wasn't organized or [where] the 
environment wasn't appropriate for him (makān mish murratib aw biʿa mish 
munāsaba li-lu). So, I found a center, and it was very put together. The teachers 
were very educated and understanding. And they accepted him.  
Imm Fadi valued her son’s education. She never assumed that Fadi’s Down Syndrome negated 
or compromised his right to education. She sought different ways to realize this right, enrolling 
him in some of Amman’s most prestigious private schools, most of which have begun 
experimenting with the same resource room model that the Ministry of Education is slowly 
implementing in public schools. In his early childhood, when Fadi’s preschool teachers tried to 
sequester him from the other children, his mother objected, insisting that, “my son will not be 
hidden (ibnī mā bitkhabbā).” However, the quest for a school that could provide Fadi with the 
care (ihtimām) he deserved led her farther away from the mainstream.  
I would like to return to the angry father sitting next to Imm Fadi who stormed out of the 
World Down Syndrome Day conference. From the perspective of many parents I spoke with, 
discourses on inclusion that refuse to engage with the broader structural realities shaping the 
education sector in Jordan feel infuriatingly divorced from reality. More expansive capitalist 
forces of inclusion and exclusion already mark schooling in Jordan as a contradictory commodity 
for purchase rather than a universal right. During the question-and-answer session, this much 
was pointed out to the HCD representative by frustrated parents who chose to stay and speak 
their minds. An older woman, flanked by her adult daughter with Down Syndrome and her 
husband, stood up and reiterated that regardless of what the law might claim, only private 
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schools actually accept disabled children. While she spoke, the man sitting in front of me nodded 
vigorously in agreement, rubbing his fingers together to make the sign for cash. Eventually, the 
question-and-answer session devolved into parents shouting: “Where? Where can we put our 
children?! Tell us which school will take them, and we’re there.”  
Amidst this collective outburst of anger, Imm Yusuf stood up and dramatically 
announced, “Give me a classroom, and I will teach them!” A round of applause followed her 
declaration. In private, however, Imm Yusuf explained that she was no longer certain inclusive 
education could work in Jordan, at least under the present circumstances.  
Look, at first, I wanted inclusion. I want my son to be included (anā bidī ibnī 
yindamaj), but, there have to be specific preparations for it to happen. There has 
to be early intervention (al-tadakhul al-mubakkir), and at 5 or 6 years old there 
should be a class for... for… Down. They have Down Syndrome (humeh Down). 
Khalās! Accept that they have Down Syndrome (kunī mutaqabbaleh humeh 
Down)! They have Down Syndrome. Afterwards, I would integrate him, even if it 
meant him entering school a year or two late. The important thing is that my son 
would have to be ready to handle it (al-muhimm huwweh ibnī byakūn muhay’a).” 
For parents like Imm Yusuf, inclusion makes them uneasy in its liberal appeal to sameness. As 
she concisely put it, “accept that they have Down Syndrome.” Many of my interlocutors made a 
distinction similar to that between equality and equity. By emphasizing his Down Syndrome, 
Imm Yusuf insisted that for Yusuf to succeed, he would need a system that recognizes and 
honors his specific needs, rather than broadly asserting he should be in a classroom with other 
children because he is just like every other child.  
Imm Yusuf stressed the utmost importance of Yusuf’s learning to read and write. 
Attaining these skills ultimately mattered more, from her perspective, than the kind of 
environment he learned them in.  
I know a mother who put her daughter into an inclusive school. After a year we 
ran into each other and the mother was crying. Her daughter didn’t benefit at all 
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(mā istafadat ay shī).  I told her, “You wronged your daughter (intī ẓalamtīha). 
The teacher can’t specialize in her! She has a whole class to look after.” If I’m 
just like, “I want my son included!” maybe I’m not doing him justice.  
Here Imm Yusuf describes education as a set of skills that her friend’s daughter failed to acquire 
in an inclusive classroom that could not meet her needs. The young girl’s happiness, her social 
experience in the classroom, or the positive impact of her presence on nondisabled peers were 
not recognized as other potential benefits of her education. Like many parents, Imm Yusuf 
approached education first and foremost as an investment in developing concrete and ideally, 
marketable skills. They define the relative success or failure of their child’s schooling, whether 
in an inclusive or special program, in very concrete and functional terms. This perspective 
extends to nondisabled children as well, who are encouraged to study fields that will ultimately 
“matter” in terms of financial security and social capital. Possessing certain kinds of knowledge 
and skills deeply impact what kind of person a child can or cannot become. 
V. “She cannot be educated”: Debating educational futures   
Schooling and education levels are increasingly important components of personhood and 
status in Jordan. With education widely available and directly connected, in popular imagination, 
to prospects for employment, upward mobility, and social stability, educational failures have 
practical, economic, and moral consequences. Descriptions and evaluations of intellectual 
disability in Jordan pivot around three main diagnostic categories: mild (basīṭa), moderate 
(muttawasaṭa), and severe (shadīda). While some families encounter these classifications upon 
bringing their children in for evaluations at diagnosis centers run by the Ministry of Health, 
others receive them from teachers and special education teachers who employ a variety of 
methods to flag students as either eligible for resource room services or incapable of being 
included within mainstream classrooms (Al-Natour, AlKhamra, and Al-Smadi 2008). The social 
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impact of these categories extends far beyond the classroom. They affect how families and 
teachers evaluate a child’s potential for learning and families’ willingness to pursue particular 
educational paths. These medico-educational categories, and the work they do in building or 
constricting a child’s imagined futures, emerged quite clearly in an encounter I observed between 
Reem, who works in a resource room at private school in northern Amman, and the parents of 
one of her students, Tamara.  
In addition to teaching, Reem offers supplementary lessons for students with disabilities 
in her home. Families find Reem largely through word of mouth. She provides academic support, 
speech therapy, behavioral therapy, and occupational therapy to students of all ages, some of 
whom are enrolled in schools or centers, while others primarily stay at home. Her degrees are in 
special education, which she earned from a private university.117 While Reem worked with 
students, I would chat with their mothers on the classic, low-rise couches lining the walls of the 
living room. We sipped coffee, or perhaps juice, and nibbled at the chocolate wafer cookies 
provided by Reem or her daughter Samira at the arrival of each new client. Reem brought me 
along to appointments with some of her clients and even arranged visits with families whose 
children she knew from previous posts on my behalf. On one such visit, we went to speak with 
Abu and Imm Tamara, who live quite close to Reem’s own neighborhood (jabal)118 in greater 
east Amman. While I introduced myself, Tamara zoomed around their apartment, excited to have 
guests, and her baby brother cried while his parents passed him back and forth, trying to soothe 
him.  
                                                
117 Jordan’s public universities, particularly the University of Jordan in Amman and Jordan University of Science 
and Technology in Irbid, are considered to be the country’s most prestigious and academically sound institutions. 
118 Many neighborhoods in east Amman are names for the jabal, or hill, on which they sit. 
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Tamara’s parents spent the first two years of her life searching for a diagnosis of their 
daughter, who they initially thought might have Down Syndrome. Tamara, they eventually 
discovered, was born with a non-inherited chromosomal condition usually caused by a partial 
deletion that develops in utero. This partial deletion can result in mild to moderate intellectual 
impairment, delays in speech and language skill, phenotypic facial features sometimes 
resembling those of Down Syndrome, lifelong problems with sleeping, and certain behavioral 
issues. Tamara was enrolled in the third grade, and she spent most of her day in the resource 
room, returning to the main class occasionally. As in Fadi’s case, Tamara’s parents experimented 
with different types of educational programing, but they perceived the effects of her time spent in 
a special education center as extremely negative. They wanted her to remain in a “regular” 
school supplemented by a resource room and additional lessons. Tamara’s parents were keen to 
gather as much information as they could from Reem, and they reacted to her authority with a 
mixture of respect for her specialist qualifications and confusion about Reem’s prognostications.  
Speaking as much to me as to Imm and Abu Tamara, Reem explained that, “people with 
mild mental disabilities are able to reach the 6th or 7th grade (al ʿiāqa aqliyya basīta wasal lī-l-ṣaf 
al-sādis, wasal lī-l-ṣaf al-sābiʿ).” Her father reacted with surprise to the precision of this 
boundary. “She wont be able to complete her studies?” he asked. Reem responded in the 
negative. “Her mental abilities are less than a normal child’s. Tamara can learn a vocation, and 
she can be trained, but she cannot be educated (qābila al-tadrīb, bas ghayr qābila al-taʿalīm).” 
This distinction between training and education points to the hierarchies of knowledge 
increasingly perceived as valuable in Jordan. These hierarchies are embedded in the general 
education system and profoundly impact students’ post-educational trajectories. In her own 
fieldwork, Adely observed that the accessibility and value Jordanians accord to formal education 
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produces particularly difficult counter effects. “Not being educated or not doing well in school 
can now be considered a deficit and is often tied to implicit assumptions about a girl’s behavior 
and respectability,” (2012, 130).  
This link between educational achievement and moral status comes out clearly in relation 
to female students assigned to the “vocational studies” track after 10th grade. One of Adely’s 
interlocutors asserted to her that, “smarter students have better morals and better behavior. It’s as 
if the students who are not smart enough are not smart enough to make the right moral 
judgments” (2012, 133). Longstanding concerns about moral intelligence and accountability, 
especially in relation to the successful performance of gendered norms and standards of sexual 
propriety, shape perceptions of intellectually disabled children and adults as potentially 
threatening to their family’s reputation. Formal education and the class-based respectability 
politics fostered by educational inequality add yet another layer of complexity to the lives of 
intellectually disabled children, whose feared “inability to learn” matters more now than ever 
before.  
Tamara’s parents negotiated with Reem about the inevitability of the limits that these 
diagnostic labels imposed on their daughter’s future. In doing so, they conveyed the importance 
of education to their construction of Tamara’s personhood.  
Im Tamara: Academically, what grade will she reach? 
Reem: Academically? 
Im Tamara: What level will she reach and still be able to learn new information? 
Reem: Not everything in depth… She might reach the fourth grade. 
Im Tamara: You mean she might reach multiplication?  
Reem: She will learn multiplication. I worked with a student with Down 
syndrome, and he doesn’t speak. I finished multiplication and division with him, 
even though he can’t speak. He knew how to write in Arabic and English.  
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Im Tamara: What level will she reach in English? 
Reem: She will learn the letters and some words, and she will be able to 
memorize them. She has a good memory for vocabulary. 
Tamara’s parents focus on highly specific, objectified tasks relating to mathematics and language 
learning, but they also resist Reem’s equally specific and objectified responses (which diminish 
Tamara’s learning over the course of the conversation from “sixth or seventh grade” to fourth 
grade). Reem offers numerous examples of her experience working with other students “like 
Tamara” who have achieved various levels of educational proficiency. 
The vast diversity of impairments Reem invoked and the spectrum of possible 
educational outcomes she connected them to undermined her own claims about what Tamara’s 
disabilities might allow in her future. When Reem mentioned that she once met a student with 
Down Syndrome who went on to study at the University of Jordan, Abu Tamara exclaimed 
“Masha’allah!” while his wife responded, her voice rising, “ʿAnjadd (really)?” Reem confirmed, 
and then she continued, “I have another girl with an intellectual disability… [who] studied and 
became a hairdresser. Three years after, she came by with her mom in her own car!” Imm 
Tamara was captivated by the possibilities. “But Reem, I want to ask you – Don’t those children 
have slow learning development?” Reem nodded. “There are students with Down Syndrome that 
I finished a 6th grade curriculum with,” Reem added. Imm Tamara then pushed Reem to address 
the apparent contradiction between the labels applied to these individuals and their own lived 
experiences. “Good. So, how are those students different from Tamara?” Reem had no 
satisfactory answer.119 
                                                
119 I suspect that much of the prognostic capacity Reem invested in these diagnostic labels came from her own 
experiences and training background. Other Jordanian special educators reading this exchange might object to 
Reem’s framing, while disability rights advocates most certainly would. As in the United States, approaches to 
special education in Jordan are diverse, and more conventional approaches in the field continue to rely on and 
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 Tamara’s parents thought about her future in terms of education, but while Imm Tamara 
articulated hopes of her daughter conforming as much as possible to a traditional educational 
trajectory of “academic” learning, her husband was concerned that constructing her life on such 
terms left little space for Tamara to “have her own future,” as he put it. Abu Tamara embraced 
the idea of vocational training because it could provide Tamara with a “future” based in skills 
and services, like hairdressing, even if those skills and services were stigmatized as lesser forms 
of knowledge. “When will we know if she is capable of learning?” he asked Reem, as though his 
talkative and energetic daughter did not already embody several years of different kinds of 
learning. While Reem and Imm Tamara went back and forth about which grades she might 
complete in her future years of academic schooling, Abu Tamara pushed back against his wife. 
“You hope she will be educated,” he began, “but if she isn’t very academic, what do you think 
she will become?”  
 Abu Tamara became increasingly emotional as they continued to talk about the future. He 
grew more vocal in contesting the relative importance of an “academic future.” 
Abu Tamara: We know that our daughter will not become a doctor. But we accept 
her, Alhamdulillah… We want her to be independent. And if she succeeds 
academically, we’ll thank God. But if that doesn’t work out, she can learn a 
vocation. My daughter is a blessing… We are accepting. She is from God. 
Alhamdulillah.  
Abu Tamara challenges the increasing equation of social value with labor market performance. 
By situating Tamara as both beloved and a blessing, a description I discuss more fully in Chapter 
Five, Abu Tamara invests his daughter spiritual, moral, and social value. Adely opened her 
ethnography with a vignette in which one of the local high school teachers, Miss Suheil, 
                                                                                                                                                       
reproduce medical models of disability. Additionally, perceptions of intelligence and ability in Jordan are connected 
to the rise and global proliferation of standardized testing and IQ measurements. 
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criticized her female teenage students – and their families – for “‘the bias Jordanians have 
against ‘working with their hands… We all want our children to be doctors and engineers’” 
(2012, 7). Abu Tamara also criticizes this increasingly hegemonic discourse of “becoming a 
doctor.” Instead, her articulates a position that requires a moral orientation. “We accept her.”  
VI. Costs and benefits: Thinking toward the future 
Reem and Tamara’s parents dealt largely in prognostications, imagining what stretched 
before the nine-year-old in terms of the potential future paths that would develop throughout her 
childhood. Reham, however, is a teenager, and she fits uneasily within the available categories of 
child, adolescent, and woman. Shifting societal expectations of education, employment, and 
marriage are reshaping Jordanian constructions of womanhood. Reham’s experience as a 
teenager with Down Syndrome highlights the powerful norms of femininity that rely on the 
performance of various abilities. When Reham and her mother showed up for a free dental 
screening hosted by the Society, I noticed her immediately. The bubbly, outgoing teenager was 
thrilled to be out and about, meeting new people and mingling. As Reham socialized and 
formally greeted all of the families and staff crammed into the crowded event, her mother held 
back and surveyed the scene.  
Reham and her family live in an upper class suburb in west Amman, and Reham, her 
parents firstborn, has two younger brothers. When I asked Imm Reham about her experiences 
pursuing inclusive education, in which Reham had been enrolled for most of her life, she offered 
an ambivalent reflection on what inclusion had given her daughter. 
You feel in the schools, the time she spends in the class with the rest of the 
normal girls (al bināt normal), it’s useless. I feel that they are on one side, and 
Reham is on her side… The schools Reham went to take the fees for her class 
plus 50% extra because of the help. So we were paying around 2000 JD per year. 
It was better, but she also wasn't benefitting (mā kānat tistafīd) when she was in 
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the [integrated] class… I mean, she doesn't have friends. You feel that most 
people who know her, they feel sorry for her, not taking her as a friend. They 
have sympathy for her (‘ātif ‘alayha); it’s not that they really like her. Maybe I 
don't want her to have Down Syndrome friends. I don't know. I don't know... We 
have Reham, but we still can't accept the presence of Down Syndrome in different 
forms. We still have resistance to it. I don't know.120 
Imm Reham wonders if it is her lack of acceptance led her to pursue inclusive education for 
Reham, a laborious process that entailed navigating the schooling systems of the many different 
Arab countries she and her family had lived in, traveling for her husband’s work in the 
pharmaceutical sector. This thread of acceptance runs throughout the different family narratives I 
recorded during fieldwork. Imm Reham’s particular use of acceptance here – as a way to 
problematize her resistance to cultivating Reham’s relationship with peers who have Down 
Syndrome – highlights the sometimes contradictory work acceptance does in parsing out the 
politics of difference, sameness, and identity.  
With her daughter in the throes of adolescence, Imm Reham was uncertain of the costs 
and benefits of having kept Reham in an inclusive classroom. Reham would soon age out of all 
available programming. Her mother worried about Reham’s lack of friends and her nondisabled 
classmates’ unwillingness to treat her as a peer and see her as a person (ka-shakhs) rather than as 
someone to “have sympathy for.” Additionally, Imm Reham spoke at great length about the fact 
that despite Reham’s literacy, intelligence, and sociable nature, she has little to no chance of 
finding a job. Although Law 31 instituted minimum quotas for hiring disabled persons in the 
private and public sectors, the regulatory and enforcement mechanisms of this stipulation remain 
unclear, and older legislation not yet repealed actually contradicts the spirit of the quota. The 
Medical Committees Statute No. 58/1977, for example, contains a list of prohibited conditions 
                                                
120 Im Reham switched between English and Arabic whenever we spoke. English words here appear in italics.  
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that disqualifies an individual from seeking employment in the public sector, and this list 
effectively excludes persons living with a wide array of impairments and disabilities ( Al-Azzeh 
2012). 
Imm Reham reflected on the inevitable passage of time and her family’s transition to the 
next foreseeable stages of life: 
[My] other two will grow up, get married.121 I always tell my husband “what 
about you start a business so Reham and I can work there? Even a supermarket! 
Let's do something.” I don't know if people employ them [persons with 
disabilities], but I think we're probably the best option to find her a job. You want 
an atmosphere that you trust. 
Imm Reham thought about Reham’s education in terms of employability, and she was not alone 
in doing so. This framing of education is consistent with a neoliberal operationalization of 
education for individual economic betterment and national development, embracing the 
assumption that education will lead to higher rates of participation in the workforce. For the 
families of intellectually disabled individuals, the question then becomes what kind of education 
– not as a path to enlightenment or self-knowledge but as a path to economic security – will 
satisfy this goal. Imm Reham’s focus on finding a way to include Reham within the labor 
market, however, is also predicated on her assumption that Reham will never become a wife or 
mother. “At the end, we will be three.” 
The World Bank and other development agencies refer to Jordan as a development 
“paradox,” because the widespread and successful inclusion of Jordanian girls and women into 
all levels of the education sector has failed to affect their persistently low rates of (formal) 
                                                
121 Adely (2012) has shown how education has become, to some extent, a prestige commodity in the Jordanian 
marriage market, influencing attitudes towards the importance and value of education. The question of marriage for 
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participation in wage labor. Adely’s work, on the one hand, calls into question the assumptions 
about wage labor and empowerment that justify this framing as paradoxical. Many of the 
educated, working women she spoke with appreciated the opportunities that careers afforded 
them. They nevertheless regretted the toll on their relationships, the exhausting “double shift” 
required to work while maintaining a home, and they encounter uncomfortable challenges in 
their workplace interactions. Adely clearly demonstrates how young Jordanian women – and 
their families – objectify and value education on their own terms, using educational achievement 
as cultural capital to enable conventional and collective investments in marital arrangements.  
Being “educated” in Jordan today can increase a woman’s appeal and offer more leverage 
in negotiating the terms of the marriage contract, a development that Adely’s female 
interlocutors enthusiastically supported. Employment, however, provoked more ambivalence 
among the teenagers she spoke with. This was in large part because they observed their own 
teachers and female relatives struggling to balance the demands of work with the demands of 
being a wife, mother, and well groomed, attractive, adult woman. Reham’s mother, however, did 
not anticipate that her daughter would be able to meet many of the standards that define adult 
womanhood in Jordan, especially marriage and motherhood.122 Employment, in Imm Reham’s 
mind, offered an alternative way for Reham to experience adulthood, albeit in an “atmosphere 
you can trust.” Several of the parents and siblings I spoke with emphasized that trust is often 
lacking from interactions with people who are not kin or close friends, and that it is hard to find 
in social worlds beyond the home. 
                                                
122 What Reham envisioned for herself is another matter entirely. Like most of her peers, she wanted to things 
happening all around her: marriage and children. I discuss this clash of desires and aspirations more fully in the 
following chapter.   
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VII. Inclusion into what? 
Simply put, inclusive education, as envisioned by education and disability rights activists, 
does not exist in Jordan. Inclusive education requires investing financial and human resources in 
restructuring classrooms, schools, and teacher development. Thus far, these resources have been 
marshaled most successfully in Jordan’s private education sector and by schools that self-
consciously orient themselves toward global (and European, British, and American) curricula 
and testing standards. Resource rooms, furthermore, do not actually create an inclusive 
classroom experience, and as Giancreco rightly points out, “many practices have been labeled as 
‘inclusion’ which are not inclusive in nature. This has led to misplaced criticism about inclusion, 
when in fact what was being criticized often was either: (a) not inclusive, (b) a partial 
implementation effort, or (c) poor quality efforts” (1997, 194). Yet many families and teachers 
offer critiques of inclusion that cannot be fully accounted for by acknowledging widespread 
failures to operationalize and properly implement inclusive design. Rather, their concerns have to 
do with broader uncertainties about the purpose and value of education, hierarchies of knowledge 
and skill determined by the labor market and economies of prestige, and the widespread 
knowledge that even the best education cannot guarantee individual financial stability. Family 
and kin networks remain critical to securing these goals. 
Lana, a special education teacher, articulated this most clearly in her conversation with 
Imm Eisa, at a summer party we all attended in a new cultural center boasting a much-coveted 
playground and semi-green space. Lana asked Imm Eisa if she planned to find an inclusive 
school program for Eisa once he reached kindergarten age. Imm Eisa conveyed considerable 
anxiety about the possibility of finding an inclusive program that would meet her standards. Lana 
nodded in solidarity. To demonstrate why she did not think Imm Eisa’s aversion to inclusive 
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education was at all problematic, she asked the following set of questions: 
Lana: Do you hide Eisa from your family? 
Im Eisa: No of course not!  
Lana: Everyone knows [that he has Down Syndrome]?  
Im Eisa: Everyone knows.  
Lana: Do you take him places with you or leave him at home (fil bayt)?  
Im Eisa: We take him everywhere.  
Lana: Isn’t this damaj (inclusion)? Why do we have to have educational damaj? 
Why is that the standard for what damaj means? 
Lana and Imm Eisa oriented themselves toward their own project of inclusion. Al bayt, in Jordan 
and across the Middle East, functions as a simultaneously educational, social, and political 
institution that competes with alternative domains for the production of identity and allegiances. 
The claim that “inclusion is an aspiration for a democratic education” (Slee 2001, 168) will not 
necessarily prove compelling for communities whose members’ well-being and social networks 
remain kinship-based in significant ways and even into the highest levels of politics, rule, and 
welfare. Nor will it resonate in a decidedly undemocratic state like Jordan, which is unlikely to 
experience strong pressures for democratization any time soon, given the country’s strategic 
importance to ongoing anti-terror operations and the increasingly anti-refugee policies of most 
European and North American countries.  
Mothers from diverse social backgrounds express a shared, patterned representation of 
the meaningful social coordinates in their lives. “The bayt is fundamental,” asserted Imm Iyad, 
the mother of a 4-year-old with Down Syndrome, while discussing everyday frustrations with a 
group of women in the reception room at the jamaʿiyya. “Without the family, the individual 
rights will not be realized.” The importance of the bayt, which can refer to the physical domestic 
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structure of a housing unit, smaller neo- and patrilocal settlements, and larger kinship groupings, 
does not merely reflect the continuing emotional and symbolic resonances of home and family 
(Vom Bruck 1997). The importance of the bayt, while part of the region’s deep cultural history, 
also reflects its adaptive function as Jordanians attempt to cope with and mitigate the wide-
ranging effects of structural adjustment policies aimed at liberalization (Baylouny 2006, 349).  
Individuals and nuclear families in Jordan turn to kinship networks for protection, 
support, and access to capital in formal and novel ways as state-provided or subsidized goods 
and social services are absorbed into a prohibitively expensive private sector, or disappear 
entirely. Sociocentric understandings of which spaces matter and how social change occurs are 
deeply informed by these experiences of kinship, vulnerability, and political economy, which are 
shaped by their own historical dynamics. Ammani residents across class and geographic divides 
embrace this perspective. While attending a mothers’ support group linked to an organization 
operating out of one of Amman’s poorest, most vulnerable eastern neighborhoods, I listened as 
women discussed how social change could occur in the context of disability rights. An older 
mother, pondering the question, volunteered the following directive: “First yourself, then the 
bayt, then the neighbors, then the society.”  
None of my interlocutors disputed the importance of education. The relationship between 
education and schooling, however, remained open to debate. Schools are not abstract universals 
but particular institutions, grounded in time and space and subject to constraints that, in Jordan, 
have becoming increasingly severe. The bayt serves as the ideal center of social life and 
inclusion, but it is nevertheless rife with tensions and contradictions of its own. An unanticipated 
diagnosis of Down Syndrome or other congenital conditions can potentially disrupt a family’s 
home life in profound ways. Most families would experience a child’s subsequent exclusion 
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from education on the basis of their disability not as logistical inconvenience but as deeply 
wrong. Ultimately, however, families are less concerned with the type of institution their 
children attend than with the feasibility of enrolling them in a place that is safe and beneficial, or 
which, at they very least, will not expose them to harm.  
Intellectually disabled children can and do fit with relative ease into the category of 
childhood. Ongoing debates over the kind and quality of education they will receive attest to this 
alignment. As mothers of young children with Down Syndrome constantly tell each other, all 
children differ in terms of their development. Some walk early, while others continue to crawl 
for months. Some are exceedingly amiable while others are crabby and cry all the time. Some 
children show an aptitude for academic learning, others struggle with basic reading, writing, and 
math. Children with Down Syndrome fit on this general spectrum of ability and growth, and 
parents and specialists work to remind each other of this diversity, irrespective of disability 
labels. The transition out of childhood, however, is fraught by comparison, and the possibilities 
are harder both to envision and realize.  
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Chapter 5. Adulthood 
I. Disjunctures 
“Christine,” Nahida called out to me, one eyebrow raised at my tardy arrival to the 
summer ifṭār celebration. “Did you come here alone?” Equally intrigued and aghast, she then 
asked me, “Where is your family?!” I laughed at her evident bewilderment and explained that my 
family was far away in America, and yes, I was alone. She then leaned in closer and whispered 
conspiratorially, “lucky you (niyyālik)!” Nahida has Down Syndrome, and she was 18 at the time 
of this exchange. Opinionated and outspoken, she has battled serious and sometimes life-
threatening health problems on more than one occasion. Nahida’s mother dotes on her only 
daughter, sandwiched between older and younger brothers. Wherever Nahida is, one can almost 
always find her mother stationed within shouting distance. Occasionally, Nahida and her mother 
were subjects of gossipy criticism, usually having to do with Nahida’s outfit choices. A volunteer 
once whispered to a staff member: “Why is she dressed like that! Look at her chest!” Nahida did 
not wear hijab, nor was this expected of her, although some of her female peers with Down 
Syndrome do in fact cover their hair and dress more modestly. The comment about Nahida’s 
chest, however, and concern about the inappropriateness of her dress for her body, gesture to 
enduring sources of tension during my research. 
Families struggled to reconcile intellectually disabled people’s irrefutable signs of 
physical development with their perceived inability to meet widely shared standards for social 
maturity. Personhood in Jordan is assessed according to how one demonstrates possession of 
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‘aql, “a complex concept, fundamental in most Muslim cultures, from Morocco to Afghanistan, 
that can be glossed as reason or social sense” (Abu-Lughod 1986, 90). Individuals demonstrate 
‘aql by embracing highly regulated and normative models of gendered embodiment, and these 
models present problems for persons labeled as intellectually disabled. “The absence [of ‘aql],” 
writes Meneley, “is associated with children and the insane” (Meneley 2000, 65). To lack or 
possess diminished ‘aql does not result in a denial of personhood. It does, however, seriously 
circumscribe the kind of person one can be become.  
While intellectual disability is usually translated as iʿāqa ‘aqliyya, I occasionally 
encountered an alternative description of iʿāqa thihiniyya (mental disability). When I asked a 
who was active in disability outreach about the difference between these two phrases, she 
responded vaguely that they were essentially the same, but the latter “sounded nicer.” On another 
occasion, when speaking with a university professor of mathematics who is also the father of a 
toddler with Down Syndrome, I described my research as a study of iʿāqa ‘aqliyya and culture. 
He nearly recoiled from the term, responding quite gruffly, “iʿāqa ‘aqliyya? Is that what we’re 
calling Down Syndrome now? Why can’t we just call it a learning or developmental delay 
(ta’akhur tʿalīmī aw namawī)?” These reactions could be interpreted as a father’s refusal to 
accept his son’s Down Syndrome or perhaps even dismissed as semantics. Instead, I would 
propose that they reflect the significance of ‘aql to adult personhood in Jordan. Adulthood 
requires the performance of highly differentiated gendered identities and expressions of 
heteronormative desire that ideally – and usually – culminate in marriage. Marriage, in Jordan, is 
a highly elaborated, closely regulated, social and religious institution accompanied by clearly 
defined conditions and terms. While some parents of intellectually disabled children attempt to 
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create ways for them to achieve adulthood, others deem impairments of ‘aql as incompatible 
with adulthood, a stance that creates intense, intractable difficulties with the passage of time. 
Young people and adults with Down Syndrome are far from silent about their own hopes 
and desires. They consistently inform their family members, friends, teachers, and specialists that 
they want the same things as their siblings, cousins, and the actors on their favorite television 
series: companionship, romance, and love. Fully absorbed in their local cultural milieu, they 
imagine typical adult futures for themselves, usually articulated as a desire to get married. Their 
attempts to enact these futures, in turn, prompt extensive conversations and debates among their 
guardians and caretakers; these are the conversations I was able to observe most closely 
throughout my research. Even the parents of younger children who are years away from the onset 
of puberty will sometimes fixate on its eventual arrival, attesting to the significance of this 
transitional moment. But exactly is the nature and trajectory of the transition that puberty 
initiates, and what roles does ‘aql play in marking the passage from one life phase to the next?  
II. Life stages and embodied asynchrony 
‘Aql not only shapes notions of proper masculinity and femininity across Arab and 
Muslim societies; it expresses an indigenous theory of human development. Lila Abu-Lughod 
writes that from the perspective of her Egyptian interlocutors, “only the insane and the dim-
witted do not develop ‘aql over time; like children, they have no social sense” (Abu-Lughod 
1986, 91, my emphasis added; see also Crivello 2008, 47). Both Abu-Lughod and Meneley 
examine the imbrications of gender, personhood, and power by examining how different actors 
attempt to claim or are denied ‘aql (see Peletz for similar research on akal in Malaysia). Neither 
researcher, however, clarifies how “insanity” or “dim-wittedness” fits into the local etiologies of 
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mental difference that might exist in the communities they worked with,123 although Abu-
Lughod’s distinction between insane and dim-witted implicitly suggests some degree of 
differentiation.124 Additionally, neither scholar fully explores to modes of temporality expressed 
through this developmental model. 
Youth and adolescence: 
The category of “youth,” or shabāb, plays a significant role in Middle Eastern politics 
and popular culture. Historians of the region have documented the importance of youth in early 
nationalist and postcolonial movements seeking to achieve independence and modernity (El 
Shakry 2011; Jacob 2013; Meijer 2000). Anthropologists, in turn, have examined how the 
contemporary Middle East’s demographic “youth bulge” marks young people as key agents of 
development – and security threats – from the perspectives of both state institutions and non-
governmental organizations (Herrera and Bayat 2010; Swedenburg 2007; Simonsen 2005; 
Sukarieh 2012). Another robust vein of ethnographic research explores the implications of 
revivalist religious movements for pious youth subjectivity (Atia 2013; Deeb and Harb 2013; 
Masquelier 2005; Schielke 2008). More recently, the term has acquired particular salience across 
disciplines, as well as in the popular media, due to the role of youth activists in sparking and 
sustaining the Arab Spring movements and their aftermath (Singerman 2013).  
Adolescence, or murāhaqa, conveys a more narrowly medicalized meaning than shabāb. 
It usually refers to the onset of puberty (bulūgh) and, specifically for young women, menarche. 
These bodily changes acquire varying social and symbolic significance across Middle Eastern 
and Muslim communities, affecting how young women and men dress, interact, and relate to 
                                                
123 In her discussion of fright illness (faja‘a), Meneley makes a clear distinction between majnūn and faja‘a, but she 
does not interrogate the intricacies of the former as meticulously as she does with the latter (2003). 
124 This distinction actually aligns with Scalenghe’s research on categories of intellectual impairment in Ottoman 
times (2014), when idiocy (‘ataha) and insanity (majnūn) were considered distinct categories of mental difference.  
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both elder and younger generations (Clarke 2007; Pearl Kaya 2010; Meneley 1995). Historian 
Omnia El Shakry offers a comprehensive picture of “the adolescent” (al murāhiq) in 20th 
century Egypt, which emerged “as a social scientific category of analysis, demarcating the 
psychological literature from the more popular writings of the mainstream press that addressed 
“youth” (shabāb)” (El Shakry 2011, 592). The core preoccupations in this psychologized model 
were the energies, powers, and dangerous sexual desires inherent in the adolescent. Although the 
sexually frustrated adolescent subject usually took the shape of a disaffected and unstable young 
man, the adolescent female also garnered concern, especially in her propensity to violate norms 
of heterosexual desire. “Adolescence,” writes El Shakry, “emerged as a distinctive stage of life, 
with its own unique psychological contours of subjective experience, in need of self-monitoring 
and management by experts” (2011, 595). Much like the political promise and unpredictably of 
shabāb, adolescents posed risks and possessed potential. The discipline of psychology, however, 
framed their inherent volatility as the product of inner turmoil, and of sexual desire in particular. 
In doing so, they abstracted youth from the social and political realities shaping their worlds.125  
Childhood 
Neither experiences nor conceptual genealogies of childhood in the Middle East have 
received attention equal to those of youth and adolescence (see Fernea 1995 for an exception) . 
In ethnographic accounts, children are often defined by their lack of ‘aql. Carolyn Sargent and 
Nancy Scheper-Hughes criticize anthropologists for treating childhood “as a transitional life 
stage devoid of any meaning or value… perceived as a permanent state of becoming rather than 
as a legitimate state of being-in-the-world” (1999, 13). It seems important to distinguish between 
                                                
125 El Shakry’s work helps contextualize and denaturalize the givenness of shabāb and murāhaqa in a regional 
context, although scholarship focused on the Levant during this period would further clarify how these ideas 
circulated and took root beyond Egypt 
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cases where this representation occurs as the result of an ethnographer’s assumptions, and those 
in which it emerges through participant observation, although cases of the latter kind certainly 
require adequate analysis. The description that Scheper-Hughes and Sargent offer as the sine qua 
non of sloppy scholarship resonates considerably with some of the attitudes toward children that 
I witnessed among my own interlocutors.  
While adored, spoiled, and subjected to endless Facebook-bound photo shoots, children 
in Jordan are generally seen as small humans in training, subjects-in-formation who can neither 
be held accountable for their actions nor, accordingly, taken too seriously.126 Amira Mittermaier, 
for example, describes the doubts that emerged among her research participants when a girl of 
three received a dream foreshadowing the death of the community’s religious leader. The 
validity of a dream portending the future was not at issue, but the identity of the dream recipient 
raised concerns. “According to all schools of Islamic law,” Mittermaier writes, “a child of that 
age lacks reason (‘aql), and according to many Egyptians I know, children should not always be 
believed because they tend to make up things” (2012, 248). Children’s lack of ‘aql marks them 
as limited. Childrearing (tarbiyya), essentially involves training children to develop and properly 
embody the qualities and capacities of ‘aql.  
Embodied Asynchrony 
Intellectual impairments unsettle normative expectations about the progression and 
alignment of ‘aql, embodiment, and maturity. To think through the nature of these unsettlements, 
I draw on Alison Kafer’s concept of embodied asynchrony, which she elaborates by analyzing 
controversy surrounding what has become known as “the Ashley Treatment.” Born with static 
                                                
126 Geoffrey Hughes reports similar observations on the constriction of childhood, based not only on his 
ethnographic fieldwork but also on considerable time spent as a schoolteacher in rural Jordan (personal 
communication, 2018). I am thankful to him for providing feedback on this chapter and drawing out some of these 
points. 
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encephalopathy, Ashley X experienced severe, lifelong impairments of her brain and body. In 
2004, at the request of her parents, surgeons at the Seattle Children’s Hospital performed a 
“hysterectomy, a bilateral mastectomy, and an appendectomy” on then-7-year-old Ashley (Kafer 
2013, 49). Two years of a high-dose estrogen regimen followed this series of operations, which 
the hospital performed without seeking the ethics review mandated by both state law and hospital 
policy in cases involving the sterilization of a minor. Ashley X’s parents and doctors justified 
these invasive procedures as means to ensure Ashley’s quality life. By severely arresting her 
growth, they argued, Ashley would be spared the pains and discomfort of puberty. By keeping 
her body the size of a small child, Ashley’s parents would never be forced to seek care for her 
outside the comfort and safety of their own home.  Her parents describe Ashley and others like 
her who received similar procedures, as “pillow angels.”  
Ashley X’s story demonstrates how normative modes of temporality underwrite ableism 
and justify intervention into disabled bodies and minds. Ashley became a “monstrous figure” and 
demanded intervention because, as Kafer writes, her “body was growing apart from her mind… 
As a result, she was embodied asynchrony” (2013, 48). Particularly egregious in Ashley’s case, 
Kafer contends, was the undeniable femaleness of her body: 
The Treatment did not improve her cognitive or physical functioning nor was it 
intended to do so. Yet it is undoubtedly a curative response to disability. Ashley 
had to be cured of her asynchrony, at least to the fullest extent possible. She also 
had to be freed of the specter of her future body, the full-sized, large- breasted, 
menstruating and fertile body to come. (2013, 57) 
While very few of the individuals I met in Jordan experienced impairments as extensive as 
Ashley’s, embodied asynchrony aptly captures the disjuncture that caretakers and other 
nondisabled people perceive as central to intellectual disability. The dimensions and dynamics of 
embodied asynchrony are formed in the shared and interlinked life courses that family members 
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create in their struggles to care for one another. The significance of communal and kin 
orientations, however, by no means obviates the importance of the individual. Rather, individuals 
achieve full adult personhood by fulfilling their obligations in the vertical and horizontal 
relationships that shape their own relational sense of self (Joseph 1999). Suad Joseph’s concept 
of patriarchal connectivity captures these relational dynamics of self, kinship, and power. “By 
connectivity,” she writes, “I mean relationships in which a person's boundaries are relatively 
fluid so that persons feel a part of significant others (Joseph 1993, 452). Where the ideal of 
connectivity prevails over that of an autonomous self, “maturity is signaled in part by the 
successful enactment of a myriad of connective relationships” (1993, 452). Intellectually 
disabled young men and women struggle to establish the connective relationships defining 
maturity. In fact, they struggle even to keep those relationships open as future possibilities.  
The stakes of embodied asynchrony are evident in emerging debates about the 
sterilization of women and girls with disabilities (isti’sāl/izālat al-raḥam). While the issue of 
sterilization, in particular, is new in Jordan, these conversations represent a new iteration of 
longstanding communal and legal anxieties about the sexual and reproductive lives of persons 
deemed “not normal” in the MENA region (Scalenghe 2014). They also echo facets of disability 
histories around the world (Block 2007; Carey 2003, 2010; Phillips 2011; Stern 2015). Such 
commonalities attest to the significance of sexuality and reproduction in constructions of 
disability, as well in ableist justifications for intervening into the lives of disabled persons across 
time and space. The experiences of mothers with intellectually disabled sons demonstrate how 
disability shapes and disrupts local constructions of masculinity, creating constraints and 
circumstances different from those encountered by disabled women. Young men with intellectual 
disabilities rarely face the same degree of bodily intervention as their female counterparts. For 
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both young men and women, however, perceptions of ‘aql determine the kinds of adults they 
might become. For nondisabled peers, the onset of puberty marks a transition into adolescence, a 
phase they experience as “betwixt and between” on their certain path to adulthood (Turner 
1969). By contrast, disabled young men and women do not experience the same kind of 
transitional adolescence. Instead, they become further entrenched in embodied asynchrony.127 
III. “She will stay a child her whole life” 
Lina did not look as old as her 25 years, nor did she visibly present as disabled. I 
wondered if I had misunderstood her younger sister Huda, who urged me to contact her mother 
upon learning about my research. “I have two sisters with intellectual disabilities,” Huda 
exclaimed when, almost four months earlier, we met at a private training session on special 
education. I attended class one evening at the invitation of Ibrahim, a well-known counselor and 
special education lecturer who freelanced as a consultant and trainer. His almost all-female 
audience during this training consisted of Bachelor’s and Diplom128 students studying special 
education in universities around greater Amman. Once they successfully completed the course, 
students would receive a certificate of participation. They hoped this piece of paper would 
bolster their resumes on the job market, where they sought work in the special education sector 
or, less commonly, in the resource rooms offered by schools experimenting with semi-inclusive 
                                                
127 Writing on the stigmatization of chronic pain in the United States, anthropologist Jean Jackson describes chronic 
pain sufferers as liminal subjects who disrupt the mind-body Cartesian dualism that grounds U.S. biomedical 
culture, as well as moral codes that rely on a clear distinction between sickness and health (2005). In using the 
description of liminal, Jackson writes that she seeks to combine both Victor Turner’s conceptualization of liminality 
as “betwixt and between” (1969), as well as Mary Douglas’s work on dirt and pollution as “matter out of place” 
(Douglas 1966). In many ways, Jackson’s description of chronic pain as confounding categories resonates with my 
observations on intellectual disability, but I am not convinced that liminality aptly captures the sense of positionality 
of young people with Down Syndrome and other intellectual disabilities. The disjuncture and sense of impossibility 
conveyed by Kafer’s concept of embodied asynchrony seems to better account for this stuckness. 
128 The Jordanian equivalent of an Associate’s degree. 
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education programming. At the end of that session, I took Huda’s contact information and 
promised to be in touch. 
Traveling via a small coaster bus, I departed from the Raghdan bus hub that connects 
Amman’s urban core to its ever-expanding peripheries and the other governorates. Huda and her 
mother were waiting in their car, idling in front of a nondescript furniture store on the route 
between Amman and Zarqa. As we pulled into their home’s secluded driveway, framed by a 
trellis covered in grape vines, Imm Lina half-joked that she hoped none of her neighbors saw us; 
they would be curious about such an unusual visitor and expect introductions. Huda’s younger 
sister Samar waited for us inside the salon with Hala’, their youngest sister; Lina was the eldest. I 
did not meet Imm Lina’s husband, who worked long hours as a truck driver, or her son. Hala’ 
joined us for the first hour of my visit, playing animatedly with an empty water bottle. She 
giggled at the sensation of ribbed plastic against her skin and the crackle it emitted when she 
applied pressure to the materials with her hands. Hala’ acquired pervasive developmental and 
physical impairments shortly after birth, and she could neither walk nor talk. Imm Lina described 
her youngest daughter’s condition as ḍumūr ‘aqlī, literally atrophy of the ‘aql.129 When Hala’ 
grew tired of this entertainment, Huda pushed her sister’s wheelchair back into the domestic 
interior of the house to lay her down for a nap. 
At different points throughout her life, Lina had been diagnosed with developmental 
delay (ta’akhur al-namū), a moderate intellectual disability (iʿāqa ʿaqliyya mutawassaṭa), and 
eventually a psychological condition that her mother simply described as “like schizophrenia” 
(hāla nafsiyya zayy al-infisām). Mental illness compounded her intellectual impairments and led 
                                                
129 This was not the first time I encountered a medicalized use of ʿaql rather than brain (damāgh, mukh). 
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to Lina’s classification as severely disabled.130 Lina was thrilled to entertain guests and sat by my 
side for the entirety of my visit. Earlier that day I left my glasses in the taxi ride to the bus 
station, so I had resigned myself to wearing sunglasses in the dimly lit salon for the entirety of 
my visit, while apologizing profusely for this awkward arrangement. Being extremely near-
sighted, I cannot see without strong prescription lenses. Whether to ease my embarrassment, or 
perhaps because she liked my style, Lina ran to get her own sunglasses and donned them in 
solidarity.   
I was not accustomed to conducting interviews with multiple family members at the same 
time, preferring to speak with mothers and sisters separately and alone. I adopted this approach 
to mitigate the potential complications that arise when asking questions about experiences and 
emotions that family members may not be keen to share with one another. While some women 
tried to ensure that a maximum number of family members would be present for my visits (in 
which case I often chose not to record due to sheer acoustic constraints), others intentionally 
arranged my visits for times when their children and spouses would not be home. Imm Lina’s 
daughters did not leave her side for the entirety of my stay, attesting to both the gendered and 
collective dynamics of their family’s experiences with Lina and Hala’. I asked whether I could 
record our conversation, and Imm Lina replied matter-of-factly: “It’s no problem.” She 
downplayed my assurances of confidentiality, reasoning that they had experience with reporters, 
so I was not a big deal. At first not fully understanding this remark, I nodded and proceeded to 
ask Imm Lina if she thought her community was accepting of disability.  
                                                
130 In describing this progression of Lina’s diagnoses, Im Lina used the categories recognized by the Ministries of 
Health and Social Development, and the Higher Council for Disabilities, which distinguish between mild (basīta), 
moderate (mutawassaṭa), and severe (shadīda). These categories reflect a medicalized approach to disability and 
have been strongly criticized by activists and scholars who advocate for an approach to disability based on the social 
model. 
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There’s more acceptance (taqabbul) now. A long time ago, people would hide 
them (khabbūhum) and stay in denial and not speak about them. And maybe, in 
cases of marriage, when people would come to ask for a girl’s hand, her father 
and her grandmother – the father’s mother131 – would tell her not to say anything. 
Even my own mother… would ask, “Does everyone who enters your house have 
to see [Hala’]?” And I would tell her that Hala’ is part of our life, and people need 
to know that she is present.  
This reply touches on familiar themes of acceptance, hiding, and the importance of marriage 
networks in shaping family members’ engagements with disability. Unlike many other parents I 
met, however, Imm Lina articulated a more optimistic perspective, describing the present as a 
significant improvement rather than a period of as-yet unrealized potential for progress.  
In this initial response, Imm Lina focused on her experiences with Hala’. Lina’s 
impairments were not immediately visible, unlike those of her youngest sister. Lina also moved 
independently and possessed a greater capacity for verbal communication than Hala’. 
Nevertheless, it was Lina who generated a greater degree of concern for her family. Her mother 
explained: 
Lina had her period for four months. And it was four months of torture. From the 
first day until the last day she would scream that she was sick and that there was 
blood and that she was going to die. She was too disgusted to stay in the 
bathroom. She would keep throwing water [on herself, in the bathroom] so that 
she wouldn’t see any blood.  
Frustrated, Imm Lina sought out further advice that would thrust her family into the center of a 
controversy they had not anticipated and did not fully understand. She first returned to the 
diagnosis center. 
                                                
131 Im Lina specifically identified the father’s mother, the paternal grandmother, as important here. The quality of 
the relationship between a wife and her mother-in-law is a frequent topic of conversation among women and a 
constant plot device for soap operas, literature, and songs across the Arab world. Given the historically widespread 
tradition of patrilocal residence, young wives enter their husband’s extended family unit at lower levels of household 
hierarchy. Only with time, children, and age do they accrue status and authority (Altorki 1986; Fernea 1995; 
Moghadam 2003).     
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The doctor told me that there were cases where they perform hysterectomies (fī 
hālāt byi’staṣalū al raḥam), and he asked me what my opinion was on the matter. 
I told him that in my opinion it was not necessary for her to keep her uterus. She 
has a mental disability, and I am not going to let her get married.  
Imm Lina described Lina’s “health” as her primary concern. The employee at the center 
told her that she needed to speak with an OBGYN for advice on this issue, so she next 
sought out the expertise of one such specialist.  
Will it affect her in any way?” I asked. [The doctor] told me no. She asked me 
whether I would prefer to take it [the uterus] out with surgery or whether I would 
prefer to remove it through suction. I told her I didn’t know. I told her that people 
would be concerned with her virginity (al- ʿuzuriyya), so people might talk, but  
[the doctor] should do what she saw best for Lina’s health. I mean it didn’t make 
a difference to me whether she remained a virgin or not. 
Imm Lina’s explanation reveals how marriage, sex, and collective family reputation mutually 
shape the composition of able-bodied womanhood in Jordan. Imm Lina separated fertility and 
sexuality from her understanding of Lina’s “health,” because her daughter would never get 
married. Lina’s fertility thus became emblematic of her embodied asynchrony.132 The parents of 
Ashley X articulated a similar logic. They justified dramatic intervention into their daughter’s 
disabled female body based on their imaginings of possible and impossible futures. Virginity, in 
Jordan, plays an important role in ideal constructions of femininity (Mahadeen 2013).133 The fact 
that it “didn’t make a difference” whether this surgery penetrated Lina’s hymen reveals how her 
                                                
132 An interesting parallel example is found in Amal Hassan Fadlalla’s work with Hadendowa Sudanese women. 
Fadlalla writes that “women… who experienced multiple reproductive traumas, are seen as women whose fertility 
has gone awry and are thus perceived as more threatening to the collective well-being than are infertile women” 
(Fadlalla 2007, 7). While Fadlalla’s focus on reproductive trauma does not directly apply to my research, Lina’s 
family considered her disability itself a reproductive trauma. Intellectual disability inherently marked her fertility as 
something “gone awry,” matter out of place. 
133Mahadeen provides two common sayings in this regard. The first “compares women to soda cans that, once 
opened, cannot be closed again and cannot regain their original value. Another compares women to delicate glass 
which also cannot be repaired after it is broken” (2013, 81). 
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exclusion from the category of “marriageable” directly affects her possibilities for embodying 
female subjectivity.134   
Imm Lina did not arrive at the decision to pursue her daughter’s hysterectomy alone. 
Although her husband figured minimally in our conversation, he would have needed to provide 
verifiable consent before any hospital would be willing to perform such a procedure. Imm Lina 
also sought the advice of medical experts, none of whom tried to dissuade her from the 
operation. She did, however, encounter dissenting voices that challenged this normalizing, 
medicalizing framework, as well as her own assumptions about the moral legitimacy of the 
operation. 
So what happened next? After the operation, people started fighting with us about 
the issue of motherhood (qaḍiyyat al-imūma). “It’s her right to be a mother 
(ḥaqqha bitkūn imm).” Lina is fundamentally a child! In the Center, they request 
that we delay the age of marriage and do not marry girls too young.135 Then they 
go back, even with this mentality, and say that it is a girl’s right to be a mother. 
But [Lina] is a child, and she will stay a child for her whole life. They are not very 
logical! 
The issue of child marriage is the subject of rights and awareness campaigns across the Middle 
East, funded by local, regional, global, and state initiatives (Sweis 2011).136 Imm Lina drew on 
the liberal discourse of children’s rights to subvert the liberal discourse of disability rights. By 
                                                
134 Virginity encompasses broader values of feminine propriety and respectability and is not dependent solely on the 
status of the hymen. In fact, Islamist sexual education courses have begun to explicitly promote awareness of this 
lack of equivalence to rectify the “backward” emphasis on gathering proof of a woman’s virginity on the night that 
an engaged couple consummates their marriage (see G. F. Hughes 2017). 
135 I’m not sure what “center” Im Lina was referring to, but it could have been any number of local or international 
NGOs or governmental organizations that sponsor awareness campaigns about the harms of marriage for young girls 
and relatively recent changes to the legal age of marriage (formally set at 18, but possible as young as 16 with 
permission from a judge). 
136 Jordan has witnessed a significant rise in average ages of marriage: 24 for women and 29 for men (Ajaka 2014). 
There are at least two socioeconomic factors contributing to this trend in Jordan. First, the importance of education, 
for both boys and girls, is seen as an economic necessity and a prestige item in terms of making a “good” marriage 
(Adely 2012). Additionally, the groom is responsible for the wedding expenses, the bridewealth (mahr), and any 
other items agreed upon in the marriage contract. In the current economic climate young men often have to save for 
years to afford their wedding license and the expensive social rituals that surround the affair (Hughes 2015). 
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squarely situating her daughter as a child, Imm Lina invoked a status that entails unassailable 
rights to protection. Having located her daughter in a phase of perpetual childhood, Imm Lina 
then sought the medical technologies necessary to intervene and alter her daughter’s body so it 
would align with this designation. The temporal dynamics of this framing, moreover, illuminate 
the imbrications of disability and futurity that shape her reasoning. There are many women in 
Jordan who do not marry.137 Yet it was the impossibility of Lina’s marital future as a disabled 
girl-woman that made her body problematic in ways that a nondisabled, unmarried woman 
would not experience.  
 “Do you know Safiya?” Imm Lina asked me rather abruptly. I was surprised by the 
question; I had met Safiya, who is a well-known and fiercely outspoken disability rights activist. 
She is especially keen to address more taboo topics relating to family, gender, and sexuality. I 
answered Imm Lina’s question in the affirmative. “I hate this woman,” Imm Lina responded, 
unexpectedly switching to English for dramatic emphasis. Then, returning to Arabic, she began 
to explain, initially addressing Safiya as though she were standing in the room with us: 
You have no right to judge me if you haven't lived my circumstances! Okay, 
Safiya, she has a physical disability. But her intellectual capacities are there 
(qudrāthā ‘aqliyya mowjūdeh). Everything is easier. You can manage yourself. 
Even me, as a normal person (banī ādam ṭabīʿī), if I started to have problems with 
my intellectual capacities, everything would change – including my own family’s 
acceptance of me! (ḥaṭa taqabbul ahlī wa usratī).  
Imm Lina’s distinction here points to the significant differences attributed to impairments of ‘aql 
versus those of body. People with minds recognized as damaged or incomplete experience 
impairment and disability differently than those whose minds are not, something emphasized by 
feminist scholars who work on issues of significant intellectual impairment (Carlson and Kittay 
                                                
137 In fact, anxiety about a crisis of marriage and looming epidemic of “spinsterhood” are common in local and 
regional discourse (Adely 2016; Hasso 2010; Hughes 2015). 
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2010; Kafer 2013). At the same time, I also met individuals with physical, sensory, and mobility 
impairments who frequently remarked that their families, and especially strangers, treated them 
as though they had problems processing information and ideas, rather than problems walking, 
hearing, or seeing, a conflation that reflects the deeply embodied dimensions of ‘aql. 
Imm Lina and Safiya spoke about Lina’s hysterectomy, although I was unclear exactly 
how they connected and whether Safiya had sought out Imm Lina or vice versa. Regardless, their 
conversation did not go well. Safiya did not support Imm Lina’s desire to pursue operation. “She 
told me that I didn’t do the hysterectomy [so Lina] could be more comfortable. She told me I did 
it so that when her father or her brother sleeps with her, she won’t get pregnant.” Imm Lina’s 
rage became evident in retelling this story. Safiya’s accusation that Imm Lina was complicit in 
aiding and abetting incestuous sexual abuse did not prove an effective strategy for dissuading the 
latter from sterilizing her daughter. Safiya linked the hysterectomy to Lina’s family in a 
relationship marked by inherent violation. On the one hand, available data overwhelmingly 
suggests that disabled women everywhere experience higher rates of sexual abuse and violence 
that those without disabilities, and this is certainly the case in the United States (Harrell and 
Rand 2010). Yet I also encountered a highly classed discourse surrounding incest in Jordan,138 
with certain elite Jordanians describing sexual abuse as an inevitable consequence of the 
collective sleeping arrangements that prevail in more “traditional” and lower class communities. 
They also imply that poverty and religious conservatism foster toxic sexual repression and 
ultimately deviance. There exists a discourse of incest accusation that reflects broader politics of 
class and kinship practices. I cannot assess the validity of this discourse or its relationship to the 
actual prevalence of incest. 
                                                
138 Other anthropologists working in Jordan have also encountered this narrative among elites (Adely 2017, personal 
communication).  
  172 
In responding to Safiya’s accusations, Imm Lina pointed out that she sought guidance 
from diagnostic and medical professionals. Technically, “the Ministry of Health and the Ministry 
of Social Development suggested it!” Safiya redirected her critique in light of this point, telling 
Imm Lina that the Center suggested the operation for the same reason, “so that when her advisor 
at the live-in center sleeps with her, she won’t get pregnant.” Imm Lina responded indignantly: 
her daughter had never slept in a residential institution, and she vowed she would never let this 
happen. By locating the threat of sexual harm in both the family home and the state run 
institutions, Safiya implicated both spheres as guilty in their failure to protect disabled women 
and enabling violations against them. Her arguments with Imm Lina portray disabled women as 
overwhelmingly vulnerable to abuse, whether committed by family members or by agents of the 
state (or actors in the private sector). In my own conversation with Safiya, we also discussed 
issues of puberty, menarche, and sterilization. She described families as unwilling to work with 
their daughters in skills of self-care relating to menstruation. “I think they do not even see their 
daughters as women,” Safiya told me. She was, I believe, correct in this assessment. Some 
families see their daughters as undeniably female, but womanhood becomes anomalous, and 
even threatening, in the presence of certain intellectual impairments. 
Despite their conflict, Imm Lina was not oblivious to Safiya’s general commitment to the 
issues of disability rights. “Maybe,” she hypothesized, “it’s just that she cares so much about the 
rights of disabled people. Kind of like a cat that eats its children because it worries about them… 
If this is how you want to protect them, it is not the proper way!” Contrasting Safiya’s misguided 
attempts by likening them to a mother destroying her offspring, Imm Lina justified her own 
maternal efforts as protection for her daughter. She did not consider the hysterectomy as bodily 
harm but rather construed it as an act of preservation, an act of care performed properly. 
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Safiya told me that they were going to teach me [to take care of Lina]. So I told 
her okay, lets assume that they teach me. But if I get sick? Safiya told me that 
they would teach her sisters. But her sisters are at the age when they should be 
getting married. Should I prevent them from getting married? She told me no, it 
was fine for them to get married. Okay. But if I die and her sisters get married, or, 
if I get sick? 
Menstruation involves symbolic and practical dimensions that play out in different ways for 
differently abled female bodies. Proper dealings with bodily fluids of all kinds – blood, semen, 
urine, vomit – are critically important for maintaining social and religious norms in Jordan. Both 
men and women are provided clear and explicit instructions regarding the maintenance of the 
body in general, and especially in relation to prayer and the successful completion of wuduʿ, a 
state of physical and spiritual purity necessary for prayer. On another level, however, bodily 
fluids are intimate, sticky, pungent materials that become especially unpleasant to encounter 
outside the domains and activities to which they are assigned (Al-Mohammad 2007). In 
explaining her decision to pursue the operation, Imm Lina stressed Lina’s inability to understand 
blood and her inability to clean herself. A menstruating woman possesses the capacity to bear 
children and the capacity to threaten ritual space; she is also bleeding. Imm Lina’s concerns were 
focused on quotidian, material dimensions of providing care. “Who will change her?” she asked 
rhetorically, dramatically suggesting Lina’s father and brother only to highlight the 
inappropriateness and impossibility of such a scenario.  
Vastly unequal power dynamics separate Imm Lina and Lina’s doctors from Lina herself, 
who presumably had very little say in the decision to remove her uterus and was most likely not 
consulted at all. Having flagged these issues, I would like to consider how Imm Lina configured 
the hysterectomy as an act of care. Anthropologist Angela Garcia, discussing the relationship 
between a mother and daughter sharing in the struggles of heroin addiction, writes: 
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For Eugenia and Bernadette, the arts of care included small gestures meant to ease 
pain.... They may have wounded as much as they healed. Nevertheless, they were 
oriented toward relieving the pain of the other and, as such, they were moral acts, 
embedded in the everyday context of shared vulnerability and difficult life 
circumstances. (2014, 56) 
Eugenia and Bernadette are by no means perfect analogies for Imm Lina and her daughter, yet 
they can be used to illuminate Imm Lina’s position. The sight of menstrual blood distressed Lina, 
and her mother sought to ease her pain. Imm Lina emphasized her discussions with the doctor 
about whether the surgery would affect Lina’s health to demonstrate that she was not trying to 
harm her. Imm Lina considered Lina a child, discounting any marital, and therefore sexual or 
reproductive future or identity for her daughter. Safiya, by contrast, insisted upon Lina’s status as 
a woman who would be made infinitely more vulnerable to harm by what the hysterectomy 
could theoretically enable – nonconsensual sex with no risk of pregnancy.  
Imm Lina and Safiya’s boundaries of care and harm are based on how they understand 
Lina as a person – child or adult, girl or woman – in relation to her intellectual and physical 
capacities. In doing so, they inscribe both gender and disability on Lina’s body. Im Lina worried 
about a future in which she would no longer be able to care for Lina, or for Hala’. This 
responsibility would then fall to their sisters, or so she hoped. In a local political economy that 
configures care as a precarious resource dependent on the availability of female kin, Safiya’s 
designation of the family as a threat to be neutralized and overcome simply did not fit with 
pervasive everyday moral sensibilities. Rather, women like Imm Lina construct and make sense 
of disability in relation to kinship futures. While Imm Lina’s solution, like Ashley X’s parents, 
was to “cure” Lina of her embodied asynchrony, some parents challenged the inevitability of 
such a disjuncture. 
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IV. “Don’t treat them like children”: 
The connection between intellectual disability and embodied asynchrony manifests itself 
in different ways and to varying degrees. Not all families experience the onset of puberty as a 
traumatic rupture. Imm Rana, for example, normalized her daughter Rana’s experience with 
menstruation. She did so precisely by foregrounding the capacity of a 17-year-old with Down 
Syndrome to provide self-care. “It was fine. Alhamdulillah it just went smoothly. [Rana] learned 
how to take care of it and take care of herself. It was normal.” Imm Rana did not frame 
menstruation as inherently problematic. In stressing Rana’s ability to “take care of it” and “take 
care of herself,” however, she implicitly acknowledged the social and material challenges that 
menstruation poses for proper care of one’s own body. It was clearly important that her daughter 
demonstrate the ability to meet those challenges in a socially acceptable way. If Rana had a 
harder time “taking care of it,” would her mother have perhaps resorted to more extreme 
measures? Imm Rana did mention hysterectomy as something that some families pursued once 
their daughters reach menarche, and she made no explicit judgments about this choice. 
Importantly, Imm Rana did not view Rana as a “child,” incorporating her more squarely 
into the realm of adolescence. She recognized and felt conflicted about Rana’s romantic teenage 
longings, which she recognized as such, as well as those she witnessed in her daughter’s peers. 
While visiting Imm Rana and Rana at their home in an upscale neighborhood in northwest 
Amman, Imm Rana admitted that: 
I don’t like how [people] joke with them, like they don’t take them seriously… A 
while ago – she loves watching Turkish soap operas, you know, and some of them 
are very open. She turned to her father and asked him, “When will I be able to fall 
in love? When I’m 18?” Can you imagine!? Dear God, ask me that, not your 
father! But she really means it! {Laughs} At least she was asking first… But they 
are really thinking about this stuff. They want this. Don’t treat them like children, 
because they don’t see themselves that way. 
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This was not the first time that Imm Rana and I discussed the trials of adolescence. Yet, Rana 
was not fully incorporated into the role of an adolescent, given that her mother could not accept 
the conventional future her daughter desired as a viability possibility. Many months earlier Imm 
Rana told me about a conversation she had with Rana that left her feeling troubled.  
Rana told me, “When I get married, I want to have 6 kids." I told her, "Six?! 
Who's going to take care of those?!" We have a housemaid, so she told me "Don’t 
worry, I will bring two housemaids!” I told her, “You should take care of yourself 
first!” … They're normal feelings for people their age.  Of course, when her 
friends are getting engaged she's going to say, "When is it my turn?" But my view 
is that at the end, it will be me, my husband, and Rana.  
Imm Lina interpreted Lina’s period as matter out of time, given that her daughter would “always 
be a child.” Imm Rana acknowledged Rana’s transition from child to teenager, framing her 
feelings as “normal for someone her age.” She actively criticized nondisabled adults for 
infantilizing her daughter.139 Yet this transition marked Rana as capable of bearing a child who 
would require care beyond what her mother believed she was capable of offering, and thus the 
transition would never be complete. Imm Rana’s anxieties about her daughter’s sexual maturity 
influence Rana’s life in immediate ways. She expressed intense fear that Rana’s disabilities 
would render her uniquely vulnerable to abuse or exploitation, a worry expressed by many 
families and one also shared by families of nondisabled young women. Sitting in the kitchen 
while Imm Rana prepared lunch, with Rana in the next room watching a Turkish soap opera, 
Imm Rana explained that the close physical proximity of various programs in Amman factored 
crucially into where they enrolled Rana. “Abu Rana is against any option where Rana would be 
on a bus… Where she could end up the first or last one on a bus, because of abuse. We’re afraid 
                                                
139 Rana, unlike Lina, had attended a mainstream school her entire life. While she struggled with the academic 
subjects, she could pick up on social cues and engage in conversation with relative ease. In other words, these two 
young women experienced significantly different impairments and disabilities. 
  177 
for her.” Vulnerability, understood as physical fragility or moral weakness, is not imputed solely 
to disabled women, but the existence of disability heightened this already gendered quality.  
Imm Maryam envisioned a different future for her daughter Maryam. In explaining this 
future, she also demonstrates how gender and disability intersect on a spectrum of vulnerability. 
We sat and talked about Maryam with Imm Maryam’s older daughter, Amina. Given their 10-
year age gap, Amina often played the role of second mother to her six-year-old sister. Imm 
Maryam made it clear to me that she fully supported the right of people with Down Syndrome to 
marry. “I hope that I can marry Maryam to someone without Down Syndrome, so he can take 
care of her. A woman with Down Syndrome can give birth to a healthy baby,140 and then that 
baby can take care of her later in life.”141 Imm Maryam maintained a possible future for Maryam 
that conforms to normative, traditional gender roles – Maryam as wife and mother – while 
allowing her to envision a radically more independent existence for Maryam as an adult capable 
of creating her own family. This projected future would also secure Imm Maryam’s own future 
status as being cared for, rather than continuing to care for Maryam. Needless to say, Imm 
Maryam strongly opposed the permissibility of performing hysterectomies on disabled women.  
When we broached this subject, however, Imm Maryam concentrated less on what a 
hysterectomy would mean for Maryam’s marriageability and fertility; instead she based her 
                                                
140 While many women with Down Syndrome are infertile or experience significantly impaired fertility, some 
women can get pregnant. The babies of women with Down Syndrome who carry to term have an increased 
likelihood of being born with Down Syndrome or other congenital and physical disabilities, but some women with 
Down Syndrome give birth to babies without any complications or congenital conditions (Bovicelli et al. 1982; 
Sheridan et al. 1989). Men with Down Syndrome are usually infertile (Pradhan et al. 2006). 
141 While patrilocal, post-marital residence patterns remain prevalent in Amman, they are increasingly being 
modified by a confluence of factors: rural-to-urban migration, nuclear families adopting neolocal practices apart 
from either side of the family, out-migration, and personal preference. Over the course of my time in the field, two 
families I knew relocated away from neighborhoods where the husband’s extended kin resided; in one case the 
family sought to move closer to the wife’s mother and care for her, and in the other case, the family simply wanted 
to put distance between the nuclear family and the paternal relatives (parents and sisters). 
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objections on broader themes of bodily integrity, God, and creation.142 “[Hysterectomy] is 
haram, forbidden in Islam” (she exclaimed. “God made her with a uterus (Allah kḥala’hā maʿa 
al raḥam). Who am I to take that from her?” She had initially been shocked to discover that other 
women were willing to consider the procedure for their daughters. “Mothers say they’re afraid of 
their [disabled] daughter getting pregnant. Why would she be in a position where she’d be 
capable of getting pregnant? Do you let her wander the streets?!” Imm Maryam extended this 
argument to non-disabled women to demonstrate the fallacy of their logic. “People fear their 
daughters – healthy daughters – having relationships and getting pregnant. But do they talk about 
taking out their wombs?!”  
Imm Maryam’s objections were not intended to trivialize the fear of illicit relationships. 
At one point during our conversation Amina asked me if it was true that girls in America could 
go out as they pleased. She expressed jealous approval when I granted that in general, unmarried 
young women had more autonomy in their daily movements than was common for many of their 
Jordanian peers. As Amina listed off her daily routine to draw attention to the lack of 
unchaperoned time that would allow for her to “go wherever she wanted,” Imm Maryam 
protested her daughter’s implicit criticism. “I fear for you,” she exclaimed. “I have to,” turning 
first to Amina, then to me, and throwing her hands up in the air when neither of us verbally 
reinforced the legitimacy of this stance. Imm Maryam did not distinguish between Amina and 
Maryam in terms of needing to protect them from the threat of bodily assault or assault on their 
reputations. She treated her daughters as both valuable and vulnerable in their gendered 
identities, which she preserved through maintaining their possible marital futures. 
                                                
142 It’s worth pointing out, however, that unlike the other individuals discussed in this chapter, Maryam was only 
four. She and her mother had yet to confront the immediate, messy materiality of puberty and bodily hygiene. 
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V. Harm and protection: Islam and the moral legitimacy of sterilization 
Both supporters and critics of hysterectomies for intellectually disabled women invoked 
Islam to legitimize their stances as morally sound. Jordan’s Department of Iftā’ (plural of fatwa, 
or legally nonbinding expert religious opinion) issued a formal position on this issue in 2014 at 
the request of local disability advocates. After collecting testimonies from medical, child 
development, and human rights experts, the Department’s official decision-making council 
issued a formal fatwa against the permissibility of hysterectomy for disabled women and girls.  
The reasoning they provide, which is accessible via the department’s online website, outlines a 
particular conception of the right to bodily integrity, premised not on the construction of an 
inviolably sovereign subject-in-body but rather on submission to the sovereignty of God over all 
bodies.  
Decision no.194, 2/2014 is titled “Forbidding removal of the wombs of girls with 
disabilities and society’s obligations toward them (hurmat izālat arḥām al-fatayāt dhuwwāt al-
iʿāqa wa masu’liyya al-mujtama‘ tijāhun).”  The text reads as follows: 
It is not permissible to undertake the removal of a [body] part made by God 
except in cases of illness that can be cured by this procedure (my emphasis 
added). As for those with an intellectual disability or illness, we do not see this 
type of operation as permissible, as it infringes on God’s creation, poses health 
risks through the surgery, and has the negative effect of enabling abuse and 
causing harm and damage to these girls. It is the duty of parents and guardians to 
protect their daughters with intellectual disabilities and to spare them what may 
harm them, just as it is society’s duty to offer them protection from exploitation 
and enact the necessary [legislative] measures to ensure this. It is the right of the 
weak to their protection (fa haqq al- ḍa’īf s ̣iānathu).143 (Department of Iftā’ 2014)  
This reasoning is consistent with previous statements on the matter. In an online query submitted 
to the research council in 2009, for example, a mother wrote: 
                                                
143 It’s interesting to note that the word chosen for protection, ṣiāna, conveys sentiments of chastity and virtue (Hans 
Wehr 2001). Maysūn is a popular name for women. 
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I have a daughter who is 13 years old and she has a mental illness (hiyya murīḍa 
‘aqliyya) and she has a complete lack of self-control (lā tusaytar ‘alā nafsha), 
even with using the bathroom. Please provide me with a fatwa in the matter of 
removing her womb, since she is completely unable to control herself. 
(Department of Iftā’ 2009) 
The scholar(s) who responded to this woman’s inquiry also denied the permissibility of 
removing the girl’s uterus. They provided the same justification, verbatim, as that of the formal 
decision reached in 2014. Additionally, they recommended that this woman “[seek out] the help 
of charitable and social services that specialize in these matters.” 
The 2014 fatwa identifies four interrelated reasons why the hysterectomy procedure is 
incompatible with Islamic ethics: 1) It infringes on God’s creation; 2) the risks of the surgery 
outweigh the benefits; 3) it has the negative effect of enabling abuse and causing harm and 
damage; 4) it denies women and girls with intellectual disabilities their right to protection. The 
first two claims, that the hysterectomy infringes on God’s creation and creates greater harms than 
benefits also emerge as salient issues in Sherine Hamdy’s research on bioethics and organ 
transplantation in Egypt (2008; 2012). The families Hamdy worked with were overwhelmingly 
opposed to kidney transplantations from live donors, despite a ruling from state religious 
scholars that deemed the operation morally permissible. Many of Hamdy’s interlocutors instead 
cited a dissenting opinion issued by the popular Islamic scholar Shaykh Shaʿrawi, who argued, 
“you cannot donate a kidney, since it is not yours to give” (2012, 3). Imm Maryam articulated a 
similar sentiment in denying her right to take away Maryam’s uterus, which was something 
given to her by God.144   
                                                
144 Muslim religious scholars, in general, see sterilization as “challeng[ing] the wisdom of God in creating 
reproductive organs in man and woman” (Rispler-Chaim 1999, 137). Certain procedures become permissible, 
however, when they offer life-saving treatment for an illness, such as uterine cancer. 
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Hamdy writes about speaking with a famous surgeon who gave up his practice after 
reaching the conclusion that transplantation was not morally sound. He did so by carefully 
considering the “legal-ethical principle in Islam: la darar wa la dirar [no harm can be inflicted 
or tolerated]” (2012, 144). In light of Egypt’s destructive transplant market, which preys upon 
the bodies of the poor, the surgeon eventually decided that the harms transplantation inflicts on 
society outweighs the good achieved through individual operations.145 Depending on how the 
scale and scope of the problem are defined,” Hamdy argues, “different risk-benefit analyses will 
inform ethical decisions” (2012, 147). Viewing the problem of transplantation on a social scale, 
rather than that of a patient’s life, the value of individual good act transforms as part of a larger, 
unethical process.   
Imm Lina, Safiya, and the fatwas described in this chapter all make claims to an ethics of 
protection and a desire to mitigate harm, but they define the scale of the problem differently. For 
Imm Lina, her daughter and the rest of her family need protection from the problems created by 
Lina’s embodied asynchrony. “Who will care for her?” Imm Lina repeated constantly when 
retelling the story of Lina’s operation. Both Safiya and the fatwa position women with 
intellectual disabilities as subjects who have a right to care, but that very right in turn creates 
their need for protection. Pregnancy, or maintaining the ability to become pregnant, preserves the 
capacity of a woman’s body to provide testimony that her assigned protectors have failed.  
Members of the fatwa department are broadly sympathetic to the challenges of providing care, 
urging the mother of the 13-year-old who submitted her online inquiry to seek social services 
that could support her. They were more concerned, however, with the ramifications of altering 
the female body in ways not intended by God and what the consequences of such alterations 
                                                
145 The surgeon was aware of the religious council’s official position on transplantation, but he pointed to their 
alignment with the Mubarak regime to call into question their capacity to issue sound and just rulings. 
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might bring. Their different lines of reasoning also converge on unstated assumptions about male 
sexuality, immorality, and aggression. 
The fatwa also reveals divergences between the concerns of Jordanian scholars of Islam 
and those of biomedical doctors. Data from 2012 indicate that approximately 64 hysterectomies 
were performed on disabled women and girls, although the exact number remains unclear, as 
registered cases likely only reflected various procedures with proper medical validation (Al 
Azzeh 2012, 121). Several online news outlets have covered this issue over the past 15 years, 
and publications often include testimony from named medical authorities expressing their 
support for the procedure. From the perspective of two doctors interviewed from the Islamic 
Hospital146 and Al Bashir hospital,147 sterilizing disabled women and girls amounted to “a mercy 
for their families” (Shadid 2009). In a different online news article, an OBGYN from Al Bashir, 
“defended the compassion of the operation and argued that, ‘the girl is not fit to become a 
mother, and she will not marry… The family fears that there will be problems with her, like she 
will be raped and have a disabled child, and how could she care for him?’” (Amman Net 2007). 
Note that in the doctor’s argument, while the possibility of rape emerges as a problem, equally 
(or perhaps more) concerning is the prospect of this hypothetical victim of rape giving birth to a 
disabled child.” 
When I mentioned this argument to Tasnim, who studied special education at a private 
Islamic university, she shook her head in frustration. “Hysterectomy is forbidden in Islam. 
People with some disabilities, like Down Syndrome, they can get married! Plus, it’s not about 
                                                
146 The Islamic Hospital is a large, private non-profit hospital located in downtown Amman. The Islamic Center 
Charity Society, Jordan’s largest Islamic social institution and the charitable branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
runs the hospital. Janine Clark (2004) has written extensively on the class politics and implications of the Islamic 
Hospital and the controversy that its private status has generated. 
147 Al Bashir Hospital is a large, public hospital located in the Ashrafieh neighborhood of eastern Amman. 
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rape, these arguments, they just fear [she made the gesture of a pregnant belly]. And then there’s 
a baby with no father and a mother who can’t take care of it.” Local conversations about sex 
between unmarried individuals, especially in instances of rape, unfold in the context of abiding 
concerns over children born out of wedlock who remain the responsibility of their maternal kin 
alone. These concerns are compounded by the dangers an unmarried pregnant woman might face 
from her own family members if left in such a situation.148  
Biomedical and religious authorities configure the boundaries of the body in significantly 
different ways. Biomedicine, in Jordan, combines modern technologies of surveillance, 
penetration, and control with a distinctly de-individualized construction of the body in alignment 
with Joseph’s model of connective selves. Doctors often define the boundaries of women’s 
bodies in relation to their kin. They discuss removal of the uterus neither solely nor even 
primarily as something that will benefit (or harm) the woman in question, but rather as a “mercy” 
for her family. In contrast, Imm Maryam and the fatwa both emphasize individualized bodily 
integrity in terms of a wholeness that, while in no way synonymous with bodily or sexual 
autonomy, nevertheless cannot be threatened or compromised to satisfy the wishes of kin. 
Hamdy notes that in Egypt, tales, myths, and urban legends – as well as stark realities – 
surrounding kidney theft have “[become] a stand-in for allegations of exploitation and 
                                                
148 An illegitimate child is not, in Islamic legal law, formally considered kin; they cannot claim nasab (relations of 
filiation; see Clarke 2009). As such, the father cannot be legally compelled to support the child, and the child will 
have no right to inheritance. These restrictions are particularly salient in Jordan. Like many other postcolonial 
countries, Jordan has a dual legal system that treats marriage, divorce, and inheritance laws under the banner of 
“personal status laws.” Amira Sonbol describes this system as “a patchwork of fiqh (Islamic theological) 
interpretations from various Muslim schools of law, particularly the Hanafi and Maliki, molded together with a dose 
of imported pre-World War I Western gender philosophy” (Sonbol 2003, 8). Christian marriages take place in the 
Church and follow Christian religious law (which often makes divorce far more difficult to pursue, especially for 
women, when compared to their Muslim peers). Inheritance law in Jordan, however, is treated as personal status 
law. Additionally, while tribal courts of justice were outlawed in 1976, these mechanisms for dispute resolution 
remain popular means to avoid or influence formal (i.e. state-run) legal institutions and frameworks (Alon 2007; 
Layne 1994; Massad 2001; Oweidi 1982; Shryock 1997; Watkins 2014). 
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vulnerability” (2012, 14). Sterilization in Jordan, while not an issue that has reached the level of 
public myth, reveals widespread fears about the exploitation of vulnerable women by their 
families and other more powerful figures tasked with providing them care. These fears directly 
inform the majority position crafted by religious scholars, as well as the views of many 
concerned families and activists who condemn the practice. The fatwa describes the 
hysterectomy as potentially “enabling abuse.” Although it does not provide any more detail, 
Safiya’s own accusations more bluntly articulated why this might be the case.149 
The various relationships that supporters and detractors make about women, 
hysterectomy, and vulnerability ultimately amount to ableist fears about disabled women’s 
sexuality, which become especially acute in the case of intellectually disabled women. These 
fears is by no means unique to Jordan, however. Pamela Block, for example, examines a 1994 
Philadelphia court case that ruled in favor of one Dorothy Wasiek’s motion to sterilize her 
“severely retarded” daughter, Cindy. After a seven-year legal battle, the court granted Dorothy’s 
request to perform a hysterectomy on Cindy, who could not take contraceptive pills because they 
interfered with her anti-seizure medications. Since oral contraceptives were not an option, 
Dorothy “decided that sterilization would be the best way to protect her daughter” (Block 2000, 
247). But protect her from what, exactly? Dorothy grounded her arguments for sterilizing her 
daughter entirely on the premise of protecting her from the threat of rape. In reality, writes 
Block, “the central theme in this story was not Cindy Wasiek’s safety, but rather how to allay her 
mother’s fears. Cindy Wasiek’s entire life was structured on her mother’s fear of her being raped 
and becoming pregnant” (2000, 247, my emphasis). These fears did not stem from a specific or 
                                                
149 Hughes (2017) has noted a similar convergence in Islamist and liberal representations of Muslim men’s sexuality 
as threatening in his work with Jordan’s Islamic Chastity Society. 
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personal threat, but rather from Cindy’s intertwined conditions of being female, intellectually 
disabled, and fertile.  
For intellectually disabled children, the embodied aspects of their impairments often pale 
in comparison to the attention given to the nature and extent of their cognitive differences. When 
intellectually disabled young people begin adolescence, however, their embodied capacities – 
primarily for sex and reproduction – can overdetermine their actual experiences of intellectual 
impairment. This overwhelming embodiment of intellectual disabilities becomes clearer in 
comparing the experiences of young women with those of young men. 
VI. “A boy grows up”: Male trajectories 
Intellectually disabled young men face different constraints than do their female peers. 
While they also encounter intense surveillance by family members, caregivers, and teachers, they 
are far less likely to find themselves the targets of invasive bodily modifications. They enjoy a 
greater degree of individualized bodily autonomy than their female counterparts, which rings 
true for gendered experience in Jordan more generally. Because of patrilocal residence practices, 
a man’s departure from his childhood home does not hold as great a symbolic significance for 
their transition to adulthood as that of woman’s. In fact, the common expectation is that they will 
not leave home.150 Many mothers continue to care for their adult sons, although they anticipate 
the introduction of younger and more active domestic laborers in the form of adult sons’ 
wives.151 The presumed inability of intellectually disabled young men to fulfill the roles of 
                                                
150 Thanks to Susan MacDougall for pointing this out to me. 
151 This pattern obviously does not apply to all families. In some cases this is due to the financial impossibility of 
realizing this patrilocal residence pattern. In other cases, couples may simply want to establish a nuclear residency or 
be forced to live apart from extended kin due to work requirements, although this is less common in Jordan. Half of 
the country’s population lives in the small region known as the Amman-Ruseifa-Zarqa area, which accounts for 
“91% of the capitalization of Jordanian companies (8.6 billion dinars out of a total of 9.4 billion in 2010), it is home 
to more than half of Jordan’s businesses, and the seat of government and justice” (Ababsa 2013b). 
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husband and provider, however, severely curtails their transition beyond the status of a 
dependent.152 Like intellectually disabled young women, they navigate two disjunctures 
simultaneously, uncertainly positioned within both their kinship networks and gender identities. 
Families struggle to answer a persistent, two-sided question: “What type of daughter/son is my 
child, and what type of man/woman can they become?”  
Young people with intellectual disabilities destabilize both the performance and reception 
of local gender norms. Many families recognize that intellectually disabled young adults possess 
bodily and emotional needs and desires like anyone else. They question, however, the degree to 
which their children can successfully inhabit increasingly adult bodies in accordance with strong 
norms of adult behavior. Described as both cultural and religious in nature, these expectations 
place significant emphasis on modesty and propriety between men and women. A gendered 
interplay of autonomy and constraint is especially clear in the discourses of older women, who 
often speak quite candidly about the desires and sexual habits of young men. Parents and 
teachers negatively discuss young women’s desires, and they usually do so in euphemistic terms 
of finding a boyfriend or husband. More explicit accounts of female sexual desire and activity 
are rare.153  
For young men, however, this talk assumes a franker tone. Marcia Inhorn, drawing on her 
research with infertile couples in Lebanon and Egypt, writes that “in the Muslim world… 
masturbation connotes illicit sexuality, and is deemed by some men to be the cause of their own 
                                                
152 Adeline Masquelier writes that young Mawri men in Dogondoutchi, Niger “are feminized by their inability to 
forge an assertive and productive masculinity through proper marriage. They have not yet moved away from the 
domain of female authority” (2005, 60). While to some degree this description holds true for intellectually disabled 
young men in Jordan, infantilization and feminization are not necessarily coterminous. In other words, remaining at 
home does contribute to the infantilization of intellectually disabled young men, and they do experience 
feminization through their association with the need for continued protection and care. But the families and 
specialists involved in the lives of intellectually disabled boys and young men are also very concerned with teaching 
them to demonstrate normative markers of masculine gender identity. 
153 My own status as an unmarried would have also played a role in marking this topic as inappropriate. 
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male infertility” (Inhorn 2007, 39). Many of Inhorn’s male interlocutors explicitly implicated 
women, and especially their mothers, as contributing factors in the tormented relationships they 
developed with masturbation. For example, Inhorn describes a conversation with one man 
struggling with infertility who asserts: 
Arabs don’t have a reasonable attitude toward sex. The problem is, the mothers 
are always telling their children, especially in the Muslim community, ‘This is no 
good. Haida haram! [i.e. this is sinful].’ Just to think about sexual matters is 
wrong… So, in cases where I would have an erection as a teenager, I wouldn’t 
know what to do, because I wasn’t taught. (2007, 44) 
In my own research, while some mothers did express a belief that masturbation was haram, 
others drew on medical or biological arguments to frame masturbation as something natural, 
albeit subject to strict regulations.  
During a mother’s support group in east Amman, for instance, one mother asked how she 
could prevent her son from masturbating. The special education professor brought in to lecture 
on the topic of adolescence (al-murāhaqa) launched smoothly into an explanation that 
masturbation was completely natural and probably practiced by all male teenagers. Their 
responsibility as mothers, the professor continued, was to teach their sons where masturbation 
was acceptable and what to do afterwards– that is, how to properly wash one’s body and deal 
with soiled clothes. She then added that too much free time could increase the frequency of a 
boy’s masturbatory practices. If one’s son masturbated excessively, the first question to ask 
oneself should be, “Why does he have all this free time in his room alone?!” I attended 
discussions in more than one group setting where expert speakers themselves introduced the 
topic, emphasizing the practice as natural and normal (ṭabīʿī), not inherently problematic.  
Although this framing did not convince everyone, the matter-of-factness with which women 
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much older than myself would easily segue into talk of masturbation suggests a certain quality of 
mundane pervasiveness.154  
Imm Farid supported and advocated for her youngest son at a time when almost no 
medical or educational services were available to him and public discussions of disability rights 
were rare. Sitting in the courtyard outside their home, enjoying a long snack of juice, coffee, and 
melon before family lunch, I asked Imm Farid about her views on hysterectomy for girls with 
Down Syndrome. Completely reversing Imm Maryam’s denunciation of hysterectomy as haram, 
Imm Farid considered surgery the best course of action.  
I support it, and so does Islam. If my daughter had Down Syndrome, I would have 
to remove her uterus. It’s better for her, and it’s better for her mother. If she got 
her period it would be such a challenge. Let her be comfortable (khalīha tirtāḥ).155 
And girls have sexual desires more than boys; that has been proven, scientifically. 
With a boy, you need to look out for him 24 hours a day, so imagine how much 
harder is it to look after a girl? You need to be even more on guard. 
Her position regarding boys, however, was quite different. 
When there is a boy, I am against the idea of a mother going to a doctor for 
medicine to lower his sexual desires. Because it of course affects him… So it’s 
wrong that the mother of a son who has Down Syndrome then causes him to 
suffer from another condition. It is wrong that a mother with a boy with Down 
syndrome should have to have even more problems. It is his right to live his life.  
Imm Farid did not invoke the principle of la darar wa la dirar (no harm can be inflicted or 
tolerated) that Hamdy discusses in her work. Nevertheless, she drew on logic closely resembling 
this principle and reasoned herself to a conclusion opposed to that of the scholars who issued the 
fatwa. The removal of the uterus, she argued, did not constitute harm. In fact, from her 
                                                
154 Indeed, Inhorn acknowledges a wide variety of positions on masturbation in Islamic thought, including practical 
arguments that view masturbation as preferable to illegitimate sex and as biologically beneficial (Inhorn 2007; see 
also Khuri 2001). 
155 This instrumental, largely negative view of menstruation was something I encountered throughout my research. 
When gauging opinions about hysterectomy among friends unconnected to my project, many described a period as 
oppressive and completely useless if one did not plan to or could not have children 
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perspective, it introduced benefits for both mother and daughter (the primary benefit being not 
having to deal with menstruation). Administering libido-reducing medicine, however, would 
introduce additional harm by negatively affecting the overall health of a boy/son– and note she 
did not use the word man (rajil). Consequently, she could not sanction such an intervention.  
Imm Farid assumed that mothers and daughters share the burdens of menstruation and 
thus would share the benefits of its cessation. In this utilitarian framework, menstruation 
becomes an embodied but also disposable nuisance in the absence of a marital future, nature 
made strange through circumstance. Regarding males, however, a different situation emerges 
because, Imm Farid explained, “a boy grows up. I mean, it is no problem, teach him to go to the 
bathroom. That’s his right to get his sexual desires out of his body. Watch out for him. Teach 
him go into the bathroom, to wash and clean himself; this is normal. But he cannot do it in front 
of people!” Describing masturbation as something easily contained and managed by the 
individual male subject, Imm Farid’s stance reflects her broader assumptions about male and 
female bodies, sexuality, and subjectivity, as well as the potential shifting sensitivity of these 
topics. While discussions about sons registered both self- and other-oriented expressions of 
heteronormative desire, similar discussions about daughters emphasized other-oriented 
expressions of heteronormative desire and were far less physical in nature. The vulnerability that 
parents impute to disability, and the sexuality associated with adolescence, shapes how young 
men and women inhabit their gendered identities. These identities change over time and become 
clearest in relation to an adult status largely denied to them.  
VII. Gendering vulnerability and aggression 
Imm Fadi is a retired tourism sector employee who lives in an affluent suburb of west 
Amman with her husband and Fadi, the youngest of her three children. She described to me the 
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onset of Fadi’s puberty as a dramatic rupture that ultimately affected her whole family’s 
wellbeing. She recalled that when he was young:  
We didn't feel like we had a disabled child at home, because we treated him like a 
normal child. And from birth to 15 years, everything was normal… [Then] he 
turned 15. Of course in the Arab World, you know that matters of the body and 
sexuality, to be frank… It's not that it's forbidden to talk about it. There's started 
to be more discussion about it. But, it's not honest, and it's not enough. And a 
mother, of a disabled son, can expect that at adolescence there will be hormonal 
changes. 
Imm Fadi followed this introduction with an abrupt change of topic. “One day he went to al-
Markez [a very expensive and exclusive special education center located in west Amman], and 
he refused to get off the bus.” I later realized that this particular memory stood out for Im Fadi as 
a turning point. It marked the onset of behavioral and affective changes in her son – anger, tics, 
and aggressive outbursts – that she connected to one particular issue. “The main problem we 
have is the bathroom. The masturbation influences his mind. We don't forbid him from entering 
the bathroom, but when he starts, our routine changes, and then there's conflict.” The bathroom 
became a metonym for the disruptiveness of puberty.156  
Fadi’s family eventually turned to medicine to control his behavior, both “the bathroom” 
and the physical outbursts Imm Fadi described as increasingly common. The introduction of 
pharmaceuticals into his daily routine, however, caused further problems. Fadi began having 
seizures, which his doctors sought to control through even more medication. This escalating 
cycle of medications and side effects unfolded exactly as Imm Farid feared it would, with drugs 
                                                
156 Michael Gill (2015) criticizes the trope of the threatening, excessively masturbatory intellectually disabled 
person, which reflects an ableist refusal to acknowledge people with intellectual disabilities as sexual beings, let 
alone as having rights to sexual expression. I find Gill’s analysis somewhat problematic in its depiction of the 
sexuality and sexual activities of nondisabled persons as somehow outside the realm of power and unrestrained by 
disciplinary measures. That being said, the implications of this trope certainly should be kept in mind during the 
mother-centric narratives I discuss.  
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creating new problems and causing additional harm.157 On the one hand, Imm Fadi depicted her 
son’s masturbation as excessive, but she also tied this excess to vulnerability. She wondered 
aloud whether Fadi had learned to masturbate at the special education center she sent him to.  
Imm Farid and Imm Fadi both describe intellectually disabled men as especially 
vulnerable. At one point Imm Farid recalled a memory from many years ago when she brought 
Farid on the bus with her to visit family in Aqaba. Upon boarding, Imm Farid had to deal with 
the reactions of fellow passengers, who initially tried to physically shield their children from 
looking at or interacting with her son. “I would tell them that he’s not aggressive (huwweh mish 
‘udwānī!), that he loves other people, that he loves music. He’s not aggressive!” At the mention 
of aggressiveness, her daughter-in-law Jumana, who had joined our lunch date since she lived in 
the same family compound, jumped into the conversation: 
Jumana: There is a girl named Aziza who sexually harassed Farid, but Farid 
understands that there are body parts where it is not allowed for others to put their 
hands on. He was very polite with her, and he came to tell us what happened.  
IF: Aziza came and held his hand, and he would tell her that this is not allowed… 
Haram, haram! I told him to hit her. He told me that he couldn’t do that because 
it’s not right. {She chuckled}. I told him to not let anyone come close to his pants 
or to his underwear. I told him to punch anyone that gets close to him there. 
Jumana: It is good that he is aware. They try to take advantage of him 
(yistagalūhu), but he is very careful. 
IF: When Farid walks, he walks like this [imitates someone with their arms tightly 
at their sides and their gaze lowered] and says excuse me so that he can pass. His 
siblings take care of him and teach him.  
                                                
157 Farid was not the only young man with Down Syndrome I met who was on pharmaceutical regimes to control 
obsessive compulsive behaviors and psychological problems. When I returned in 2016, a new arrival to the young 
adult program had several doctors in his family who prescribed him multiple medications to control his tics and 
outbursts. They were, one staff member told me, “destroying his brain.” 
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I smiled at this description because it so accurately captured Farid’s bodily habitus. He was 
extraordinarily conscientious while navigating the mostly female space of the Society, always 
careful to employ exaggeratedly deferential physical gestures exactly as his mother conveyed.  
Farid’s mother and sister-in-law described Aziza as predatory and Farid as vulnerable. 
Aziza, who was the same age as Farid, frequently articulated her desire to find a boyfriend, much 
to the concern of her family. Once, at an event very early on in my fieldwork, a volunteer 
coordinator who knew Aziza well from the special education center she had attended for years, 
asked me to monitor her and another young man with Down Syndrome. She wanted to “keep 
them from flirting.” I was caught off guard by this request and wrote in my fieldnotes about how 
uncomfortable I felt being tasked with policing the social interactions of two individuals older 
than myself. I watched Aziza and the young man in question, Hassan, happily and perhaps 
flirtatiously chat with each other; they made sure to stay a chair’s distance apart the entire time. I 
also witnessed Aziza actively express her own concerns about maintaining local moral standards. 
When she attended events where music and dancing occurred, she did not partake and once 
chastised her friend Lara, only five years her junior, for shaking her hips too suggestively.  
According to his family, Farid felt that Aziza crossed a boundary when she tried to hold 
his hand. “He came to tell us what happened,” in Jumana’s words. But this boundary was tied to 
an internalized understanding of his body as completely off limits. Farid’s family entertained the 
possibility of him experiencing natural sexual desires, but only so long as they remained self-
directed. These desires ceased to be acceptable once they involved another partner. When Imm 
Farid described her son’s tight and restricting body language in the presence of women, she 
expressed this as a positive evaluation; this was how men should act, although many do not. In 
local constructions of masculinity, aggression can be potentially positive but in excess becomes 
  193 
reframed as backward and un-Islamic (Hughes 2017). The stereotype that people with 
intellectual disabilities are inherently more aggressive than those without also contributed to 
many families’ anxieties about how their children will be perceived. Imm Farid criticized Aziza 
for being sexually aggressive and less capable of controlling her sexual desires while praising 
Farid for his lack of aggression and visible demonstration of modesty and obedience. While 
seemingly an inversion of gender norms, these characterizations actually draw from and 
reinforce normative depictions of feminine sexuality as exceedingly dangerous, and women as 
less naturally capable of self-control (Abu-Lughod 1986; Mernissi 1975). 
Imm Farid was not the only mother who contrasted her son with Down Syndrome to a 
dominant yet morally flawed ideal of (hyper) able-bodied masculinity. Imm Sami lives in a 
working-class neighborhood of Amman where many Syrians displaced by the war have found 
housing. She spoke highly of 18-year old Sami’s moral character. 
He is not aggressive, nor does he get upset easily or cry. He was very sweet, and 
he still is. Even if he were to stay at home for the entire day, he doesn’t go outside 
the house. I keep telling him to go outside and play, and he doesn’t respond. I 
keep telling him until he goes. He loves silence and to sit at home, and he loves 
organizing the house, and watching TV and writing….  The neighbors’ children 
play with him, but they don’t accept him. They want him to be aggressive like 
them, but he doesn’t like to be like that.  
Both Sami’s mother and father praised his lack of aggression and emphasized his conscious 
decision to “not to be like that.” Later on, Imm Sami, continuing to reflect on Sami’s good 
qualities added that, “We’ve taught him what is haram, what is ʿayb, what should not happen. 
We’ve taught him not to harass girls. Even his teachers in Syria stopped letting him greet them 
by handshake when he turned 10 years old, and until now he doesn’t greet [women with his 
hand].” His father chimed in with a smile, “he just dances.” Imm Sami concurred; “Yes he 
dances, but he doesn’t greet [women]!”  
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Sami was clearly invested in this ideal of modesty. On a previous outing I sat behind him 
and another teenage boy – placed into the special education system due to severe learning 
disabilities – while riding a bus on a spring outing. Sami’s companion turned around to first stare 
at me. Then he began to ask me questions about myself. Sami followed suit, turning around to 
observe our interaction. Once his seatmate had both my and Sami’s attention, he leaned over to 
Sami and whispered something in his ears, presumably a comment of the sort teenage boys 
whisper to each other when in the presence of young women. Sami looked at me and then looked 
back at his friend and exclaimed haram! He sat down and stared straight ahead for the remainder 
of the car ride, ignoring his seatmate’s requests to rejoin the conversation or at least engage him 
in sidebar chatting. 
From the minute he got home from his job as a car mechanic, a thankfully translatable 
skill that allowed his family to survive under precarious circumstances,158 Abu Sami sat with us 
and actively contributed when he heard a question that piqued his interests.  He shared his wife’s 
concerns about their son’s vulnerability. Sami had previously secured employment at a popular 
local restaurant chain, but eventually his parents grew uncomfortable because they felt his bosses 
were exploiting him. They also worried about the influence other employees might wield over 
their son. Abu Sami elaborated vaguely. “He might not always realize things. For example, if 
someone told him, ‘Let’s go and get something,’ he might go with that person. Those are the 
worries that we and others have for them; that someone will take advantage of him.” Imm Sami 
confirmed this general fear of exploitation. “When he was in a restaurant, for example… We 
always told him not to take anything from anyone, even water. He brought his water from home. 
Even the restaurant manager asked us why we sent him with water, and I told him so that no one 
                                                
158 The vast majority of Syrian refugees live outside of the designated refugee camps of Zaatari, Azraq, and Emirates 
Jordanian (UNHCR 2018). 
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will take advantage of him or harass him.” Sami’s parents feared his inability to manage the 
relationships of hospitality and reciprocity that form the core of Jordanian social life, protection 
and isolation emerging in equal parts. 
Unlike Imm Farid, however, Imm Sami did not view masturbation as something normal. 
While talking about Sami’s commitment to piety, prayer, and his refusal to shake women’s 
hands, she commented, “Everything just needs its own warning. Even if they want…” She 
paused and got quiet. “Other things… you know what I mean,” her voice dropping a bit lower.  
So that they don’t make it a habit, we tell him that it is haram. One of the mothers 
told me that she was jealous of me because I was able to make my son understand 
that… We worry about him, but we watch him closely.  
While Imm Farid acknowledged her son’s sexual desires but sought to keep them self-directed, 
Im Sami sought to suppress her son’s urges entirely. Neither woman, however, embraced the 
possibility that her son might eventually get married. 
VIII: Marriage matters 
Many families refuse to consider the question of marriage, while others invest a great 
deal of imaginative and practical labor in maintaining this vision of a possible future. Family 
members support or oppose marriage with a variety of arguments. Some families see in marriage 
a vision of their child’s future security, happiness, and companionship. Many of those opposed 
offer materialist arguments against marriage, pointing to the expenses and work that maintaining 
a household economy requires. Other arguments focus on the intellectual and emotional 
requirements that a sharʿī (meaning both religiously legitimate and legal) marriage entails. Still 
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others use the issue to critique a local “obsession” with marriage and to point out that moral 
personhood in a properly Islamic society should not hinge on marital status.159   
Imm Farid and Imm Sami voiced similar objections to the desirability and feasibility of 
marrying their sons. Abu Sami, however, openly disagreed with his wife. When we began to talk 
about the “future,” Sami’s parents oriented themselves differently in time and space. For Imm 
Sami, the future marked a space of painful uncertainty, linked to their status as refugees in a 
country that they felt was difficult and inhospitable. After prefacing her statement by declaring 
that her faith in God was greater than her fear of the future, Imm Sami went on to describe the 
impossibility of returning to Syria, the toll that living in a state of ghorba (homesickness) took 
on their wellbeing, and the strain of facing the endless hardships living of in Jordan. Abu Sami, 
at this point in the conversation, asked his son to leave the room for a few moments. He then 
turned to me and said, “When you say future, are you asking if he will one day get married?” 
Without pausing to hear if this was in fact what I imagined, he continued, “I hope that I can 
marry him to a girl like him. But people tell me it is impossible.” He trailed off.  Imm Sami then 
interjected, disagreeing with her husband, and they began to argue:  
Imm Sami: No, I am against this. I am the first one to oppose this. 
Abu Sami: Why?! What is the reason? 
Imm Sami: So that he will not have a child like himself. Who will take care of him? 
Am I right? I am 60 years old and I take care of him. If he gets married to another 
girl like him, there will be two people that need to be taken care of. 
                                                
159 Whether parents would ever raise this critique with regards to a single adult child without a disability remains 
questionable. Marriage remains a key component of the transition to adulthood in Jordanian society, although trends 
and ideas about marriage are in fact changing (Adely 2016). For example, Jordanians are well aware that 
“westerners” tend to marry later. Many of the women and men I knew either connected this trend to the perceived 
moral deterioration of western society, approved of it as practical and necessary to succeed in today’s economy, or 
combined a paradoxical mix of both assessments. They recognized that similar trends had taken root in their own 
society, and these trends were subject to extensive debate (Hughes 2015). 
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Abu Sami: That doesn’t have to be the case. He doesn’t have to have children. But 
just so that he can learn to be responsible and have a life. Like other countries, where 
they try to have them depend on themselves and they have real work. When he sees 
his brother get married, he will ask why not him? And he will get sad and frustrated 
(bitḥizni nafsu wa bitdayi’). When he watches TV and sees two people in love, he 
watches them closely. He gets happy and laughs. 
Imm Sami: Yes, of course he has feelings and affections. He’s human! (ilu ‘awātif 
wa andhu mishā’ir. Huwweh insān!) 
Abu Rami: I hope that he will get married, even if they don’t do anything, just so that 
they can be two people together, so that they will be a family and have a house.   
Imm Sami articulated two major concerns. Echoing the doctors who support hysterectomy 
operations, she brought up the issue of Sami having a child “like himself,” a child he and his 
wife would not be able to care for. Aside from the question of children, however, a marriage “to 
another girl like him” would mean more work for Im Sami. Daughters-in-law are both expected 
and valued for their contributions to their mother-in-law’s home and personal wellbeing. Im 
Sami did not believe that a daughter-in-law with Down Syndrome could fulfill this role. To the 
contrary, Imm Sami would be the one required to prolong and expand her role as a caregiver in 
her old age.  
Imm Farid echoed these concerns when I asked her whether or not people with Down 
Syndrome in Jordan got married. She responded:  
If I wanted to marry [Farid], I would have to meet the girl’s parents and their 
financial situation would have to be very good. Because they [people with Down 
syndrome] have expenses for medicine and food... I am not able to take care of 
another like my son; it would be impossible. But if her [financial] situation was 
very good, and they take him for a month, and then I take him for a month, then… 
maybe.  
Imm Farid described the responsibility of caring for two adults with Down Syndrome as 
impossible (mustahīl). She did not foreground Down Syndrome itself but emphasized her 
material objections: food, medicine, expenses, and the implicit emotional and physical burdens 
  198 
that care work entails. Like Imm Rami, she anticipated that Farid marrying would culminate in 
the addition of another resident to her household, one for whom she would be expected to accept 
primary caregiving responsibilities and costs. That was a prospect she could not agree to. Imm 
Farid connected the limits of her domestic economy and issues of household governance to the 
larger political economy of caregiving in Jordan: 
We don’t need any problems… I would consider it ignorance (jahl) for us to 
marry them. Why? Why is it so important? Leave him alone. Let him be. Once, 
when these doctors from Switzerland came, they told us to let them get married. 
“It’s his life,” they said. You all provide him everything, but here it isn’t like that! 
Why would I marry him? To carry his burdens on top of my own (‘ibā’u fowq 
‘ibā’ī)? Should I ask his siblings [to help]? If the government helped a little and 
gave him a salary, I would get him married. But to make the whole thing my 
burden – it’s impossible. 
Families and experts often deployed accusations of ignorance (jahl) to critique local practices of 
shaming and stigmatizing disability. In this case, however, Imm Farid obliquely accused the 
Swiss doctors, authoritative and prestigious figures, of being ignorant. Their thoughtless 
promotion of marriage for people with Down Syndrome irrespective of local context and 
constraints marked them as the backward ones. She also pointed out the enduring connections 
between Farid and his siblings. The idea that siblings remain responsible for each other’s care is 
by no means novel or unreasonable (Joseph 19993). Parents understand, however, the 
precariousness of this sibling-dependent care, especially given the difficulties of making ends 
meet in contemporary Amman. They know they cannot rely completely on the generosity of their 
other children, as much as they hoped for it. 
Despite changes in betrothal practices and the criteria that make for a “good” match, 
marriage in Jordan continues to operate as a fundamentally communal process conceived in 
terms of collective wellbeing. That the decision to marry should ever lie solely in the hands of 
individuals remains cultural anathema among both Muslims and Christians in Jordan (Adely 
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2016). At the same time, the particular arguments parents marshaled for or against the marriage 
of their disabled children – and the anxieties these arguments indexed – reveal how sexual 
morality and constructions of disability are intimately intertwined. While in constant 
conversation with globally circulating rights discourses and productions (such as the UNCRPD), 
these constructions remain grounded in a local world where marriage is deeply connected to 
moral personhood, kinship politics, and resource distribution. 
IX. Unresolved conflicts 
For families who invest a great deal of time, energy and passion into advocating for their 
children’s rights to education, employment, and (more fundamentally) for respect and dignity, 
ambiguous adolescence and stalled adulthood present painful contradictions. One day, Farid 
returned home from the Society rather smitten with a female volunteer he had met. He went to 
his mother and showed her the girl’s picture on Facebook. She responded, as she had before in 
similar situations, first by pretending not to understand his desires and then by redirecting them. 
He started to ask me my opinion of her. I looked at her and asked him, “Who is 
that?” I understand what he wants, but I pretend that I don’t understand. He told 
me, “This one! I am asking you what you think of her.” I told him, “I don’t like 
her at all. She is very arrogant.” I told him that I didn’t like her at all, and that she 
was not pretty. He disagreed… I changed the subject so that he would forget and 
talk about something else. But there was a period when he would talk about it a 
lot.  
The inability to get married raises frustrating and unresolvable questions for people with 
intellectual impairments as they age. After one of many such conversations, Farid, visibly upset, 
asked his mother, “Am I sick? Is that why I can’t get married?”  
These struggles are by no means unique to people with intellectual disabilities in the 
Middle East. Reflecting on the life of her younger brother with Down Syndrome, feminist 
philosopher Sophia Isako Wong (2002) writes that, “nobody quite knows how to deal with the 
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idea of an individual with Down syndrome being sexually active, let alone having her own 
family” (107). Elaborating on this point, she continues: 
In this society, mentally retarded adults are caught in a double bind. They are 
pervasively treated like perpetual children misplaced into sexually mature bodies 
who should be carefully monitored and prevented from expressing themselves. 
Institutional structures as well as social norms restrain their sexual impulses. If a 
retarded person acts on her impulses, for example hugging a person she finds 
attractive, she’s punished by her parents or social worker for “inappropriately 
showing affection” and further restrained. If she learns to suppress her impulses 
and doesn’t show them, she’s considered asexual and therefore isn’t provided 
with opportunities to develop romantic companionship. (2002, 108) 
Given how strongly my interlocutors emphasized that Jordanian/Arab cultural values dictated 
families’ attitudes toward disability, they might be surprised by the degree to which the society 
in question, Wong’s hometown of Alberta, Canada, captures many of the tensions at play in their 
own lives.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
Families in Jordan imagine the future in terms of relationships between kin, and Down 
Syndrome emerges through these relationships. Imagined and feared futures loop back to shape 
the present in myriad ways, and in so doing, they shape Down Syndrome itself. The lineal 
relationships between parents – mothers in particular – and their children are usually central to 
these issues. With the passing of time, however, siblings become increasingly vital actors and 
sustainers of kinship futures. How do families imagine relationships yet to come and the roles 
they will play? Families cannot avoid, nor can they completely articulate, these futures, but they 
acknowledge the inevitability of death with a mixture of aspirational acceptance and practical 
concerns. Questions about care haunt the future, forcing family members to distinguish between 
what they can and should expect from their family members, especially as they contemplate 
generational transitions and transformations. To understand how the presence of death shapes 
these relationships of care and futurity, one must consider notions of morality and personhood in 
Jordan, both of which are informed by shared notions of religious truth and commitment, albeit 
to varying degrees. The pivotal concepts that hold together these elaborate dynamics – namely, 
ambivalent inheritance and kinship futures – are in turn situated in relation to larger disability 
worlds. My interlocutors and I interacted as fellow inhabitants of these worlds, not as total 
strangers, and many of the people I worked with most closely understood my research as one 
moral project among many others, and they incorporated me into projects of their own. These 
worlds continue to shift and expand into new territories, but they also face ongoing challenges in 
the form of local and regional circumstances that undermine their security. 
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I. Maintaining moral accountability: ‘ajr and hisāb 
 Imm Tariq lives in an upper-middle class neighborhood of west Amman. She left her 
native Iraq over 20 years prior to my meeting her. Her family members live scattered across the 
globe, in Europe, Canada, and the United States and keep in touch primarily through a giant 
family WhatsApp group. Ten-year-old Tariq, the youngest of Imm Tariq’s three sons, has Down 
Syndrome. As we sat drinking coffee in the salon of their family home, Imm Tariq and I 
discussed various facets of life – the superiority of Iraqi cuisine, the ṣadma she experienced on 
learning of Tariq’s Down Syndrome, and her dream of one day opening a nature-based therapy 
program for intellectually disabled children and adults. She lamented Amman’s sprawling urban 
landscape, which she described as a negative influence on one’s psychological health and 
wellbeing. Imm Tariq described her son as a person like every other human being: (huwweh 
insān).  
He doesn't understand that anything is different about him. He’s a human being, 
and we have to treat him as such! And that he has a right to live his own life. 
Right? This is important. Religious experts tell you, "Take care of him. Watch out 
for him. He will take you to heaven… I once asked a religious woman (daʿiyya) 
about this… She told me that he is a path to God, a path to heaven (tarīq li-l-
janna). 
The idea that a disabled child creates a path to heaven – and I use the word child to signify a kin 
relationship rather than an age or category – emerged repeatedly throughout my research. Recall 
that Imm Samira, introduced in Chapter Two, responded quite strongly when her friend Alia 
mentioned some Muslims might understand disability as a curse. “Habībtī!” she replied. “How 
could Samira be a punishment? She is my path to heaven. She is proof that God loves me. She is 
mine and of me.”  
What does it mean to be a path to heaven? How is this path created, and for whom? I 
asked Imm Tariq as much. 
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This phrase means that – look, a disabled person doesn't come to just any family. 
That’s not how it works. This is a test from God. He's telling you, "This person 
needs care. This person has needs. Are you going to provide for him?”... It’s like 
with normal children! Normal children are also a trust from God (amānah). It’s 
the same thing… This sends you to heaven. That is the meaning. 
Like in Hamdy’s discussion of the body and ethics of organ donation ( Hamdy 2008, 2009, 
2012), Imm Tariq identified children as a trust (amānah) from God. While children are “of” their 
parents, to take from Imm Samira’s words, they ultimately come from God. This godliness 
intensifies in the case of disabled children, whose needs increase the rewards (ʿajr) gained 
through the good deed of providing care.160 Amira Mittermaier encountered a similar sentiment 
among young people participating in community service initiatives in Egypt, who frequently 
reminded each other “the poor don’t need us; we need the poor. They’re our gate to paradise” 
(2014, 524). This logic does not fit within a humanitarian or even a humanist justification for the 
work they undertake; it concerns matters of life – and death – beyond the human.  
Many of the volunteers in Mittermaier’s research, like many parents entrusted with 
providing care and raising a disabled child, understand themselves as fulfilling a duty to provide 
for others in order to maintain their relationship with God. Yet the provision and continuing need 
for care does not fully account for what makes intellectually disabled persons unique and 
particularly valuable within this spiritual economy. As Imm Tariq’s explanation above makes 
                                                
160 In his typological study of benefit granting in Islam, Kazuo Ohtsuka (1988) notes that while thawāb definitively 
refers to rewards granted in the afterlife, ‘ajr ostensibly covers both rewards in this life or the afterlife (142-132). In 
everyday conversation, however, my interlocutors primarily used the term ‘ajr, rather than thawāb, but they 
explicitly connected ‘ajr to entering heaven. I have not encountered distinctions between ‘ajr and thawab in 
ethnographic research, with anthropologists appearing to define both as “reward” (Atia 2013; Deeb 2006; Schielke 
2009). I once asked my friend Rania to explain the difference between hasanāt and ajr to me. After laughing and 
exclaiming that this was an odd question, I explained that I often heard people discuss both, and I wondered whether 
they were the same thing. Rania answered definitely in the negative. She did, however, equate ajr and thawāb as 
things you need to enter heaven. Hasanāt, by contrast, were good deeds that could help you at heaven’s door, but 
they were not as important as mandatory requirements like fasting. Fasting gives you ajr. Donating to a good cause 
gives you hasanat. After providing this distinction she paused, “maybe I should check the Internet, just to be sure.” 
Her Internet search, however, was inconclusive, and we moved on to other topics. 
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clear, all children are blessings from God, and caring for any child increases one’s ʿajr. So the 
difference at hand is not one of kind but one of degree. It is nevertheless significant. This is 
because many family members and professionals believe that intellectually disabled persons do 
not hold accounts with God (mā yuhāsibū). In other words, they do not, nor will they ever, need 
to worry about committing sins and accruing ʿajr – they are already guaranteed a spot in heaven. 
The embodiment of ‘aql, which is central to assessments and performances of adult personhood 
in Jordan, plays a role in how people with Down Syndrome embody this non-accountability. 
While investing intellectual disability with a particular kind of value, this framing 
nevertheless comes at a cost. The non-accountability that makes intellectually disabled persons 
valuable also makes them vulnerable. Not having an account means that family members and 
caretakers in turn became even more accountable, justifying the close surveillance and 
restrictions they impose on intellectually disabled kin, especially as they age out of childhood. 
The more valuable one becomes in defining closeness to God, the more risk one poses to 
reputation and individual accounts of kin. ʿAjr and hisāb provide insights into aspects of 
personhood and agency that emerge through hierarchical, nonsecular relationships where matters 
concerning the afterlife shape everyday, interactional aspects of disability. But the inevitability 
of death intrudes into families’ everyday realities in other ways as well. To reiterate, families do 
not necessarily describe the economies of care that shape their futures in terms of Islam, but 
caring well for family makes one a good Muslim. The moral economy of care in Jordan 
possesses spiritual dimensions, but it is equally thought of in terms of the fragile exchanges and 
debts between kin. 
  205 
II. Fraught transitions: continuing care 
Parents and siblings fear for the future in terms of questions of care that loom in the 
distance. Hana’s mother occasionally became distressed when thinking about the future, asking 
her daughter, “‘If I die, and your father dies, what will happen with Jamil?" Hana usually 
responded by trying to problematize the nature of the question itself. “We don't know. Maybe I 
will die first! It's not always the older generation that dies first,” she added somewhat ominously 
to me. “Of course, I fear the future, for everything in my life. We can't think too much about the 
future because it makes life hard.” One dimension of Hana’s critique speaks to the moral 
implications of fearing the future. As a good Muslim, Hana tried to remind her mother and 
herself that that the future belongs to God. But Hana’s avoidance of her mother’s plea also 
reflects how young people in Jordan today cannot rely on the normative trajectories imagined 
through kinship futures. Across the Middle East, displacement, war, and poverty continue to 
disrupt and demolish family and generational cycles, and “it’s not always the older generation 
that dies first.” Perhaps more importantly to Hana, her mother’s fears center on Jamil. Hana, in 
turn, re-centers these fears to acknowledge her concerns about her own life. As a young woman 
living in her parents’ home, Hana also has to wonder about what will happen to her after her 
parents die. 
 Like Hana’s mother, Imm Fadi spoke openly about how she feared for her youngest son’s 
future. Fadi’s turbulent transition to adolescence exacerbated his mother’s concerns about 
providing for him in the future and who, besides her, would be capable of doing so. On the one 
hand, she worried about Fadi’s safety and happiness, and she dreaded the possibility that he 
would eventually live in some sort of residential center. On the other hand, she expressed equal 
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concern about asking any of her children to commit to caring for Fadi after she passed. In 
describing these anxieties, Imm Fadi situated herself within a transnational disability community.  
Now I'm thinking about his future… it's not just us thinking about the future. I 
opened Youtube and I saw that many families - even in Britain - have fears about 
the future of their children with Down Syndrome. In Britain, some families… 
marry their children with Down Syndrome. But, even with marriage, they need 
supervision from the mother and father… In Britain [people with Down 
Syndrome] are educated, and they can work, but they still need a mother or father 
supervising their routine... So the mothers [there] suffer, and we mothers suffer 
too.  
Turning to the Internet to conduct her own research, Imm Fadi noted that futures everywhere 
seem fraught with tension. Even in Britain, where marriage, education, and work are possible 
(unlike, she sought to imply, in Jordan), questions of guardianship, care, and supervision endure, 
and they are linked to the burdens of mothers.  
Sibling relationships in the Middle East have been used to theorize gender, patriarchy, 
and power (Joseph 1994; Joseph and Slyomovics 2011; Kaya 2010; Moallem 2005), kinship and 
statecraft (Jean-Klein; Peteet 2010), complexities of artificial reproductive technologies (Clarke 
2007), and theories and practices of kinship more broadly, especially through practices of milk 
kinship (Al-Torki 1987, Guindi 2012; Holy 1989; Clarke 2007). Less attention, however, has 
been given to the practical forms of care and accountability that link siblings across time, 
especially in caring both for aging parents and for each other after parents die. As she considered 
her children’s possibly connected futures, Imm Fadi felt deeply troubled by her options. “For 
me,” she said, “as long as I'm alive, my son will stay with me. I will care for him at home. After 
that... I tell his siblings - this is your choice. At that time, you do what's appropriate… They 
shouldn't carry guilt.” Imm Fadi paused for a second, digesting the weight of the words that hung 
in the air. “But Insha’allah no. Insha’allah. We'll leave it to God. We'll leave it to time.” 
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Although Imm Fadi tried to reconcile herself to the idea of leaving this choice to her other 
children, the implications for Fadi’s future proved too unsettling.  
III. Disability worlds 
The moral, temporal, and social dimensions of intellectual disability in Jordan are 
manifest in how families encounter and negotiate Down Syndrome and other intellectual 
disabilities. The passage of time and nonsecular dimensions of temporality play key roles in 
shaping the meanings and experiences of disability in Jordan, which emerge through interlinked 
life paths shared by kin. I have used the notion of kinship futures to capture the collective and 
evolving nature of these dynamics. Disability, I argue, must be placed in the broadest possible 
context to be understood in its local iterations, while locality in no way implies isolation from the 
global and transnational circuits of ideas, alliances, and activism that the very word “disability” 
entails. Devlieger et al. introduce the notion of “disability cosmology” to capture, “the largest 
possible perspective on the making of disability worlds,” or the worlds “generated by 
experiences of disability” (Devlieger, van Hove, and Renders 2006, 77).161 Disability worlds can 
be multiple and contradictory, and they exist inside of, apart from, and enmeshed within non-
disabled worlds. This was true of my fieldwork, and I’d like to conclude by thinking through the 
implications of this complicated process of enmeshment. 
A different world 
During Ramadan, many of Jordan’s philanthropic and charitable organizations coordinate 
ifṭārs for people in need. I attended one such ifṭār in the city of Madaba, which was sponsored by 
                                                
161  Faye Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp titled their 2013 annual review piece “Disability Worlds,” but they do not 
contextualize the use of their term as an analytic.  “Inspired by the local and worldwide disability rights 
movements,” they write, we are increasingly convinced of the global importance of bringing disability perspectives 
to every domain of human life, recognizing the commonalities as well as differences among them” (2013, 62). 
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a national organization that focuses on addressing hunger in Jordan. To coordinate the event, 
they worked in conjunction with a local women’s society, providing basic meals and toys for the 
families in need who attended. My former landlord, Dunia, invited me to join her. She had 
convinced the father of a young autistic woman she met many years prior to send his daughter 
and her caregiver to attend the event, to give them a chance to get out of the house and celebrate. 
Dima was in her early twenties. She was non-verbal, quite tall, and extremely thin. She showed 
up with a water bottle in her hand, shaking it and observing the flows of water and light quite 
contently while wandering around the room. Her caregiver, Linda, sat in a chair while looking 
bored. They had arrived far too early and were the only two people in the gymnasium that 
doubled as a dinner hall.  
I went over to talk with Linda about her work and her life with Dima. Linda was 
originally from a small village near Irbid, and she had completed a B.A. in education. She rolled 
back the sleeves of her long black abaya and became more animated as she talked. She 
eventually secured a job in the special education sector, and at one point she worked in a center 
that served autistic children on the very northern edge of Amman. When the center announced 
they had a client looking for a full-time caregiver for his adult daughter, she jumped at the post. 
The salary was over double what friends made in the private special education sector. With her 
significant raise and bi-weekly trips back to her family in Irbid, Linda was extremely happy with 
her job. When she left to visit family, Dima’s father would come and take care of her. She 
described him as a good man who loved his daughter. But after the death of his first wife, he 
remarried, and Dima became an unwanted figure in the new marital home. “He’s not ashamed of 
her, or anything like that. When they host gatherings in the family diwan (meeting hall), he lets 
her wander around and stay by his side. But I’ve never met the second wife…” I asked Linda if 
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Dima had any friends. She gave me an incredulous look. “She knew her mother; she knows her 
father; she knows me; and she knows the gatekeeper (ḥāris). That’s it.” 
As I sat contemplating the dynamics of death, (re)marriage, and care that shaped Dima’s 
lonely life, other families began to arrive. For almost the entirety of my fieldwork, I worked in 
disability-centered spaces or met families in their homes. I rarely encountered firsthand the 
intense stigma and ostracism that families spoke about. This particular occasion, however, 
provided me with another perspective. People stared at Dima. Young girls stared and whispered. 
Mothers shot concerned glances her way and held their children closer. One woman, after 
watching Dima for a few moments, got up and relocated her whole family to a table farther away 
from where we sat. Much to her chagrin, Dima followed them, although this was only because 
they had relocated by the window, and Dima enjoyed the rays of sunshine. I walked over to join 
her, and she grabbed my hand without looking at me. We then walked back to Linda.  
At this point, Dunia arrived and joined us at our table. This officially made us the oddest 
table in the room – a woman in a wheelchair, an autistic woman shaking a water bottle 
continuously (stimming), and a clearly foreign guest. Dunia informed me that while the ifṭār was 
open to anyone in need, almost every family in attendance was raising at least one disabled child. 
Scanning the room and watching everyone stare back at us, she added, “If these families actually 
live with some sort of disability, and treat Dima like this, imagine what the families who have no 
experience with disability are like.” Then Dunia did something unexpected. She shouted out, 
“Hey everyone, this is Dima. She likes to move around a lot. This is something from God (shī 
min Allah). Everyone has their own issues. You can talk to her. You can call her name. She’ll 
respond. She understands.” Dunia’s announcement amounted to a watershed moment of sorts. 
Her tactic was not necessarily in Dima’s best interest. Dima dislikes loud noises, for one thing. 
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Dunia was correct, however, to insist that our audience recognize Dima’s capacities for response 
and communication, although she responds and communicates on her own terms and in ways 
that the other children and adults present might not have found familiar.  
Recognizing these issues, Dunia’s speech nevertheless moved Dima from the category of 
a threatening person to the category of a vulnerable person, and people began to engage with her. 
Eventually, more families arrived with members who embodied various kinds of disabilities. 
Dima, already made a less exceptional through Dunia’s intervention, became an even more 
mundane figure. The sun set, the food boxes were distributed, and everyone turned their attention 
to breaking the fast. It struck me, however, that this ifṭār lacked the sense of conviviality I had 
experienced elsewhere, such as during iftars held at the Society. The event’s somewhat fractured 
organization may have played a role in this. Regardless, each of the tables in the room ultimately 
felt like an island. Families did not engage each other through shared experiences of disability in 
the ways I frequently observed elsewhere. Needing a break from the post-dinner chaos of 
children receiving gifts and beginning to ride their sugar highs, I walked outside. There I ran into 
Inas, chain smoking and chatting with her friend Iyad and his brother. Both Inas and Iyad were 
physically disabled wheelchair users. They were part of the volunteer team that organized the 
meal. They asked me the usual questions about who I was and what I was doing in Jordan. “Let 
me tell you,” Inas started, “Jordan is the worst country in the world and in the Middle East to 
have a disability in. There’s no money and no infrastructure.” Almost simultaneously, we all 
glanced at the giant gaps between the curb and the parking lot, one of the many elements of the 
center’s completely inaccessible design. Inas invited me to visit her at work, and after some 
further chatting, we made our way back inside. 
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Cosmologies and cosmopolitanisms 
Dima’s story differs from most of the individuals I met through my research. In large 
part, this is due to the absence of her family, and especially her mother. Dima is the only child 
her mother gave birth to before falling ill and ultimately succumbing to cancer. Her father now 
lives with his second wife and their children. Essentially, Dima no longer belonged to a 
collective kinship future. Devlieger et al. propose the notion of cosmology to push studies of 
disability beyond an overwhelming focus on culture and identity and to recognize the greater 
stakes of disability as a form of being-in-the-world and disability as generative of worlds. But 
what really is a world? And is each person, or each experience of disability a world unto itself? 
The concept of cosmology, reflecting a desire to take the “broadest perspective possible,” allows 
us to see how disability generates and has the capacity to dramatically remake relationships. It is 
through these relationships that worlds are built or become imperiled. Most of the participants in 
my project understand themselves as connected and connecting through disability, and they 
struggle to wield this connectivity to nurture their collective needs and individual trajectories. 
The dissertation tracks the relationships – and moral risks – that families of disabled children 
create, as well as those they attempt to challenge. Over time, the relationships change, as do the 
risks. Down Syndrome itself is also changing and will continue to do so. This dynamism reflects 
evolving practices of care and expanding opportunities for persons with Down Syndrome to 
determine the meaning of the label applied to them. These capacities, in turn, open doors into 
other disability worlds. 
Almost all the families I met in Amman cultivated connections with disability 
communities both in person and online. In fact, most parents, and definitely all of the 
organizations I encountered, use and follow social media accounts more diligently than I do. 
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Social media facilitate engagements on a global scale, although these ultimately maintain clear, 
distinctly local goals and effects. “Down Syndrome Without Limits” (mitlāzamat Down blā 
hūdūd), for example is a public, Arabic language Facebook group with over 13,000 members, 
approximately .01% of whom I know personally. “We Have Down Syndrome, Our Lives Have 
Meaning” (mitlāzamat Down maʿānā, ḥayātnā lahā maʿnā) is an Arabic Language Facebook 
Community Page with 32,455 likes and 32, 287 followers. “Love Syndrome” (mitlāzamat al-
ḥubb), also a community page listed under the subcategory of “public figure,” features one 
young man in particular. Most of these communities are run by the family members of people 
with Down Syndrome – mothers, fathers, and siblings – who seek allies, friends, and 
connections, in the more instrumental sense of the words.  
 These pages prominently feature images. On some accounts, especially in the case of 
group or personal pages associated with schools, special centers, or individual family members, 
almost all of the photographs will feature actual members of the communities. Other popular 
images include stock photos or photos of individuals with Down Syndrome who have achieved 
some sort of pop culture status. These photos frequently have inspirational quotes pasted over 
them. One popular recurring meme features a smiling, nameless child with Down Syndrome, 
usually the same blonde boy or a brunette with pigtails, whose face is bordered by Arabic text in 
various fonts. The text has variations of the phrase, “you are beautiful but the eyes of your 
society are ugly.” In other cases, images or posts include biographical details about the specific 
person featured. For example, when Frank Stephens testified in front of Congress in the fall of 
2017 to advocate for increasing the NIH budget allotted to Down Syndrome (which is 
disproportionately limited given the prevalence of the condition), his face suddenly appeared all 
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over my newsfeed. His speech was translated into Arabic, with subtitles provided underneath the 
actual C-Span video or in a separate text on the side.  
Images do not always dominate online accounts. Some pages widely distribute 
information – primarily medical or rehabilitative in nature – about Down Syndrome. Others 
serve as message boards, with parents looking for advice on good schools, methods for 
discipline, or child-rearing techniques. Members will also share conflicts and awkward moments 
with society, as in the case of one woman from North Africa who described entering the post 
office and having to respond to an employee’s queries about what was “wrong” with her 
daughter. Thumbs up, hearts, and angry faces follow in torrents, and comment threads can climb 
to hundreds of messages long. Facebook walls and Instagram feeds enable connections between 
Arabic speakers living around the world and under extremely different circumstances, from 
Occupation in Palestine and revolution in Egypt to extreme wealth in the United Arab Emirates. 
They also enable connections with English-speakers around the world, and it is here that many of 
my interlocutors find their most provocative comparative material. If Down Syndrome 
everywhere consists of the same chromosomal signature, why do people with Down Syndrome 
live such different lives? How is it possible that a person with Down Syndrome in Switzerland 
can go to school, have a job, and get married, while in Jordan they are often consigned to severe 
disability and early death? These reality gaps create both hope and anger, speaking to the 
aspirations, inequalities, and immobilities that shape the production of cosmopolitan imaginaries 
and practices of identification (Appadurai 1996; Schielke 2012).  
Online connections allow me to continue communicating with interlocutors and observe 
evident shifts that nevertheless remain mysterious from afar. Friendships end, careers change, 
families move, crises occur, and achievements are celebrated. The use of social media across the 
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Middle East attests to shifting domains of public and private, although the online worlds I 
encountered remain structured by the same moral standards that exist offline as well. The 
increasing public-ness of piety intertwines with the emergent public-ness of disability, giving a 
distinctly religious tone to many of the interactions and depictions that occur online. Individuals 
and group pages post fatwas pertaining to intellectual disability and ask members for their 
opinions. One topic of persistent concern: fatwas relating to marriage for persons with Down 
Syndrome. This has been accompanied by a small, but nevertheless significant, increase in 
shared posts featuring young Arab couples with Down Syndrome getting engaged or married.  
Moral projects and (kinship) futures yet to come 
Throughout the dissertation I describe my interlocutors as both actors and targets of 
various moral projects. They largely saw me as an ally in such projects, although their 
contributions to my work have far surpassed any help or utility my presence might provide for 
them. Nevertheless, in thinking through the simultaneously global and particularly local 
dimensions of connectivity generated through disability, I often return to an early encounter in 
my fieldwork. The Society hosted a free dental clinic, and it gave me a chance to meet long-term 
members, as well as many newcomers drawn by the much-needed services. The dentist 
providing the free services, Lama, fled Syria at the start of the war. She first made her way to 
Beirut and then decided to settle in Amman. She asked what brought me to same city, and I 
began to describe my project. Lama became progressively more enthusiastic as I explained the 
details of my research. “We are all human,” she exclaimed, aptly summing up the core premise 
of the discipline of Anthropology. She then connected this statement to the goodness of God, 
whom she began to praise at some length. Imm Zahra, standing beside me, began to chuckle. 
“Christine is one of the least religious people you’ll ever meet.” The dentist, however, disagreed. 
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“Religion is in good works. God put us on the planet to be good to each other. We need each 
other. He doesn’t need us! But we need each other to understand each other and live with one 
another; this is being religious (hayy maʿnā al dīn).” Lama had no problem incorporating me into 
her own moral project, making my presence perfectly legible on her terms. 
 The children and adults with Down Syndrome I met during my research created worlds 
in and around themselves, but for these worlds to flourish they require commitment from and 
connections to kin. The possibilities of their worlds ultimately depend on their incorporation into 
kinship futures, and in cases of family conflict, they remain supremely vulnerable. Down 
Syndrome in Jordan will continue to unfold at the nexus of global ideas and local practices, on 
Facebook walls and in conference halls. Demographic pressures and worsening economic 
conditions will continue to have transformative, unpredictable effects on families, communities, 
and political dynamics in Jordan. As persons with Down Syndrome live longer and healthier 
lives, they will challenge families, neighbors, and society to engage in new debates over what 
defines normal and who gets to decide. In turn, broader shifts in marriage practices, economic 
mobility, residence patterns, religious engagement, and legal structures will shape and reshape 
what it means to be disabled and what kinds of impairments become disabling in Jordanian 
society. But not everything will change. The future will remain unknown. It belongs to God, and 
it depends on family. These truths, as they have already done, will continue to motivate family 
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